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MYRES S. MCDOUGAL DISTINGUISHED LECTURE
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
ILLEGALITY IN CONTEXT .................... Burns H. Weston 1
The University of Denver College of Law was honored to have Professor
Burns H. Weston, Professor of Law at the University of Iowa, as its guest
speaker for the eighth annual Myres S. McDougal Distinguished Lecture.
Professor Weston chose to address the topic of assessing the legality of nu-
clear weapons and warfare, and he notes it is the special obligation of law-
yers, "together with our clerical friends, to point up the normative rights
and wrongs of coercive nuclearism." In his remarks, Professor Weston ac-
knowledges that while there are no explicit treaties or treaty provisions
which render nuclear weapons illegal per se, there are six "core rules" appli-
cable to nuclear weapons which may be derived from the conventional and
customary laws of war. Having identified these six core rules, he then pro-
ceeds to analyze the potential ways in which nuclear weapons might be
used in terms of these rules. These ways include first defensive use, second
defensive use and threat of first or second defensive use. Professor Weston
concludes his remarks by stating that "almost every use to which nuclear
weapons might be put, most notably the standard strategic and theater-
level options which dominate United States and Soviet nuclear policy, ap-
pear to violate one or more of the laws of war that serve to make up the
contemporary humanitarian law of armed conflict, in particular the princi-
pal of proportionality."
ARTICLES
A GLOBAL SURVEY OF GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS
TO PROTECT CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS. Hector Fix Zamudio 17
The purpose of Professor Fix Zamudio's survey, which is a condensed ver-
sion of his masterful study in Spanish, LA PROTECCI6N PROCESAL DE LOS
DERACHOS HUMANOS (1982), is "to demonstrate the fact that within almost
every country of the world with an organized government, there exists some
means by which citizens may redress grievances of fundamental rights vio-
lations." The survey is divided into two parts. The first part concerns legis-
lative enactments, primarily constitutional provisions, and the judiciary,
and examines the conceptualization and classification of domestic instru-
ments, Anglo-American instruments, Latin American instruments, conti-
nental European instruments, and the Procurator of the socialist legal sys-
tems. The second part focuses on executive remedies and is examined
primarily through the Ombudsman model, which originated in Scandinavia.
Professor Fix Zamudio's overall thesis is that national institutions are more
promising than multinational institutions for the redress of fundamental
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rights violations, and he concludes that through this global survey, "we may
obtain a better perspective of the most effective and expedient means for
the protection and resolution of fundamental rights violations, namely the
pursuit of domestic remedies rather than the more idealistic and cumber-
some methods of external world pressure currently advocated." An Adden-
dum is attached to the article to update the reader on events transpiring
between authorship and publication.
LEGISLATIVE REFORM OF U.S. EXTRADITION STATUTES:
PLUGGING THE TERRORIST'S LOOPHOLE ... William M. Hannay 53
Mr. Hannay's basic contention in this article is that U.S. antiterrorist pol-
icy and U.S. antiterrorist law as set forth by current U.S. extradition proce-
dures are unacceptably inconsistent. The reason for this inconsistency is
the absence of legislation dealing with extradition procedures, which ab-
sence has resulted in a situation in which "recent U.S. court rulings have
appeared to put the imprimatur of our judicial system on the violent acts of
terrorists who have no respect for human life, for democratic process or for
the Rule of Law." Mr. Hannay gives an overview of these cases as well as of
legislation, developed in cooperation with the Departments of State and
Justice, which would have transferred the standards for extradition from
the judiciary had it been passed during the second session of the 97th Con-
gress. Significant differences developed, however, between the House and
Senate versions of the bill, with respect to the "political offense" exception
to extradition treaty. Most of the article is spent analyzing the different
approaches to defining the "political offense" exception. Mr. Hannay sug-
gests that amendments proposed by the ABA's Section of International
Law and Practice, a copy of which is appended to the article, provide a
resolution of the issue. He concludes that the Senate's version "would be
entirely satisfactory if it is recognized that the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee has set forth the correct standard for interpreting "extraordi-
nary circumstances" [which goes to the reasonableness of committing the
political offense], if a new prohibition excluding terrorist attacks on civil-
ians is added, and if the American Bar Association's proposed amendment
is adopted. Such a statute will give courts the necessary tools with which to
separate the truly downtrodden from the merely dissatisfied, to distinguish
the rebel from the terrorist."
AN OVERVIEW OF COMPARATIVE
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ................... A. Dan Tarlock and 85
Pedro Tarak
Professors Tarlock and Tarak attempt "a brief comparative analysis of the
different [national] institutional responses to the various types of environ-
mental degradation." They begin their study by categorizing environmental
insults as episodic or periodic and then examining their legal consequences.
From there they turn to the factors influencing environmental protection
levels, which will vary from country to country, in terms of industrializa-
tion, political organization, political idealogy and opportunities for public
influence. Following this, they examine the costs and benefits of the two
basic legal strategies to control environmental insults: private actions and
public actions. In addition to judicial actions, they devote attention to pub-
lic regulation by legislation, exploring how policy is formulated and how
institutional and/or general arrangements are created to regulate the envi-
ronment. They conclude that all nations, despite their internal differences,
should incorporate three essential features in their environmental protec-
tion policies. The first is for an arm of the central government to have an
exclusive mandate, the second is that such arm have "the power to decide
how pollution costs are to be allocated as between public and private enti-
ties" and the third is the integration of values promoting environmental
goals must occur in the countrys' general policymaking processes.
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MYRES S. MCDOUGAL DISTINGUISHED
LECTURE
Nuclear Weapons and International Law:
Illegality in Context
BURNS H. WESTON*
It is a distinct pleasure-more than that-a great privilege to speak
tonight as this year's McDougal lecturer. I thank you for the invitation.
In my judgment, Myres McDougal is without peer among international
law scholars and jurisprudential thinkers in the Twentieth Century. He is
to the fields of international law and jurisprudence, I believe, what Albert
Einstein was to the world of physics: a man of seismic vision and conse-
quence. So it is for me a tremendous honor as well as pleasure to be here
tonight, speaking under his name. Not that Mac would agree with every-
thing I plan to say this evening; indeed, he sometimes thinks of me, I
suspect, as one of his black sheep, somehow gone astray. But if ever there
was a man willing to engage in honest disagreement and still call you a
valued friend and colleague, that man is Myres McDougal-provided, of
course, that you muster the intellectual wherewithal needed to make that
disagreement honorable and respected. Myres McDougal does not suffer
fools lightly.
Now in the interest of avoiding the fool's errand, let me say at the
outset that I harbor no illusions about the role of law and lawyers in rela-
tion to nuclear weapons and warfare. There is only so much any one con-
stituency, professional or otherwise, can do by itself. But relative to the
other professions, the legal profession can boast, I believe, at least three
comparative advantages when it comes to such matters of high state pol-
icy as that of nuclear weapons and warfare; and each merits at least brief
mention.
One is found in the realm of negotiation, mediation, conciliation, and
the like-the so-called table skills of agreement-making and conflict set-
tlement. Alan Sherr and others of us from LANAC (the Lawyers Alliance
*Burns H. Weston is Murray Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of Iowa
College of Law; Member, Consultative Council, The Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy;
Member, Lawyers' Alliance for Nuclear Arms Control [LANAC]; A.B., 1956, Oberlin Col-
lege, L.L.B. 1961, J.S.D. 1970, Yale Law School. This article is the text of the eighth annual
Myres S. McDougal Distinguished Lecture in International Law and Policy, presented at
the University of Denver College of Law in May of 1983.
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for Nuclear Arms Control) are hard at work exploring and promoting
such ways and means to minimize, if not altogether to eliminate, the
threat of nuclear war from the face of the earth.
Another especially lawyerly function-one, frankly, that goes much
too unsung these days-is the art of regime-building, of inventing and
constituting institutions and structures that are capable of coping with
major misfeasance of malfunction-for example, the twin diseases of mili-
tarism and nuclearism that now infest our planet. Lawyers, I believe, are
especially well equipped for what McDougal would call the constitutive
enterprise, although shamefully few are now seriously engaged in map-
ping out those alternatives to the present madness that realistically could
enhance our collective national and international security without endan-
gering our biological survival.
Finally, taking my cue from the religious communities (most conspic-
uously, perhaps, the Catholic Bishops) who with increasing unanimity
now condemn the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons as fundamen-
tally immoral and violative of our sacred traditions, there is the all-im-
portant business of rendering normative judgment-here, of assessing the
legality of nuclear weapons and warfare-and it is this function or com-
parative advantage I want to stress this evening. We lawyers, particularly
in the United States, are to a large degree the high priests of the secular
order, and for this reason we have an especial obligation, together with
our clerical friends, to point up the normative rights and wrongs of coer-
cive nuclearism. It is an obligation that is, I think, especially important in
an essentially voluntarist community, such as our present world commu-
nity, where one is well advised to emphasize the authority over the con-
trol component of international legal prescription lest the law be revealed
as merely or mainly the expression of the will of the strongest. The fox in
the chicken coop has somehow to be leashed.
I.
Permit me to begin, then, by first acknowledging that, despite the
aggravated mutilations we call Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which some rep-
utable scholarship says lacked military necessity, the world community
has yet to enact an explicit treaty or treaty provision that prohibits gen-
erally the development, manufacture, stockpiling, deployment, or actual
use -,nuclear weapons. Tus o imp-ant treaties prnhihit n-
clear weapons in Antartica, Latin American, outer space, and on the sea-
bed beyond the limit of the national territorial seas. The Partial Test Ban
Treaty outlaws the testing of nuclear weapons in outer space, underwater,
and within the earth's atmosphere (testing nuclear weapons is truly the
Devil's act, you see; you have to go underground). The United Nations
General Assembly has declared the use of nuclear weapons to be "a direct
violation of the Charter of the United Nations," "contrary to the rules of
international law and to the laws of humanity," "a crime against mankind
and civilization," and therefore a matter of "permanent prohibition."
And, in a much too neglected decision rendered almost twenty years ago,
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in the Shimoda Case, a Japanese tribunal felt compelled to condemn as
contrary to international law the only instance of actual belligerent use of
nuclear weapons to date, the United States bombings of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki. But the fact remains that, despite these various efforts to limit
resort to nuclear weapons, there does not yet exist a general treaty ban on
their use and threat of use.
Of course, this fact is not lost on those who defend the legality of
these weapons. Consistent with the traditional state-centric theory of in-
ternational legal obligation, which requires that prohibitions on interna-
tional conduct be based on the express or implied consent of States, they
rest their claim, in substantial part, on the proposition drawn from the
World Court decision in The Case of the S. S. Lotus; i.e., that States are
free to do whatever they are not strictly forbidden from doing. Indeed,
consistent with Cicero's oft-quoted maxim inter arma silent leges (in war
the law is silent), some go so far as to contend that nuclear weapons have
made the laws of war obsolete.
But surely this is not the end of the matter. While the lack of an
explicit ban may mean that nuclear weapons are not illegal per se, the
face is that restraints on the conduct of war never have been limited to
explicit treaty prohibitions alone. As stated by the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg in September, 1946:
The law of war is to be found not only in treaties, but in the customs
and practices of states which gradually obtained universal recognition,
and from the general principles of justice applied by jurists and prac-
ticed by military courts.
The law of war, like the whole of international law, is composed of more
than treaty rules, explicit and otherwise.
Well, taking my lead from the Nuremberg Judgment, I undertook
this last year to consider what the conventional and customary laws of
war had to say about our topic; and what I found were at least six core
rules that struck me as prima facie relevant:
first, that is is prohibited to use weapons or tactics that cause
unnecessary and/or aggravated devastation and suffering;
second, that is is prohibited to use weapons or tactics that cause
indiscriminate harm as between combatants and noncombatant mil-
itary and civilian personnel;
third, that is is prohibited to effect reprisals that are dispropor-
tionate to their antecedent provocation or to legitimate military
objectives, or that are disrespectful of persons, institutions, and re-
sources otherwise protected by the laws of war;
fourth, that it is prohibited to use weapons or tactics that cause
widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the natural
environment;
fifth, that it is prohibited to use weapons or tactics that violate
the neutral jurisdiction of non-participating States; and
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sixth, that it is prohibited to use asphyxiating, poisonous, or
other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials, or devices, includ-
ing bacteriological methods of warfare.
Of course, these humanitarian rules of armed conflict, as I choose to call
them, are general rules, and like all general rules, which are susceptible of
differing contextual as well as linguistic interpretation, they harbor ex-
ceptions. Also, each traditionally has involved, particularly the first three,
a balancing of the customary principles of military necessity and human-
ity, with "the line of compromise," as McDougal has written, tending to
be "closer to the polar terminus of military necessity than to that of hu-
manity." The relative tolerance heretofore extended to "scorched earth"
and "saturation bombing" policies and to incendiary and V-weapons, for
example, probably attests to this observation. Nevertheless, even after
subjecting these core rules to the sophisticated jurisprudence of New Ha-
ven, as I have attempted to do elsewhere for the purpose of determining
their precise jural quality, one may reasonably accept their pertinence to
nuclear weapons and warfare.
More precisely, one may reasonably reach the following three conclu-
sions about them: first, that they continue as a vital civilizing influence
upon the world community's warring propensities; second, that as con-
temporaneously understood, they are endowed with an authority signal
that communicates their applicability to nuclear as well as to conven-
tional weapons and warfare; and finally, that there exists on the part of
the world community as a whole, evidence-thankfully, more in words
than in deeds-an unmistakable intention to have them govern the use of
nuclear weapons should ever that terrible day arrive again. To be sure,
there is manifest an ambiguity about the extent to which this control in-
tention could in fact be fulfilled, and this ambiguity will persist as long as
the distribution of the world's effective power remains as oligarchic as it
now is. But it would be error to conclude from this ambiguity that there
is no prescription or law placing nuclear weapons and warfare under the
legal scrutiny of the humanitarian rules of armed conflict. Moreover, in
view of the horrifying and potentially irreversible devastation of which
nuclear weapons are capable, not to mention the very little time their
delivery systems allow for rational thought, it is only sensible that all
doubts about whether they are subject to the humanitarian rules of
armed conflict, as a matter of law, should be answered unequivocally in
the affirmative, as a matter of policy. Such a response seems mandated, in
any event, by a world public order of human dignity, in which, as McDou-
gal has repeatedly stated, values are shaped and shared more by persua-
sion than they are by coercion.
In sum, despite an erosion over the years of legal inhibitions regard-
ing the conduct as well as the initiation of war, there remains even in this
nuclear age an inherited commitment to standards of humane conduct
within which the reasonable belligerent can operate, a commitment to the
fundamental principle from which all the laws of war derive, namely, that
the right of belligerents to adopt means and methods of warfare is not
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unlimited. It is, I think, not unreasonable to contend that nuclear weap-
ons are illegal per se, within the terms of Rule 6 prohibiting the use of
chemical, biological, and "analogous" means of warfare. Perhaps not all
nuclear weapons conceivable, but certainly all nuclear weapons now
deployed or planned, including the so-called "neutron bomb" or "en-
hanced radiation" (ER) weapon and the "reduced residual-radiation"
(RRR) or "minimum residual-radiation" (MRR) weapon, manifest radia-
tion effects that for all intents and purposes are the same as those that
result from poison gas and bacteriological means of warfare; and, in any
event, the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol is so comprehensive in its prohibi-
tion that it may be said to dictate the nonuse of nuclear weapons alto-
gether. But in the absence of a specific prohibition, one is expected to ask
the same basic question that the conscientious belligerent is obliged to
ask -in any given conflict situation: Is resort to this means or method of
warfare proportionate to a legitimate military end?
II.
In most if not all nuclear warfare situations, the answer to this fore-
going question must be given, I believe, in the negative. It is hard to im-
agine any nuclear war, except possibly one involving a very restricted use
of extremely low-yield battlefield weapons, where this vital link between
humanity and military necessity, i.e., proportionality, would not be
breached or threatened in the extreme; and it is especially hard to imag-
ine in the face of the "countervalue" and "counterforce" strategic doc-
trines that underwrite the core of the nuclear deterrence policies of the
two superpowers. Considering the millions of projected deaths and uncon-
trollable environmental harms that would result from any probable use of
nuclear weapons, it seems inescapable that nuclear warfare is contrary to
the core precepts of international law.
But the point here is not to deal in generalities, important as the
generalities are. Rather, as my subtitle is meant to indicate, it is to inves-
tigate how and to what extent the humanitarian rules of armed conflict
actually operate in concrete nuclear weapons contexts. After all, if Myres
McDougal teaches us anything, it is that a proper appreciation af any
prescription, whether explicitly or implicitly formulated, cannot be had
without a conscious understanding of the "real world" contexts within
which it has to function.
Let us first be clear, however, about the overall issue we are address-
ing, which is to say not the lawfulness of using or threatening to use nu-
clear weapons as part of a campaign or single act of aggression (as that
term is defined in the 1974 United Nations General Assembly Resolution
on the Definition of Aggression). Whatever the exact legal status of the
Kellogg-Briand Pact and U.N. Charter article 2(4), particularly after the
deafening silence that greeted the 1980 Iraqi invasion of Iran, arguably an
act of aggression is unlawful irrespective of the kinds of weapons used,
nuclear or conventional. Thus, recalling the customary right of individual
and collective self-defense (now enshrined in U.N. Charter article 51),
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and noting that all the nuclear weapon states admit to no other rationale
for their arsenals, the question ultimately before us must be whether any
defensive use or threat of use of nuclear weapons may be considered con-
trary to international law, and hence prohibited. The issue subdivides,
first, in terms of the actual first- or second-strike defensive use of these
weapons for "strategic" or "tactical" purposes; and second, in terms of
the threat of their use by way of research and development, manufacture,
stockpiling, or deployment for any defensive use or purpose. It should be
understood, however, that "strategic" objectives and uses have been the
centerpiece of U.S. and Soviet deterrence policies since the late 1940s and
early 1950s when the nuclear arms race between them began. Indeed, de-
spite a growing interest on both sides in counterforce doctrine and capa-
bilities for damage limitation, the concept of "countervalue" or "assured
(societal) destruction" has served at least the United States as the princi-
pal rationale for its nuclear arms buildup ever since it began.
A. First Defensive Use of Nuclear Weapons
1. Strategic Warfare: Countervalue Targeting
Nuclear weapons designed for countervalue or city-killing purposes
tend to be of the strategic class, with known yields of deployed warheads
averaging somewhere between two to three times and 1500 times the fire-
power of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Further, they
are "dirty" bombs, capable of producing severe initial nuclear radiation,
spatially and temporally dispersed residual radiation (or radioactive fall-
out) and, in addition, wide-ranging electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effects.
Further still, their CEP ("circular error probable") currently averages
somewhere between 300 and 2500 meters (i.e., 0.3 to 2.5 kilome-
ters)-which is to say that they lack pinpoint accuracy. Thus, in addition
to violating the Rule 6 prohibition against chemical, biological, and "anal-
ogous" means of warfare, their capacity for violating all the other prohibi-
tory rules noted, and on a truly awesome scale, seems self-evident.
However, when evaluating this defensive option, what really matters,
in a certain sense, is less the fact that nuclear weapons would violate one
or another of the prohibitory rules mentioned than the fact that massive
nuclear warfare, as a defensive measure, would be unleashed most proba-
bly in response to a conventional warfqr.. . nrovocation. By any rational
standard, this would constitute a gross violation of the cardinal principle
of proportionality. Assuming even the so-called "worst-case" scenario,
e.g., a Soviet conventional assault against Western Europe or the oilfields
of the Middle East, where is the military necessity in incinerating entire
urban populations, defiling the territory of neighboring and distant neu-
tral countries, and ravaging the natural environment for generations to
come simply for the purpose of containing or repelling a conventional at-
tack? Surely a failure to provide for an adequate conventional defense or
to develop alternative energy sources does not excuse these probable re-
sults. If so, then we are witness to the demise of Nuremberg, the triumph
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of Kriegsraison, the virtual repudiation of the humanitarian rules of
armed conflict in at least large-scale warfare. The very meaning of "pro-
portionality" becomes lost, and we come dangerously close to condoning
the crime of genocide, as a military campaign directed more towards the
extinction of the enemy than towards the winning of a battle or conflict.
It is, of course, conceivable that a city-killing first strike might be in
response to a perceived but as yet unexecuted threat of nuclear at-
tack-an imminent one, we must assume. Indeed, it is conceivable that
the threatened attack would be equivalent in character. Thus, however
much the anticipatory or preemptive strike would run afoul of the rules
against aggravated and indiscriminate suffering (Rules 1 and 2 above), it
might nevertheless be argued to meet the test of proportionality in some
rough way. But the argument would be, I think, deceptive. A preemptive
strike of the sort contemplated here, particularly if surface bursts are in-
volved, still would inflict large-scale collateral harms beyond the place
and moment of immediate conflict. In addition to violating the Rule 6
ban on chemical, biological, and "analogous" weapons, it would likely vio-
late also the minimal safeguards extended to internationally protected
persons (Rules 2 and 3), the natural environment (Rule 4), nonparticipat-
ing neutral States (Rule 5), and consequently by these excesses would
strain severely the principle of proportionality. Moreover, to the extent
that U.N. Charter article 51 admonishes recourse to minimally coercive
and nonviolent modes of conflict resolution, including resort to the collec-
tive conciliation functions of the United Nations, a preemptive strike
probably would disproportionately violate Rules 1 and 2 as well. After all,
the threat still would be unexecuted. In any event, the principle of pro-
portionality surely would require that the burden of policy proof be
shouldered by those who would unleash the preemptive countervalue
strike, and that burden would be a heavy one considering the massive and
extended deprivation potentially involved. It is difficult to conceive of any
nuclear threat that could not be met by some lesser preemptive mode
-except, of course, in the case of foreign policies lacking in creative im-
agination and insensitive to the magnitude of the human values at stake.
2. Strategic Warfare: Counterforce Targeting
Involving the same strategic weapons with the same odious capabili-
ties relied upon for countervalue targeting, a counterforce first strike, like
a countervalue first strike, faces the test of proportionality with many
presumptions against it. Even if intended for essentially military targets
alone, it still would have far-reaching EMP and radiation effects that
could not be confined to the place and moment of immediate confronta-
tion, thus violating not only the Rule 6 ban on chemical, biological, and
"analogous" weapons but, as well, the rights of great numbers of innocent
and neutral-including distant-third parties both living and unborn.
And, howevermuch actually restricted to essentially military targets, it
still would consist of a massive nuclear retort to what likely would be only
a conventional war provocation.
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Concededly, because counterforce strategy is a policy of targeting the
military, especially nuclear, forces rather than the cities of the other side,
there is at least surface plausibility in the argument that a counterforce
first strike would not unduly trample upon the Rule 2 prohibition against
indiscriminate injury to noncombatant persons and property. Indeed, a
lure of counterforce doctrine is that it makes nuclear weapons more credi-
ble as instruments of war in part because, at least theoretically, it is less
subject to the legal and moral criticisms that can be leveled against
countervalue doctrine. The plausibility of this argument quickly vanishes,
however, when it is matched against the available data. An oft-cited Of-
fice of Technology Assessment study published in 1979, for example,
quotes U.S. Government studies indicating that between 2 million and 20
million Americans would be killed within thirty days after a countersilo
attack on United States ICBM sites, due mainly to early radiation fallout
from likely surface bursts. The test of proportionality is thus greatly
strained once again.
Indeed, when all the dynamics of an actual counterforce first strike
are taken into account, the test of proportionality seems to be abrogated
completely, particularly when the opposing sides are both nuclear powers,
as would likely be the case. In the first place, unless the counterforce at-
tack were an all-out "disarming first strike" aimed at the total incapacita-
tion of the enemy's nuclear forces (a highly unlikely achievement), it
would virtually guarantee retaliation and therefore greater and more
widespread devastation and suffering. Second, notwithstanding voguish
theories of "intra-war bargaining," "intra-war deterrence," and "con-
trolled escalation," it is highly improbable that the opposing sides would
or could restrict themselves to fighting a "limited" rather than "total"
nuclear war, as if somehow governed by the rules of the Marquess of
Queensbury. Finally, it seems fairly clear that counterforce capabilities,
involving missiles that never have been tested over their expected war-
time trajectories, are neither as accurate nor as reliable as publicly
claimed.
Again, however, it remains to be asked whether different conclusions
might not obtain in the case of an anticipatory counterforce first strike as
distinguished from an initiating one. Such a strike, designed to preempt,
say, an imminent devastation of equivalent or greater dimension, conceiv-
ably could mneet the test of proportionality rcsl eas twudb
directed, pursuant to counterforce doctrine, against only military targets.
Particularly might this be the case where the statistical probability of ac-
curate warhead delivery would be fairly high, i.e., where the CEP of the
preemptive strike would be fairly low (within 100-200 meters by current
standards). This logic is based, however, on a calculation of statistical
probability, and probabilities, let us be clear, are not certainties. In addi-
tion, it suffers from all the disabilities concerning proportionality that we
noted in connection with both the preemptive countervalue strike and the
initiating counterforce strike. Again, therefore, it is reasonable to con-
clude that the test of proportionality would not be met or that, at the
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very least, those who would unleash the preemptive counterforce strike
would have the burden of proving otherwise.
3. Tactical Warfare: Theater/Battlefield Targeting
There is no clear borderline between so-called "tactical" and so-
called "strategic" nuclear weapons, with the yields and consequent effects
of the former commonly rising to the level and impact of the latter. The
public debates and demonstrations in Europe since late 1979, which have
related primarily to intermediate-range weapons and weapons systems
such as the SS-20 ballistic missile and Backfire bomber on the WTO
(Warsaw Pact) side, and the planned deployment of Tomahawk ground-
launched cruise missiles and Pershing II ballistic missiles on the NATO
side, are vivid witness to this fact. Accordingly, it is logical to conclude
that the first-strike use of tactical nuclear weapons above, say, the 13 to
22 kiloton range of Hiroshima-Nagasaki, i.e., almost sixty percent of the
estimated intermediate "theater of war" and more limited "battlefield"
nuclear weapons currently deployed by the NATO and WTO countries,
should be subject to the same legal judgments that attend the first-strike
use of strategic nuclear weapons (both countervalue and counterforce).
The first-strike use of their strategic (particularly counterforce)
equivalents would appear to violate in the same way and to a similar de-
gree, separately and in combination, not only all or most of the humanita-
rian rules of armed conflict listed in Section I but, as well, the fundamen-
tal principle of proportionality that mediates among them.
But what of tactical nuclear weapons below the 13 to 22 kiloton
range of Hiroshima-Nagasaki? Would the first-strike use of such lower
yield weapons, particularly those in the one to two kiloton or sub-kiloton
range, equally violate the prohibitory rules discussed above? Would such
a strike equally violate the principle of proportionality, on the grounds
that, like its strategic counterparts, it probably would be in response to a
conventional warfare provocation; indeed, in likely contrast to its strate-
gic counterparts, probably in response to a conventional warfare provoca-
tion by a non-nuclear adversary? By common definitional agreement, it
will be recalled, the term "tactical nuclear weapons" is intended generally
to refer to those weapons systems that are designed or otherwise available
for use against essentially military targets in so-called intermediate "the-
ater of war" and more limited "battlefield" situations.
In theory, I agree, the answers to these questions must depend, inter
alia, on the characteristics and capabilities of the tactical weapons in
question. For example, though the provocation might be a conventional
one or, indeed, at the hands of a non-nuclear opponent, it is possible at
least to conceive of a low-yield, relatively "clean," and reasonably accu-
rate nuclear weapon or weapon system whose tactical first defensive use
actually would save lives and protect property within the meaning of mili-
tary necessity, that is, without violating the principle of proportionality.
This "best-case" scenario, however, appears to be a limited one. Judging
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from the state of the art as so far publicly revealed, no such option is
available among existing intermediate-range theater weapons, although
some "progress" in this direction appears to be taking place in connection
with limited-range battlefield weapons. The possibility of minimizing de-
struction and of avoiding indiscriminate harm consonant with Rules 1
and 2 may be present, but not without substantial and, I submit, dispro-
portionate cost in most circumstances relative to internationally pro-
tected persons (Rules 2 and 3), the natural environment (Rule 4) and
nonparticipating neutral States (Rule 5), due to initial and residual radia-
tion. Moreover, except by a process of interpretation that is uninformed
by the basic assumptions of a world public order of human dignity, there
is no getting around the Rule 6 prohibition of chemical, biological, and
"analogous" weapons. By its very nature, a fission weapon must be re-
garded as "dirty," and even if a pure fusion weapon with no fission were
developed, its explosion in the air and, of course, at ground-level still
would result in some radioactive contamination, albeit not as extensive as
when nuclear technology was less "tailored" than it is today.
But what truly is damning of the first defensive use of tactical nu-
clear weapons, whether in theater or battlefield operations, is less the na-
ture of the weapons themselves than the nature of tactical nuclear war-
fare as a whole. In the first place, as should be apparent to all, if a
military campaign defined in part by a first-strike use of nuclear weapons
were ever to take place, it surely would not be limited to one or two nu-
clear strikes, even if only the first user were a nuclear power. Likely as
not, as conservatively projected in the 1980 Report of the Secretary-
General on nuclear weapons, tactical nuclear warfare, at least at theater
level, would result in hundreds and thousands of nuclear explosions and,
consequently, untold immediate and long-range, long-term collateral
harms. In addition, once unleashed, the probability that tactical nuclear
warfare could be kept at theater or battlefield level would be small. A
crisis escalating to the actual first use of even relatively small nuclear
weapons would bring us dangerously close to the ultimate stage, a "strate-
gic exchange," particularly if one of the two sides saw itself at a disadvan-
tage in a drawn-out "tactical exchange." In sum, once out of the bottle,
likely as not even the tactical nuclear genie would quite literally cause
"all hell to break loose;" and this fact, in combination with the observa-
tions already made regarding the humanitarian rules of armed conflict,
would seem by any rational analysis to run hard up against the principle
of proportionality upon which the doctrine of military necessity is
premised.
Thus, the first use of nuclear weapons again would appear contrary
to the basic laws of war as contemporaneously understood. It need only
be added that, for all the reasons noted above, but especially the last two
relative to the essential uncontrollability of tactical nuclear warfare in
general, this conclusion may be seen to apply to the preemptive first use
of tactical nuclear weapons as well as to their initiating first use.
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B. Second Defensive Use of Nuclear Weapons
Would a second defensive use of nuclear weapons-one undertaken
as a claimed "legitimate reprisal" in response to a prior attack unlawfully
initiating the use of such weapons-equally or similarly violate the hu-
manitarian rules of armed conflict? In view of the numerous qualifying
reservations now attached to the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, conditioning
adherence to it upon reciprocal observance of its terms, it may be that the
Rule 6 ban on chemical, biological, and "analogous" means of warfare
would not stand in the way. On this point, concededly, there is ambiguity.
But what about the Rule 3 prohibition of reprisals that are disproportion-
ate to legitimate belligerent objectives or that are disrespectful of per-
sons, institutions, and resources otherwise protected by the laws of war?
Is there ambiguity here as well?
1. Strategic Warfare: Countervalue Targeting
In the case of a second use of nuclear weapons characterized by
countervalue targeting, there is, I submit, no ambiguity. For at least three
reasons, such a use may be said to violate the humanitarian rules of
armed conflict as contemporaneously understood, especially Rule 3.
In the first place, a retaliatory city-killing attack would flagrantly
trample upon guarantees extended to civilians and civilian populations,
among other internationally protected persons, by the most recent formal
statements on the laws of war. Article 51(6) of 1977 Protocol I Additional
to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, for example, is characteristically une-
quivocal: "Attacks against the civilian population or civilians by way of
reprisals are prohibited."
Second, except to destroy enemy morale, which is clearly an imper-
missible objective under the laws of war, and the more so, one would
think, when the result is to terrorize an enemy community through the
infliction of literally overwhelming-perhaps irremedial-societal de-
struction, it is difficult to see how a retaliatory countervalue strike would
serve any military necessity whatsoever. To the contrary, even if the
antecedent first use were likewise countervalue-destructive in character, it
would appear to serve mainly the purpose of vengeance rather than the
values of proportionate policing (given, at least, the present essentially
rural deployment of the world's strategic forces).
Finally, if the history of belligerent reprisals is any indication, there
is the near certainty that a retaliatory countervalue strike would lead not
to a reduction of hostilities nor to a moderation of tactics but to an es-
calatory spiral and spread of countervalue exchanges. At this point, virtu-
ally everything for which the principle of proportionality is supposed to
stand, including the integrity of the natural environment and the inviola-
bility of neutral state territory, would be threatened; the humanitarian
rules of armed conflict would become all but obsolete.
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2. Strategic Warfare: Counterforce Targeting
The case of a second counterforce use of nuclear weapons is not so
clear-cut. Because such a response would be directed, pursuant to
counterforce doctrine, against the military (especially nuclear) forces
rather than the cities of the first user, and because the laws of war do not
invite national suicide, there is room to contend that such a strike would
be compatible with prohibitory Rule 3 and the other humanitarian rules
of armed conflict, provided that it not be patently excessive relative to
the antecedent attack and the goal of law-compliance or nonrecurrence.
Indeed, paradoxical though it may seem, it might even be argued that, to
ensure a minimum destruction of cherished values (preferably the values
of freedom and equality), a nuclear counterstrike of this kind would be
required. On the other hand, bearing in mind the characteristics and ca-
pabilities of the weapons and weapons systems that constitute today's
counterforce arsenals, there remains the problem of reconciling the rights
of states not party to the conflict and of persons and property expressly
shielded by the law of reprisals and the more general laws of war. "Clean
bombs" and "surgical strikes," especially in relation to strategic warfare,
exist more in the minds of military planners than they do in reality. Ad-
ditionally, there is the customary injunction that reprisals be taken only
as measures of last resort. In the context of nuclear war, this injunction is
all the more imperative.
Thus, the permissibility of a counterforce second strike under the hu-
manitarian rules of armed conflict may be regarded as ambiguous. Of
course, because of the essentially uncontrollable dangers involved, one
must assume that such a second use, if permissible, would be authorized
only in response to an antecedent attack of equivalent or greater propor-
tion, i.e., a prior counterforce or countervalue attack. But even then, be-
cause of the unrefined nature of the weaponry involved and the likelihood
of crisis escalation and spread, the burden of policy proof would again
weigh heavily on those who would retaliate in this manner. Let us be can-
did. As Roger Fisher has written, "Honestly, each of us would prefer to
have our children in Havana, Belgrade, Beijing, Warsaw, or Leningrad
today than in Hiroshima or Nagasaki when the nuclear bombs went off."
3. Tactical Warfare: Theater/Battlefield Targeting
If there is a case to be made for the use of nuclear weapons consis-
tent with the humanitarian rules of warfare, it is here, in respect of the
second use of tactical nuclear weapons. Arguably, a second retaliatory use
of a low-yield "clean," and reasonably accurate intermediate- or limited-
range nuclear weapon directed only at a military target could be said to
meet the requirements of proportionality (or military necessity) that gov-
ern the law of reprisals as presently understood. When making the case
beyond this highly circumscribed option, however, at least two major
complexities arise. First, to the extent that a retaliatory second use would
involve theater or battlefield weapons around or above the 13 to 22 kilo-
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ton range of Hiroshima-Nagasaki, there is the problem of having to deal
with all the ambiguities and qualifications noted in connection with a sec-
ond counterforce use of nuclear weapons. And second, regarding all tacti-
cal nuclear weapons, including those in the one to two kiloton or sub-
kiloton range, there is the problem of establishing upper limits on the
number of retaliatory strikes that could be launched at any time without
doing violence either to the rights of internationally protected persons
(Rules 2 and 3) and neutral States (Rule 5) or, more generally, to the
principle of proportionality. In other words, except in the narrowest of
circumstances, the unrefined and unpredictable nature of nuclear weap-
ons and weapon systems in general continues to cloud the legality of their
second use even in tactical warfare. Add to this the extreme dangers that
would attend a likely escalatory spiral once the process of reprisal and
counter-reprisal were set into motion, and again the burden of proving
that this retaliatory approach should be favored over other means of de-
terring the enemy becomes very heavy.
C. Threat of First or Second Defensive Use
If a given use of nuclear weapons is properly judged contrary to the
humanitarian rules of armed conflict, then logically any threat of such
use-including not only an ostentatious brandishing of arms (such as a
menacing "demonstration burst"), but also their research and develop-
ment, manufacture, stockpiling, and deployment-should be considered
contrary to the humanitarian rules of armed conflict as well. In view of
our preceding discussion, the threat at least of a strategic first strike, a
tactical first strike, a second countervalue strike, and possibly also a sec-
ond counterforce strike as well as most tactical second strikes would fit
this logic.
A distinct problem with this thesis, however, is that nothing in the
traditional rules of warfare prohibits the preparation in contrast to the
actual use of weapons and weapon systems. Also, it flies in the face of the
deterrence doctrines which are said to have kept the peace, at least be-
tween the superpowers, for the last thirty-odd years-a conflict of major
significance because, to be minimally credible, a policy of deterrence re-
quires the research and development, manufacture, stockpiling, and de-
ployment of the weapons upon which it is premised. It is true that the
nuclear deterrence policies currently practiced, between the superpowers
especially, may be criticized in numerous ways: for involving unaccept-
ably high risks; for building upon an inherently unstable balance; for ter-
rorizing populations and holding them hostage as a consequence; for de-
tracting from acceptable solutions or alternatives in case of failure of
deterrence; and so forth. But because of the widespread preception, how-
ever much open to debate, that the prevention of widespread conflict
rests on nuclear deterrence and that this system is, in turn, dependent on
credible nuclear threat, it would be difficult to conclude that measures
short of actual use would violate the humanitarian rules of armed conflict
as presently understood. Not even U.N. General Assembly Resolution
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1653 (XVI) or 2936 (XXVII), which declare the use of nuclear weapons,
respectively, "a crime against mankind and civilization" and a matter of
"permanent prohibition," seek to outlaw measures short of actual use.
Nevertheless, to facilitate comprehensive outlook, at least three qual-
ifying observations should be borne in mind. First a number of path-
breaking treaties do specifically prohibit nuclear weapons preparations
short of actual combat use: the 1959 Antarctica Treaty, the 1963 Partial
Test Ban Treaty, the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco, the 1967 Outer Space
Treaty, the 1971 Seabed Arms Control Treaty, and the 1979 Draft Moon
Treaty. Second, where "demonstration bursts" or equivalent menacing
tactics are involved, there is always the possibility of violating the Rule 6
ban on chemical, biological, and "analogous" weapons and, in addition,
the other humanitarian rules of armed conflict designed to safeguard in-
ternationally protected persons, the natural environment, and neutral
states. Finally, because of the high risks and monumental dangers in-
volved, any nuclear weapons measure short of actual use, but especially
those of a particularly ostentatious or provocative nature, must be taken
with extreme caution. The history of war is riddled with well-meaning
doctrines gone out of control, and the possibilities of war increase in di-
rect proportion to the effectiveness of the instruments of war we adopt. It
is, no doubt, this viewpoint that lies behind article 36 of 1977 Geneva
Protocol I Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions: "In the study, de-
velopment, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means or method of
warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an obligation to determine
whether if employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited
by this Protocol or any other rule of international law applicable to the
High Contracting Party."
In sum, and by way of conclusion, while no treaty or treaty provision
specifically forbids nuclear warfare per se, except in certain essentially
isolated whereabouts, almost every use to which nuclear weapons might
be put, most notably the standard strategic and theater-level options
which dominate United States and Soviet nuclear policy, appear to vio-
late one or more of the laws of war that serve to make up the contempo-
rary humanitarian law of armed conflict, in particular the cardinal princi-
ple of proportionality. Whatever legal license is afforded appears
restricted to the following at most:
* essentially cautious, long-term preparalions for preventing or de-
terring nuclear war, short of provocative "saber-rattling" activities;
• very limited tactical-mainly battlefield-warfare utilizing low-
yield, "clean," and reasonably accurate nuclear weapons for second
use retaliatory purposes only; and
" possibly, but not unambiguously (until as yet undeveloped techno-
logical refinements are achieved), an extremely limited
counterforce strike in strategic and theater-level settings for sec-
ond use retaliatory purposes only.
In other words, applying the humanitarian rules of armed conflict to dif-
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ferent nuclear weapons options or uses tends to prove rather than dis-
prove the illegality of these weapons generally. And when one adds to this
the conclusion at Nuremberg that the extermination of a civilian popula-
tion in whole or in part is a "crime against humanity," plus the spirit if
not also the letter of the 1948 Convention of the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide, then a presumption of illegality and a
commensurate heavy burden of contrary proof relative to the use of nu-
clear weapons on any extended or large-scale basis seems beyond perad-
venture. To be sure, ambiguities exist here and there, especially in the
case of limited tactical uses where the venerable test of proportionality
must struggle between increasingly "tailored" military technologies and
the human propensity for escalatory violence. But overall, the law op-
poses resort to these instruments of death, and to argue otherwise on the
basis of the arguable permissibility of some essentially restricted use is to
engage in a high form of sophistry.
Of course, as I stated at the outset, it would be naive to expect that
the law alone can make the progressive difference, particularly when, as
here, it touches sensitively upon prevailing notions of national security.
But more and more the strategic planners among the nuclear weapon
states especially; the defense policymakers, the military operators, the
laboratories of military R & D, and even the arms controllers have got to
change their modes of thinking. More and more they (we) must come to
see the essential incompatibility of nuclear weapons with the core
precepts of international law. More and more they (we) must be made to
understand that the bell tolls for us all-so that we can wake up to-
morrow not to the threat of nuclear holocaust but, in the gentle words of
Emily Dickinson, spoken at the close of that magnificent film Sophie's
Choice to "a morning excellent and fair."
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A Global Survey of Governmental
Institutions
to Protect Civil and Political Rights
HECTOR Fix ZAMUDIO*
INTRODUCTION
This global survey was written to demonstrate the fact that within
almost every country of the world with an organized government, there
exists some means by which citizens may redress grievances of fundamen-
tal rights violations. The present emphasis in world affairs has been on
organizing sanctions exterior to the governmental structures of nation-
states through such august bodies as the United Nations and the Organi-
zation of American States. However, such sanctions do not effectively and
efficiently aid those who require the greatest protection: the citizens of
nation-states themselves.
This survey attempts to show the philosophic and functional similar-
ity between various nations with diverse governmental organization and
geographic location. It is divided into two major parts. The first part is an
examination of legislative enactments, primarily constitutional provisions,
for the protection of certain fundamental human rights and an examina-
tion of judicial bodies where citizens may bring such violations to the at-
tention of the courts for their resolution. The second part examines the
executive branch as a possible source of non-judicial redress, or alterna-
tively, as a vehicle to prevent fundamental rights violations in a prophy-
lactic capacity. This latter method is examined through the Ombudsman
model which has been established in Scandinavia and utilized in various
capacities throughout Europe and certain developing nations.
Part One of this survey, concerning legislative enactments and the
judiciary, is divided into five sections: (1) conceptualization and classifica-
tion of domestic instruments; (2) Anglo-American instruments for the en-
forcement of fundamental rights guarantees; (3) the special system in
Latin America; (4) the system of continental Europe; and (5) the Procura-
tor as the instrument of socialist legal systems. The latter half of the pa-
per, concerning the ability of the executive to remedy fundamental rights
violations, is examined from the institutional model of the Ombudsman.
* Hector Fix Zamudio is Director of the Institute of Legal Research and Professor of
Law at the Universidad Nacional Autonomia de Mexico in Mexico City. The initial editing
was done by Professor James A.R. Nafziger of the Willamette University College of Law,
and the translation was done by Linda Friedman Ramirez, a member of the Oregon Bar and
recent graduate of the Willamette University College of Law.
An Addendum is appended at the end of the article to note briefly the most recent
developments in the myriad of laws mentioned in this survey.
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
I. LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS AND JUDICIAL REMEDIES
A. Conceptualization and Classification of Domestic Remedies
1. The Necessity of Exhausting Domestic Judicial Remedies
Before Recourse to the International System
The availability of international authorities and commissions such as
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, the Inter-American
Commission and Court of Human Rights, and the European Commission
and European Court of Human Rights to redress human rights violations
is expanding. An essential pre-requisite for recourse to the international
petition system is prior exhaustion of domestic remedies.' Therefore, a
study of the means by which human rights can be protected through the
domestic legal process is of great importance.
2. Classification of Legal Remedies
a. Statutory Remedies for the Protection of Fundamental Rights
The first category refers to legal remedies that are directed to the
protection of statutory rights, but which can be utilized indirectly for the
protection of fundamental rights. Administrative justice and judicial ac-
tions, including civil and criminal actions, fall within this category.
Though indirect, both legal forums can be used as direct means to pro-
tect basic human rights; for example, a judicial proceeding may assure the
protection of fundamental rights such as due process, access to the court
for redress of grievances, and the right to a fair trial. France provides an
administrative remedy to protect the human rights of citizens through its
Council of State.'
1. The Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of the United
Nations states in article 2 as one condition for a complaint's admissability, "that the indi-
vidual has exhausted all available domestic remedies." Optional Protocol to the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, entered
into force Mar. 23, 1976, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 59, U.N. Doc. A/
6316 (1967). The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
states in article 26 that "the Commission may only deal with the matter after all domestic
remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognized rules of international
law." European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, done Nov. 4,
1950, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953, Europ. T.S. No. 5. The American Convention on
Human Rights states in article 46, section 1(a) that a petition will be admitted to the Com-
mission only if "the requirements under domestic law have been pursued and exhausted in
accordance with generally recognized principles of international law." American Convention
on Human Rights, done Nov. 22, 1969, entered into force July 18, 1978, O.A.S. T.S. No. 36
at 1.
2. The Council of State has jurisdiction over the activity of the executive branch in
France, although it is an administrative tribunal within that branch and thus independent
of it. Individuals can petition the Council to redress grievances caused by government ac-
tions and may be awarded damages or other remedies. For a complete description of the
French judiciary, see R. DAVID, FRENCH LAW: ITS STRUCTURE, SOURCES, AND METHODOLOGY
(M. Kindred trans. 1972).
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b. Complementary Remedies
Complementary remedies are not created for the protection of the
rights of man, but are used to compensate for the irreparable violations of
fundamental rights when such violations have been committed. In this
sense, they are equivalent to remedies that have been classified by one
school of thought as restrictive. Two examples of complementary reme-
dies are: (1) a judgment of a political nature about the accountability of
high public officials when they have compromised the Constitution, and
particularly the human rights guaranteed by it; and (2) the economic re-
sponsibility of the state when its activity has caused damage which has
had a prejudicial effect on fundamental rights.
c. Specific Remedies
Specific legal remedies are those that have gradually been shaped
with the purpose of granting rapid and effective protection to fundamen-
tal rights, in an immediate and direct manner, generally with remedial
effect. These instruments can be grouped, according to the approach of
the Italian jurist Mauro Cappelletti, as "constitutional jurisdiction over
liberty."'
In this category, we mention habeas corpus and judicial review of the
constitutionality of laws and offical acts from the Anglo-American system;
the acci6n, recurso or juicio de amparo and the mandado de seguranqa
in the Latin American legal system; and the Verfassungsbeschwerde
(constitutional appeal) of some continental European countries. Other
protective mechanisms that cannot be considered strictly as part of the
legal process, but which can be used specifically as legal instruments for
the protection of human rights in various other countries include the




Habeas corpus apparently had its origin in Roman law, but gradually
developed into British custom in the Middle Ages. It began as a judicial
order for the appearance of persons before the court, and during the 14th
and 15th centuries, in such laws as the proceso foral aragon~s de
manifestacion de las personas (Aragonese statute to produce the person),
it assumed the fundamental purpose of examining the legality of the de-
tention of persons.4 Whereas the Aragonese statute was abolished in 1591,
3. For an exposition of Cappelletti's views on the historical development of "constitu-
tionalization," see M. CAPPELLETTI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD (1971).
See also M. CAPPELLETTI, LA JURISDICcI6N CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA LIBERTAD (H. Fix Zamudio
trans. 1961).
4. See LAW OF HABEAS CORPUS, 1679, 31 CAR. I. CH. 2, as amended by 56 Geo.III ch.
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on the occasion of the famous episode of Antonio Perez,5 in England
habeas corpus developed in an uninterrupted manner until it culminated
in the Law of Habeas Corpus of 1679.6
a. The Doctrine of Habeas Corpus in the United States
In the United States, the writ of habeas corpus was applied in colo-
nial times by virtue of the above-mentioned Law of 1679. Subsequently it
became incorporated into some of the constitutions drawn up after the
War of Independence, such as the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780,
the New Hampshire Constitution of 1784, and the Federal Constitution of
1787.7
In federal law the writ of habeas corpus has had a very important
evolution. The U.S. Supreme Court initially limited its scope to con-
testing acts of administrative authorities and, only in exceptional cases, to
incompetent judicial decisions. Gradually, the possibility of challenging
judicial decisions was recognized, especially when they were based on
statutory provisions that were considered unconstitutional. Habeas
corpus is now openly recognized as the means by which to appeal final
decisions of local courts, based upon errors which have been committed
that affect the constitutional rights of the accused.
In this regard, two opinions of the Warren Court are of particular
note: Escobedo v. Illinois (1964)1 and Miranda v. Arizona (1966)," both of
which strengthened the exercise of the fifth amendment right against
compulsory self-incrimination, as well as the right to counsel even during
custodial investigation by the police.
Since 1969, the year in which Warren Burger became Chief Justice,
the rights of accused persons have undergone significant changes. Specifi-
cally, the U.S. Supreme Court has restricted the scope of federal habeas
corpus relief because of the growing number of petitions that have been
brought before the federal courts challenging local decisions. However,
these changes have not undermined the essential function of habeas
corpus.
100 (1893); W. Church, A Treatise on the Writ of Habeas Corpus §§ 23 (2nd ed. 1893). See
also V. FAIREN GUILL9N, ANTECEDENTES AROGONESES DE LOS JUICIOS DE AMPARO (1971) (a
study of the history of the evolution of amparo).
5. Antonio Perez was an extremely capable statesman and favorite in the Spanish court
of Philip II, who was imprisoned for a murder in which the king allegedly had complicity.
For a full treatment, see G. MARARON, ANTONIO PEREZ: "SPANISH TRAITOR" (C.D. Ley trans.
1954).
6. Law of Habeas Corpus, 1679, note 4 supra.
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 6, art. 7; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art.
91.
8. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
9. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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b. The Doctrine of Habeas Corpus in England
In England, habeas corpus traditionally conformed to the law of 1679
and was utilized to defend individuals against detentions ordered by the
administrative authorities subordinate to the Crown. It evolved to be-
come the means by which the deprivation of liberty brought about by
judicial order could be challenged. Because of its widespread application,
with repeated and successful appeals before various judges, the Adminis-
tration of Justice Act of 1960 '0 now limits its use. The 1960 Act permits
prison wardens, against whom habeas corpus petitions are directed, the
possibility of appeal against the granting of habeas corpus protection.
This is possible even when the appeal has a delaying effect prejudicial to
the accused.
2. Judicial Review
The concept of judical review that now exists in numerous countries
of the world has its origin in the British Colonies. The control that the
Private Council of the Crown exercised over decisions of the colonial
courts was of particular influence in America. For example, the theory of
the English Judge Edward Coke contained in the classic Bonham's Case"
stated that there exists a superior right which cannot be contradicted by
the Laws of Parliament. Paradoxically, at that time the courts of England
did not have the power to pass judgment on the constitutionality of laws,
due to the principle of parliamentary supremacy.
The concept of judicial review was incorporated into the U.S. Consti-
tution and was defined by the U.S. Supreme Court, most notably in the
case of Marbury v. Madison." The case established that all legal deci-
sions are subject to the principles of the Constitution, and in cases where
Constitutional principles conflict, an individual may bring the question
before local courts whose decisions are subject to appeal in the U.S. Su-
preme Court.
The principle of judicial review was introduced by almost all Latin
American constitutions, as well as by the majority of countries that pres-
ently comprise the Commonwealth of Nations, with the exceptions of
England, New Zealand, Israel and South Africa. The principle of judicial
review has had an influence in various continental European countries,
particularly Switzerland, and to some extent in Norway and Denmark. 3
10. 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, ch. 65, § 15.
11. 8 Co. Crep. 114a; 77 E.R. 646 (K.B. 1610).
12. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
13. In addition, judicial review has influenced the legal systems of Rumania and the
Weimar Republic in the first post-war period, as well as in the Italian Republic under its
Constitution of 1948 and until the Constitutional Court began to function in 1956.
1983
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
3. Extraordinary Writs
The writs of injunction and mandamus, in addition to those of quo
warranto, prohibition and certiorari, were established in traditional En-
glish law as a means of collateral challenge. 4 They have on occasion been
utilized by individuals for the defense of specifically guaranteed rights
under the law or by the Constitution, without losing their quality of being
standard proceedings.
These methods of challenge have been transformed in some legal sys-
tems into specific instruments for the defense of fundamental rights. 5 In
this same manner, some Argentinian provincial constitutions, such as
those of Santiago del Estero (1939), Chaco, Chubut, Rio Negro and For-
mosa-all written in 1957-have adopted the writs of injunction and
mandamus with the names of mandamientos de prohibici6n y ejecuci6n,
which can be issued by the courts at the request of those affected to re-
strict state authorities from fulfillment of an obligation established under
law.' 6
C. THE SPECIAL SYSTEM IN LATIN AMERICA
The acci6n, recurso or juicio de amparo (injunction) is undoubtedly
the prime instrument for the protection of human rights that has gained
wide acceptance throughout Latin America. It was initially consecrated in
the state constitution of Yucatan (Mexico) of 1841,17 due to the ideas of
Manuel Crescencio Rej6n. It was then introduced into the federal sphere
in Mexico by Mariano Otero under the "Acta de Reformas" of 1847'8 and
culminated in articles 101 and 102 of the Federal Constitution of Febru-
ary 5, 1857."9
The Republic of El Salvador, in its Constitution of August 13, 1886,'0
was the first country to introduce the amparo subsequent to Mexico.
Later, Honduras and Nicaragua introduced the amparo into their Consti-
14. In England, the writs were transformed into prerogative orders beginning in 1938.
15. See, e.g., CONSTITUTION OF INDIA arts. 32 & 246; and CONSTITUTION OF THE UNION OF
UNION OF BURMA art. 25.
16. CONSTITUTION OF THE PROVINCE OF CHACO art. 22 (Argen.); CONSTITUTION OF THE THE
PROVNcE oF Cmuuu'r aris. 35-36 (Argen.); CONSTITUTION OF THE PROVINCE OF FORMOSA For-
mosa art. 32 (Argen.); CONSTITUTION OF THE PROVINCE OF RIO NEGRO arts. 12-13 (Argen.);
CONSTITU 12-13 (ARGEN.); CONSTITUTION OF THE PROVINCE OF SANTIAGO DEL ESTERO art. 22
(Argen.).
17. POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF THE FREE STATE OF YUCATAN, SANCTIONED BY ITS CONSTI-
TUTIONAL CONGESS ON MARCH 31, 1981. For the Mexican evolution of amparo, see H. CLAG-
ETT & D. VALDERRAMA, A REVISED GUIDE TO THE LAW AND LEGAL LITERATURE OF MEXICO
3861 (1973).
18. Constitutional Act of Reforms Sanctioned by the Extraordinary Constitutional
Congress of the Mexican United States on May 18, 1847.
19. FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF THE MEXICAN UNITED STATES SANCTIONED AND SWORN BY
THE GENERAL CONSTITUTIVE CONGRESS ON FEBRUARY 5, 1857 arts. 101-102.
20. POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF EL SALVADOR of 1886 art. 110.
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tutions and Laws of Amparo, in 1894 and 1897, respectively.21
At the present time, there are thirteen Latin American countries with
constitutional enactments that guarantee the right of amparo: Argentina,
Bolivia, Costa Rica, Chile, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, El Salvador and Venezuela, in addition to the
Brazilian writ of security (mandado de seguranqa), translated by some
authors as a mandamiento de amparo because of its similarity to the
amparo.
In order to compare the protective capacity of the right of amparo, it
is necessary to classify this very complex material as follows:
1. One type of amparo is intended solely as an instrument equivalent
to the habeas corpus and can be utilized only for the protection of indi-
vidual freedom against illegal detention or with respect to irregularities in
criminal proceedings.
2
Some of the Argentine codes of criminal procedure refer indiscrimi-
nately to the writ of habeas corpus or to the amparo of personal liberty,
and a similar provision appears in the Fifth Transitory Provision of the
Venezuelan Constitution of 1961.
2. By way of contrast, in the laws of Argentina, Venezuela, and re-
cently Peru, the recurso or acci6n de amparo has acquired significance as
an instrument for the protection of fundamental constitutional rights
other than personal liberty. Personal liberty, which is protected through
the traditional writ of habeas corpus, constituting the first type of
amparo, is an exception to the more general meaning and use of the sec-
ond type of amparo.23
21. Guatemala introduced the amparo in the constitutional reform of March 11, 1921,
and in Argentina it was introduced in the Constitution of the Province of Sante Fe, on
August 13, 1921. Panama introduced it in its Constitution of January 2, 1941; Costa Rica in
its Supreme Law of 1949; Venezuela in its Constitution of 1961; Bolivia, Paraguay, and Ec-
uador in their constitutions all promulgated the amparo in 1967 (although Ecuador has
since abolished it), and finally Peru included it in its Constitution executed in July of 1979,
which became effective July, 1980.
Also, the amparo was enacted in the two federal constitutions of Central America: the
Political Constitution of the United States of Central America (Honduras, Nicaragua and El
Salvador), promulgated in 1898; and the Charter of the Central American Republic (Guate-
mala, El Salvador, Honduras), of September 9, 1921.
It is appropriate to point out that the right of amparo has been reestablished in the
Spanish Constitution that became effective on December 29, 1978. It was introduced previ-
ously in the Republican Charter, December 9, 1931, due to the teachings of the Mexican
jurist, Rodolfo Reyes.
22. The amparo has been given this meaning in the Republic of Chile. The Political
Constitution of the Republic of Chile of 1925 (at least prior to the military coups of 1973)
provides for a habeas corpus type writ in its amparo.
23. The following countries' laws have also included amparo procedures for the protec-
tion of fundamental human rights: Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Paraguay and the Republic of Panama.
Bolivia:
The Constitution of Bolivia art. 19, promulgated Feb. 2, 1967, introduced the recurso
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a. Argentina
The right of amparo in the Republic of Argentina has been the ob-
ject of an expansion that we can characterize as explosive, even though it
was introduced long ago in article 17 of the Constitution of the Province
of Santa Fe of 1921. With regard to this Argentine instrument, we ought
to distinguish two sectors: the provincial sphere, where the regulation of
the legal process at the provincial level is in conformity with national re-
quirements, and the national sphere, where the right of amparo has been
somewhat limited.
I. At the provincial level, the recurso o acci6n de amparo created in
article 17 of the Constitution of Sante Fe in 1921 was first regulated by
Law Number 2994 of October 1, 1935. Subsequently, it was created in
article 22 of the Constitution of Santiago de Estero of June 2, 1939, regu-
lated by articles 673 to 655 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the same
de amparo, as independent from habeas corpus, against the illegal acts or wrongful omis-
sions of public officials or individuals that restrict, suppress, or threaten to restrict or sup-
press the rights and guarantees recognized by the Constitution. This instrument has been
regulated by arts. 762-767 of the Code of Civil Procedure of Bolivia.
Costa Rica:
The Constitution of the Republic of Costa Rica art. 48(3) (1949) regulates the recurso
de amparo to maintain or re-establish the rights guaranteed by this same Constitution, with
the exception of personal liberty protected by habeas corpus. This provision is regulated by
Law No. 1161 of June 2, 1980.
Ecuador:
The former Constitution of Ecuador, promulgated May 25, 1967, established the
amparo jurisdiccional in art. 28, cl. 15, as protection against "any violation of constitutional
guarantees." However, the amparo jurisdiccional has never been applied by virtue of the
lack of a regulatory law, and also by the successive coup d'6tats of 1971 and 1972, which
brought back the Constitutions of 1946 and 1945, respectively, both of which did not recog-
nize the amparo. The current Constitution approved in the referendum of January 15, 1978
also does not contain the right of amparo.
El Salvador:
Art. 89, pt. I of the current Constitution of El Salvador of Jan. 8, 1962 (regulated by
art. 12 et seq of the Law of Constitutional Procedures of Jan. 14, 1960) regulates the process
of amparo for the protection of constitutionally guaranteed human rights in a manner inde-
pendent of the writ of habeas corpus, which is limited to the protection of personal liberty.
Guatemala:
The Constitution of the Republic of Guatemala art. 80 (1965) and the first part of pt. I
of the Law of Amparn; Habeas Corpus, and Constitutionality of April 20, 1966, establish
that the fundamental purpose of amparo consists in maintaining or restoring the enjoyment
of rights and guarantees provided by the Constitution with the exception of personal liberty.
Paraguay:
The Constitution of Paraguay art. 77 (1967) provides for the right of amparo in a form
similar to the Constitution of Bolivia. Although a regulatory law has not been passed, some
case law has directly supported the constitutional provision.
Republic of Panama:
The Constitution of the Republic of Panama art. 49 regulates the recurso de amparo
of constitutional guarantees in a form independent from the writ of habeas corpus against
the acts of authority that violate constitutional rights and guarantees. This precept is regu-
lated by the Enabling Law of Constitutional Remedies and Guarantees (Law No. 46 of No-
vember 24, 1956).
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province, issued in 1944 (and preserved in articles 818 to 829 of the new
Civil and Commerical Procedural Code of November 14, 1969). After
that, it appeared in article 33 of the Constitution of the Province of Men-
doza, of May 31, 1949.
After the 1955 military overthrow of the first government of General
Per6n, the recurso or accion de amparo received a new impetus so that it
was incorporated into the following provincial constitutions: Catamarca
(1966); Corrientes (1960); Chubut (1957); Formosa (1957); Misiones
(1958); La Pampa (1960); Rio Negro (1957); Santa Cruz (1957); and Santa
Fe (1962).24
In addition to the above-mentioned local constitutional enactments,
a number of regulatory laws were passed and, without intending to be
exhaustive, we mention the following, all of them called the Law of Ac-
cion de Amparo: Buenos Aires (1965-66); Catamarca (1977); Cordoba
(1967-74); Corrientes (1970); Entre Rios (1947-63); La Rioja (1960); Men-
doza (1954-75); Misiones (1962-67); Salta (1977); San Luis (1958); Santa
Cruz (1958-77/78); and Santa Fe (1935-69/73).
Thus, without even considering other local legislation which included
the amparo (such as the Civil and Penal Codes of Santiago del Estero
mentioned previously), we can affirm that practically all the provinces of
Argentina have created the right of amparo in their constitutions, specific
regulatory laws, or in their procedural codes.
II. Nationally, the accibn de amparo first appeared in the Supreme
Court of Justice through the cases of Angel Siri (December 27, 1957) and
Samuel Kot (September 5, 1958).26 It has been expanded considerably by
virtue of the decisions of the federal courts that have admitted the right
of amparo, not only in opposition to the acts of the authorities, but also
with respect to some social pressure groups. The National Law on the
acci6n de amparo" was subsequently passed, restricting the scope of this
procedural instrument in various aspects and limiting it with respect to
pressure groups. As a substitution, the so-called summary process, or
amparo against the acts of individuals, was established.
27
24. CONSTITUTION OF THE PROVINCE OF CATAMARCA arts. 38-39 (Argen.); CONSTITUTION OF
THE PROVINCE OF CORRIENTES art. 145(13) (Argen.); CONSTITUTION OF THE PROVINCE OF CHU-
BUT art. 34 (Argen.); CONSTITUTION OF THE PROVINCE OF FORMOSA art. 20 (Argen.); CONSTITU-
TION OF THE PROVINCE OF MISIONES arts. 16-18 (Argen.); CONSTITUTION OF THE PROVINCE OF
PAMPA art. 16 (Argen.); CONSTITUTION OF THE PROVINCE OF RIO NEGRO art. 11 (Argen.); CON-
STITUTION OF THE PROVINCE OF SANTA CRUZ art. 15 (Argen.); CONSTITUTION OF THE PROVINCE
OF SANTA FE art. 17 (Argen.).
25. Much of the opinions in Siri and Kot have been translated into English in both K.
KARST, LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS: PROBLEMS FOR COMPARATIVE STUDY 652-58
(1966) and K. KARST & K. ROSENN, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA: A CASE BOOK
161-65 (1975).
26. No. 16,986, Oct. 18, 1966.
27. CODE OF CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL PROCEDURES, art. 321 (Law No. 17,454 of Sept. 20,
1967).
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b. Venezuela
The Venezuelan Constitution of January 26, 1961 enacted the
amparo in its article 49. The amparo serves as an instrument for the pro-
tection of all fundamental constitutional rights, with the exception of per-
sonal liberty, which is protected by the rules of the Fifth Transitory Pro-
vision of the same constitution.28 Article 49 has not been applied,
however, because of the lack of a corresponding regulatory law. Although
some judicial decisions began introducing this legal instrument into case
law, this practice was curtailed with the resolutions of the Sala Politico
Administrativo (Political Administrative Division) of the Supreme Court,




The right of amparo was not introduced until very recently in Peru,
in the new Constitution approved in July, 1979.30 Only after a long evolu-
tion beginning with article 69 of the previous Constitution of 1933,31 in
which the amparo was confused with the writ of habeas corpus, did the
new Constitution extend to protect all constitutionally guaranteed funda-
mental rights. The current Constitution, executed by the Constitutional
Assembly, July 13, 1979 and which became effective in July, 1980, initi-
ated the new constitutional government that replaced the military regime
and provided for the amparo in article 295.
This provision clearly distinguishes the amparo from the writ of
habeas corpus, so that the writ of habeas corpus is limited to its tradi-
tional role of protecting personal liberty, while the purpose of the amparo
is "to be on guard for those other rights recognized by the Constitution,
that are vulnerable or are threatened by an authority, official or
person." 2
3. There exists a third group of laws that gives the amparo a
broader application than even the second group while retaining more pre-
cisely the direct influence of the Mexican amparo; for example, article 58
of the Constitution of the Republic of Honduras of June 3, 1965, regu-
lated by the Law of Amparo of April 14, 1936; and the Nicaraguan Con-
stitution of 1973, with its Law of Amparo of October 23, 1974. In these
enactrment-; the amparo has assumed three purposes: (1) its own special
protection of fundamental rights; (2) the protection of personal liberty for
the purpose of habeas corpus; and (3) the very limited protection against
28. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF VENEZUALA art. 5 (transitory) (1961).
29. Agreement with Obligatory Force, Apr. 24, 1972. See H. Fix ZAMUDIO, LA PROTEC-
C1ON PROCESAL DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS ANTE LAS JURISDICCIONES NACIONALES (1982).
30. POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF PERU art. 295, July 13, 1979, effective July, 1980.
31. POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF PERU SANCTIONED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONGRESS OF
1931, promulgated Apr. 9, 1933.
32. See note 30 supra.
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statutory provisions that violate the Constitution. Accordingly, a protec-
tive judgment invalidates the challenged provision, but only with regard
to the petitioner.
Because of the popular revolution that overthrew the prolonged dic-
tatorship of the Somoza family in 1979, the Nicaraguan Constitution of
1973 was replaced by the Fundamental Statute, promulgated by the Gov-
ernment of National Reconstruction on July 20, 1979. This same govern-
ment issued the Law of August 31, 1979 on the rights and guarantees of
Nicaraguans, in which article 50 guarantees the recurso de amparo for
the protection of the rights or liberties recognized by both statutes.
Based upon article 50, two statutes were enacted: the first, enacted Janu-
ary 8, 1980, exclusively protects the personal liberty of habeas corpus,8
and the second, enacted May 28, 1980, protects other human rights.84
4. The Mexican amparo3 5 possesses a protective sphere much wider
than any of the other previously mentioned institutions by the same
name. It serves five functions: (1) as an instrument to protect personal
liberty, similar to the writ of habeas corpus; (2) as the only means by
which to challenge the constitutionality of laws, thus receiving the name
amparo contra leyes; (3) as a means to challenge judicial decisions in all
courts of the country, local as well as federal, thus having been called
"amparo judicial or casaci6n" (repeal) because of its similarity to the
recurso de casaci6n; (4) as an appellate instrument to challenge the deci-
sions or acts of administrative authorities that cannot otherwise be chal-
lenged in an administrative court, thus functioning as a "proceso con-
tencioso administrativo" (adversarial administrative proceeding); and (5)
at the beginning of the reforms to the legislation of amparo in February
1963, special formalities were introduced to protect legally the campesi-
nos subject to the agrarian reform, such as the ejidatarios and
comuneros. This has received the doctrinal name of amparo social
agrario (social agrarian amparo).
The significance of the Mexican amparo can be distinguished from
other Latin American legal systems which attribute these five functions
to different procedural instruments. The Mexican amparo protects not
only constitutional rights, but also rights established by legislation in a
manner that constitutes an instrument to protect all laws-from the con-
stitution to the most humble municipal ordinance.
33. Law of Amparo for Liberty and Personal Security, Jan. 8, 1980. This law specifi-
cally protects rights guaranteed under habeas corpus.
34. Law of Amparo, May 28, 1980. The fundamental rights other than those under
habeas corpus are protected by this law.
35. POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF THE MEXICAN UNITED STATES arts. 103 & 107 (1917);
New Law of Amparo Pursuant to Articles 103 & 107 of the Federal Constitution, D.O., Jan.
10, 1936 (amended 1951, 1968 & 1976). For an English translation of the 1917 Constitution,
see THE MEXICAN CONSTITUTION OF 1917 COMPARED wrr THE CONSTITUTION OF 1857 (H.
Branch trans. & arranger, 1917).
36. Fix ZAMUDIO, BREvE INTRODUCCI6N AL JUCIO DE AMPARO MEXICANO 152-67 (1977).
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5. Upon examination of the European constitutional appeal, we will
make a brief reference to that which is referred to as the recurso de
amparo, established in the new Spanish Constitution of December 29,
1978.37
6. The mandado de seguranqa, which has been previously men-
tioned and which has been characterized by some writers as the
mandamiento de amparo, was introduced by the Brazilian Federal Con-
stitution of 1934."s The mandado de seguranQa proceeds specifically
against unconstitutional or illegal acts of administrative authorities and,
in general, against administrative acts of any authority that affect the
rights of the governed. In exceptional cases it also governs judicial deci-
sions. Theoretically, the writ cannot be brought against legislative enact-
ments that are considered to be unconstitutional, but can only be used to
challenge administrative acts or decisions that are based on unconstitu-
tional laws.
7. Finally, a mechanism peculiar to Latin American law should be
mentioned. It is the acci6n popular de inconstitucionalidad (popular act
of unconstitutionality), by which every citizen has standing to go before
his respective Supreme Court to challenge the constitutionality of a law.
If this claim is considered well-founded, the high court will declare the
law unconstitutional with general effects (erga omnes). The Organic Law
of the Supreme Court of Justice of July 30, 1976 and article 188, part I of
the Constitution of the Republic of Panama of 1972, and the Law on
Constitutional Appeals and Guarantees of October 24, 1956 as well as ar-
ticle 96 of the Constitution of El Salvador of 1962, all require a general
interest on the part of the claimant. This mechanism was provided for, at
least in theory, in articles 150 to 173 of the Constitution of the Republic
of Cuba of 1940, which was amended in 1959. Beginning in July 1973,
various reforms were established in the Cuban judicial system in accor-
dance with the Soviet model, all of which were reaffirmed in the Constitu-
tion of 1976.1' Provision was expressly made for the type of constitutional
control that predominates in the socialist legal systems and which will be
examined later in this survey.
D. The System of Continental Europe
1. French Constitutional Analysis
French constitutional analysis must be understood within the frame-
work of its traditional opposition to judicial review of the constitutional-
ity of the acts of authority. In the absence of a specific mechanism for the
37. THE SPANISH CONSTITUTION art. 53, Dec. 29, 1978.
38. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES OF BRAZIL art. 113, para. 33
(1934, as amended by art. 153, para. 21, Jan. 24, 1967).
39. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA, arts. 121-33, Feb. 24, 1976. The details of
the administration of the Cuban judiciary and its present form are found in the Law of
Organization of the Judicial System, June, 1973.
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protection of fundamental rights by courts of first impression, this protec-
tion has been entrusted in an indirect manner to two specialized organs:
the Council of State and the Constitutional Council, a political body.
a. French Council of State
The French Council of State, as an organ of administrative justice,
has acquired great prestige due to the notable work achieved by its court
decisions favoring the protection of civil liberties and the protection of
constitutionally guaranteed human rights. This Council takes its modern
form, by virtue of laws 6 and 7-11 of October 1790,40 issued by the Revo-
lutionary French Assembly, which placed it within the administration's
control, but from which it later gradually acquired its independence.
The law of May 24, 187241 should be noted as truly important in the
evolution of this institution. It transformed the judicial function of the
Council into a court of delegated jurisdiction with a certain degree of au-
tonomy in making decisions. The Law of September 30, 195342 further
reorganized the administrative justice system, establishing inferior ad-
ministrative courts of original jurisdiction in such a manner that, at pre-
sent, the Council of State operates, except for special cases, as a court of
appeals.
Three types of claims can be asserted before the Council of State: (1)
quo warranto (excess or abuse of power), which involves the nullification
of an administrative determination made by an incompetent authority
when procedural formalities have not been followed, or because of its fun-
damental illegality; (2) abuse of discretion (the most important jurispru-
dentially), which involves the examination of administrative acts and de-
cisions made in the exercise of discretional authority; and (3) general
administrative jurisdiction, which examines public services contracts and
the responsibility of public officials and the administration to the public
for such contracts.
Although the methods of challenge are not structured as specific rem-
edies for the procedural protection of fundamental rights, according to
some the Council of State has indirectly been converted into a "constitu-
tional judge." The Council looks to the preamble of the Constitution of
1958 as a source of fundamental "general principles of law." The Council
then applies them to controversies within its jurisdiction, and by these
principles has given the force of law to the Declaration of Rights of
1789,"1 completed by the Charter of 1946.""
40. See Letourner, El Consejo de Estado Franc~s, REvISTA DE LA COMISI6N INTERNA-
cIONAL DE JURISTAS, Dec., 1967, at 96-100.
41. Under the law of May 24, 1872, "executory force was given to the judgments of the
Conseil d'Etat." See C. HAMSON, EXECUTIVE DISCRETION AND JUDICIAL CONTROL 82 (1954).
42. H. Fix Zamudio, supra note 29, at 151.
43. Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, Aug. 26, 1789. For an English
translation of the Declaration, see J. BRISSAUD, A HISTORY OF FRENCH PUBLIC LAW 543-45 (J.
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b. Constitutional Council
The current Constitution of 1958"5 provided for the Constitutional
Council, with antecedents in the Constitutional Committee of the 1946
Charter.4 In accordance with articles 56 to 63, the Constitutional Council
must decide on the constitutionality of organic laws and rules of the As-
sembly before they are promulgated. At the request of either the Presi-
dent of the Republic, the Prime Minister, or a President of any of the two
legislative houses (the National Assembly or the Senate), any other law
can be submitted to the review of the Council. As a result, if the Council
decides that a law or rule is unconstitutional, it cannot be promulgated.
This Council played a very modest role in the constitutional control
of laws until 1971, when the Council came forth with a classic resolution
on the protection of freedom of association. The number of members of
the Council who were legal scholars increased and in 1974 amendments to
article 61 of the Constitution and article 18 of the Organic Law of the
Constitutional Council of November 7, 1958 created a new complaint
(saisine) by which members of parliament could raise the issue of consti-
tutionality of a law as a preventive measure. 7
This reform has stimulated a transformation of the activities of the
Constitutional Council. It has been converted into an effective organ for
the protection of fundamental rights by way of its prior review of numer-
ous legislative enactments. This is essentially due to the high number of
petitions from parliamentary groups. Doctrinally, the Council has come to
be considered as having truly constitutional jurisdiction."
2. Continental Constitutional Courts
Constitutional courts have been established in accordance with the
model initiated by the Austrian Constitution of 1920-29, with the support
of ideas from the well-known Hans Kelsen on the necessity of establish-
ing a true, specialized constitutional jurisdiction." It has become known
as the "Austrian" system of constitutional control, which is to be distin-
guished from the "American" system of constitutional control.
In very broad terms, it can be stated that there are two ways in
Garner trans. 1915).
44. Letourner, supra note 40, at 114-15.
45. CONSTrrUTION OF FRANCE arts. 56-63 (1958).
46. FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF OCTOBER 13, 1946, arts. 19 et seq.
47. H. Fix Zamudio, supra note 29, at 164.
48. Favoreu, 1977, Annke Charnire: le Dtveloppment de la saisine parlamentaire et
de la jurisprudence relative aux liberts et droits fondamentaux, REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC
ET DE LA SCIENCE POLITIQUE EN FRANCE ET A L' TRANGER, May-June 1978.
49. The AUSTRIAN FEDERAL CONSTITUTION of 1920-29 was re-established in 1945 and is
regulated by the Law on the Constitutional Court of 1953 in accordance with the Constitu-
tional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof). See H. Kelsen, La guarantia jurisdiccional de la
Constituti6n, I [1974] ANUARIO JURiDICO 471.
VOL. 13:1
GLOBAL SURVEY OF GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS
which constitutional courts can protect fundamental rights: first, through
the control of the constitutionality of law, that is to say, annulment with
effects erga omnes of legislation that is considered contrary to the funda-
mental rights guaranteed by the constitution; and second, by challenging
the constitutionality of acts by any authority, especially those of an ad-
ministrative nature that affect fundamental rights. Such legal challenges
can be made through such mechanisms as the constitutional appeal under
German law,50 and recently by means of the recurso de amparo provided
for by the Spanish Constitution of 1978.51
a. Articles 139 and 140 of the Austrian Federal Constitution of
1920-29 provide for review of the constitutionality of legislation, local or
federal, on petitions from the federal government or governments of the
federated states, respectively. Where some doubt exists as to the constitu-
tionality of a law applicable in an actual case, jurisdiction has been given
to the Supreme Court for Civil and Criminal Affairs (Oberster Gericht-
shof), and to the Supreme Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgericht-
shof) to suspend the proceedings and request that the fundamental rights
issue be resolved by the Constitutional Court.
b. The most elaborate system of this type is that established by ar-
ticles 93 and 94 of the 1949 Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Ger-
many,51 which was inspired by the Austrian system and which provides
for a Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht).
This Federal Constitutional Court recognizes claims made by federal
or state governments, challenging the constitutionality of state and fed-
eral laws respectively (abstrakte Normenkontrolle). In addition, it acts to
review issues raised by the courts when doubt exists as to the constitu-
tionality of laws applicable in cases being heard (Richterklage).
It ought to be noted that in the majority of West German states with
courts functioning at the local level and in the same manner as this Fed-
eral Court, there are various constitutional courts which carry out the
same functions, but which do not inhibit questions relating to the Federal
Constitution from reaching the Federal Constitutional Court."
c. The Constitution of the Italian Republic, which became effective
January 1, 1948, provided in articles 134 to 137 for a Constitutional
Court, which, for political reasons, could not function until 1956." In ac-
50. BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (Grundgesetz, cited GG), art.
93, § 4a, May 23, 1949 (as amended by the Federal Law of Jan. 29, 1969).
51. THE SPANISH CONSTITUTION, Title IX, arts. 159-65, Dec. 29, 1978.
52. The BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (Grundgesetz, cited GG),
May 23, 1949, inspired by the Austrian system, provides for a Constitutional Court
(Bundesverfassungsgericht), and is regulated by its Organic Law of March 12, 1951 (as
amended).
53. H. Fix Zarnudio, supra note 29, at 180.
54. "Largely because of the difficulty of selecting judges in a turbulent political climate,
the Court was not instituted until 1956." M. CAPPELLETTI, J. MERRYMAN & J. PERILLO, THE
ITALIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 77 (1967).
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cordance with the Austrian model, this constitutional court takes jurisdic-
tion of claims made directly by the national government or by autono-
mous regions regarding adherence to the Constitution of local or national
laws. It differs from the Austrian model because the issue of constitu-
tionality can be brought by the courts. When the question of constitu-
tionality arises in an actual case, before a judge of a lower court can con-
sider the issue to be justiciable, he must suspend the proceedings until
the issue is resolved by the appropriate constitutional court.55
d. Title IX, articles 159 to 165 of the Spanish Constitution, which
became effective December 29, 1978, provides for the structure and juris-
diction of the Constitutional Court, which very closely follows the exam-
ples of Austria and the Federal Republic of Germany. The Court's or-
ganic law was promulgated October 3, 1979.26 The above provisions
establish the constitutional appeal as the means by which the following
people or bodies can bring a claim of the unconstitutionality of national
laws, provisions having the force of law and provisions of the Autonomous
Committees before the Constitutional Court: the president of the govern-
ment, the public defender (Ombudsman), fifty deputies, fifty senators, or
the executive bodies of the Autonomous Communities. As in Italy, under
article 163, judges in Spain also have access to this court if the issue is
raised in an actual case. 57
e. A similar although unique system has been created by the Con-
stitution of the Portuguese Republic of April 25, 1976. Articles 280 to 282
regulate the jurisdiction and function of an organ of constitutional control
called the Council of the Revolution. The Council, which is predomi-
nantly comprised of the military, is competent to declare laws unconstitu-
tional at the request of the President of the Republic, the President of
the Assembly, the Prime Minister, the Promoter of Justice
(Ombudsman), the Attorney General of the Republic or the Assembly of
Autonomous Regions. The Council of the Revolution is also competent to
declare a legislative rule unconstitutional with general, binding effect
when the Constitutional Commission, its administrative body, finds it to
be contrary to the Constitution as applied in three actual cases, or in only
one case, if it is found prima facie unconstitutional."
f. A Supreme Constitutional Court was introduced in articles 133 to
151 of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, promulgated August
55. "The competence of, and procedures before, the Court, as well as the necessary
suspension of civil proceedings, are governed by the Constitution [arts. 127 & 13437], consti-
tutional laws [Constitutional Laws of Feb. 9, 1948, no. 1 and Mar. 11, 1953, no. 87] and
ordinary legislation [Law of Mar. 11, 1953, no. 87 and Law of Mar. 18, 1958, no. 265]." Id. at
117.
56. Organic Law of the Constitutional Court, Oct. 3, 1979.
57. "When a court of law considers a legal norm determinative of a case, but of doubt-
ful constitutional validity, it will submit the matter to the Constitutional Court in such
cases ...." G. Glos, The New Spanish Constitution, Comments and Full Text, 7 HAS-
TINGS CONST. L.Q. 127 (1980).
58. CONSTITUTION OF THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC arts. 277-78 & 280-82, Apr. 25, 1976.
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16, 1960. The Court had extremely disparate and complicated powers, but
had the fundamental purpose of achieving an equilibrium between the
Greek and Turkish communities in accordance with the principles of the
Constitution. This Court and the Court of Appeals were abolished in
June 1964 in favor of a Supreme Court that combines the functions of
both.5 '
g. In articles 145 to 152 of the Constitution of the Republic of Tur-
key, promulgated July 9, 1961, a constitutional court was established and
expressly modeled after those of Italy and the Federal Republic of
Germany.60
h. A Constitutional Court was created by the Greek Constitution of
1968." Drafted according to the Austrian model and with some influence
from the German system, it existed, however, only theoretically by virtue
of the authoritarian Government of the Colonels. The Constitution of
June 9, 1975 abolished this court. Article 100 of the 1975 Constitution
created a special court with jurisdiction over questions of the funda-
mental constitutionality or constitutional interpretations of laws when
contradictory decisions have been made by the Council of State, the
Court of Appeal, or the Exchequer.
i. In some socialist countries, the door has been opened to the influ-
ence of the Austrian system. It was effectively introduced into the Consti-
tution of the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia, 2 which aban-
doned the Soviet system of constitutional control in order to follow the
example of the Federal Republic of Germany. In articles 241 and 251 of
the Constitution of April 7, 1963, as well as in the constitutions of all six
republics that comprise the Federative People's Republic (promulgated
the same year), the federal constitutional court and local constitutional
courts, respectively, were established. In the two Federated Republics
that comprise the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, a Federal Constitu-
tional Court, as well as local constitutional courts, exist by virtue of the
Constitutional Amendment of October 27, 1968,s" lacking only the neces-
sary regulatory laws.
3. Austrian Influence On Latin American Constitutional Courts
With regard to Latin America, there have been various laws which
59. Administration of Justice Law, Miscellaneous Provisions, July 9, 1964.
60. The Law on a Constituent Assembly was promulgated on June 29, 1981, forming a
Constituent Assembly to draft a constitution on political parties and an electoral law. It is
not known whether the new constitution will provide for a constitutional court.
61. CONSTITUTION OF G EECE arts. 95 et seq, Sept. 29, 1968.
62. These Republics are the People's Republic of Serbia, the People's Republic of Croa-
tia, the People's Republic of Slovenia, the People's Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the
People's Republic of Macedonia and the People's Republic of Montenegro.
63. Constitutional Law No. 143/1968 of Oct. 27 set up the Czechoslovak Socialist Re-
public as a federative state of two equal fraternal nations: the Czech Socialist Republic and
the Slovak Socialist Republic.
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have introduced specialized constitutional courts according to the Aus-
trian model.
a. The Court of Constitutionality established in the Guatemalan
Constitution 4 is regulated by articles 105 to 111 of the Law of Amparo,
Habeas Corpus and Constitutionality of April 20, 1966.
b. The Constitutional Court of Chile 5 functioned actively from
1971 until 1973, when it was abolished by the military junta that came to
power in September of that year.
c. The Court of Constitutional Guarantees established by the Ecua-
dorean Constitution of January 15, 1978 does not have decisional powers
equal to those of the National House of Representatives. However, when
the House is not in session, the Court can formulate observations on the
conformity of legislation to the Constitution."6
d. The Peruvian Constitution of 1979 established a Court of Consti-
tutional Guarantees similar to the Austrian model, wherein it empowered
the court to declare, with general effect, the total or partial constitution-
ality of legislation. The court can be petitioned by the following: the Pres-
ident of the Republic, the Supreme Court of Justice, the Attorney Gen-
eral, sixty deputies, twenty senators, or 50,000 citizens with signatures
verified by the National Panel of Elections. 7
e. Finally, the evolution of Colombian constitutional law, referred
to previously as the acci6n popular de inconstitucionalidad, is high-
lighted in the amendments to the Constitution of 1968. A constitutional
division was established at the headquarters of the Supreme Court of
Justice to advise and formulate opinions as to the constitutionality of
laws before such questions would be decided by the full court." Through
the recent reforms of December 7, 1979, autonomy was given to this court
to decide most questions of constitutionality in such a manner that, al-
though it still forms a part of the Supreme Court, it in fact has been
converted into a truly specialized constitutional court.6 9
4. Direct Constitutional Claims
Another way exists by which constitutional courts can protect human
rights, aside from a general declaration of the constitutionality of a law or
64. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GUATEMALA arts. 262-65, Sept. 15, 1965.
65. The Court was established in a Jan. 21, 1970 amendment to the Constitution of the
Republic of Chile of 1925.
66. CONSTITUTION OF ECUADOR arts. 140-41, Jan. 15, 1978. The Court of Constitutional
Guarantees does not have decisional powers equal to that of the National House of Repre-
sentatives or to plenary sessions of legislative committees. However, when they are not in
session, the Court can formulate observations on the conformity of legislation to the
Constitution.
67. POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF PERU arts. 298 & 299, July 12, 1979, effective July, 1980.
68. Decree No. 432 of 1969.
69. THE CONSTITUTION OF COLOMBIA art. 214 (as amended Dec. 4, 1979).
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by constitutional appeal. This remedy exists when a specialized constitu-
tional court of the Supreme Court accepts claims from persons whose
fundamental rights have allegedly been infringed by some official act,
particularly an administrative one.
The countries which merit special attention for providing this proce-
dure for constitutional protection of fundamental rights are Austria, the
Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland, and recently Spain, which
calls the remedy "recurso de amparo" as a result of Mexican influence.
a. In the Austrian system, the Beschwerde, or complaint, emerged
during the previous century in the Constitutional Law of the Superior
Court of the Empire (Reichsgericht) on December 21, 1897 and was per-
fected by article 144 of the Constitution of 1920-29, which was re-estab-
lished in 1945.70
b. The specific instrument for protecting human rights in the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany is called the Verfassungsbeschwerde, or consti-
tutional complaint. Similar institutions existed in the provincial constitu-
tions of Bavaria of 1919 and 1946, but were not provided for in the
original text of the Constitution of 1949. It was later introduced in arti-
cles 90 to 96 of the Law on the Federal Constitutional Court of 1951,"
and was subsequently elevated to constitutional status through the
amendment of January 29, 1969."
This petition of appeal can be presented to the Federal Constitu-
tional Court or to the state constitutional courts by any individual or
group whose fundamental constitutional rights have been affected.
Considering that the Verfassungsbeschwerde has been the method
by which more than ninety-five percent of all constitutional questions
have been brought before the Federal Constitutional Court, it is apparent
that it has assumed great importance in German constitutional law.
c. Although a specialized constitutional court has not been created
in Switzerland, article 113, paragraph 3 of the Federal Constitution of
May 29, 1874 provides for an appeal of public right (Staatsrechtliche
Beschwerde) by which any citizen can have recourse to the Federal Court.
Complaints are limited to the challenge of administrative, legislative and
judicial acts by the canton authorities when such acts infringe the funda-
mental rights recognized by the Federal Constitution or the Constitutions
of each canton.
d. The Spanish Constitution, which became effective on December
29, 1978, re-establishes the remedy of amparo that had appeared in the
Republican Constitution of 1931. This remedy is a final appeal to the
Constitutional Court available to any citizen, the Public Defender, or the
70. The Beschwerde is regulated by Arts. 82-88 of the Law on the Constitutional Court
(Verfassungsgerichtshofgesetz) of 1953 and its effectiveness has been amplified by the re-
cent federal law which became effective July 1, 1976.
71. Organic Law of Mar. 12, 1951 (as amended).
72. BASIC LAW OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY art. 93, § I, 4.2, Jan. 29, 1969.
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Attorney General.7"
The Organic Law of the Court, as well as the Constitution, recognizes
that there is no law specifically creating the action of amparo in the lower
courts. The laws require that resort be made to the amparo only after the
regular administrative adversarial process or the protective proceeding
described in the Organic Act has taken place."'
E. The Instrument of Socialist Legal Systems: The Procurator
1. Historical Background
The Procurator is not the sole agency that can be used for the pro-
tection of fundamental rights provided by the socialist constitutions.
There exists a definite remedy, such as in article 58 of the Constitution of
the U.S.S.R. of October 7, 1977, which provides that citizens whose con-
stitutional rights have been infringed may obtain judicial review25 The
Procurator has been the major source for strengthening protection of so-
cialist legality, including what we call human rights. The Procurator has
its origin in the office known as the Procurador, utilized during Czarist
times. In 1918, Lenin introduced the Procurator in its present form to
serve as an organ of control and defense of the socialist legality in the
nascent Soviet state, while the primary organic law was enacted in 1922.76
In examining the structure and function of the Procurator in the Soviet
Union, one is able to view the institution as it exists in the Communist
bloc nations.
a. Structure
In the Soviet Union, the Procurator is a very complex body, organ-
ized in a hierarchical form and headed by the Procurator General of the
U.S.S.R., who has been appointed by the Supreme Soviet of the Union for
a period of five years (seven years in the Constitution of 1936). The Proc-
urator is responsible only to the Supreme Soviet or, during the time be-
tween its sessions, to the Presidium.7 ' The Procurator General directs the
73. THE SPANISH CONSTITUTION art. 162, §1(b), Dec. 29, 1978. For a translation of the
Constitution, see Glos, note 57 supra.
74. H. Fix Zamudio, supra note 29, aL 201.
75. Article 58, as translated in THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE USSR AND THE UNION RE-
PUBLICS: ANALYSIS, TEXTS, REPORTS (F.J.M. Feldbrugge ed. 1979), essentially provides that
citizens of the U.S.S.R. have the right to address complaints against the actions of officials
and of state organizations. The complaints can be brought to a court, in the manner estab-
lished by law, against actions which violate the law or exceed the authority of an official,
and which infringe the citizen's rights. There is also a right to compensation for damages
inflicted by unlawful actions of the state agencies or officials in the course of performing
their official duties.
76. See G. SMITH, THE SOVIET PROCURACY AND THE SUPERVISION OF ADMINISTRATION 46
(1978).
77. CONSTITUTION (FUNDAMENTAL LAW) OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
arts. 165-68, Oct. 7, 1977; Organic Law of the Procurator of Nov. 30, 1979 (U.S.S.R.), arts. 6
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central organ, located in Moscow, which is divided into various secretari-
ats and departments for carrying out its numerous functions, including
those of the Chief Military Procuracy and the Transportation
Procuracy.7
There are three lower levels subordinate to the Procurator General,
the first of which is comprised of the Procurators of the Union Republics
and of the Autonomous Republics. Next are the Procurators of the terri-
tories, provinces, and autonomous regions, all of which are directly ap-
pointed by the Procurator General. The lowest level is comprised of the
Procurators of the autonomous areas, districts, and cities, named by the
Procurators of the Union Republics and confirmed by the Procurator
General. All of these Procurators serve for five years.7 9
b. Functions
It is difficult to classify the function of the Soviet Procurator. He is
neither a judge nor an administrative official nor in a strict sense a public
official, but he has aspects of all of these since he gives direction to and
supervises socialist policy. 0
The Procurator has two principal functions: that of a public official,
because the Procurator has charge of criminal prosecutions as well as the
authority to impose disciplinary and administrative sanctions against offi-
cials and citizens who contravene the law,"1 and that of supervising the
prisons, with the power to order the immediate release of all persons ille-
gally detained or held without legal basis."2
Second, according to articles 22 to 25 of the Regulatory law, the
Procurator carries out what is considered the most important of its func-
tions: the supervision and enforcement of socialist policy with regard to a
great portion of public officials, social and economic organizations, and
citizens. Excluded from the Procurator's control are the highest organs of
the state, such as the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. and those of the
Union and Autonomous Republics. The Council of Ministers in the local
and federal sphere (certainly with respect to individual officials), as well
& 8.
78. Organic Law of the Procurator of Nov. 30, 1979 (U.S.S.R.), art. 14.
79. CONSTITUTION (FUNDAMENTAL LAW) OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
arts. 16667; Organic Law of the Procurator of Nov. 30, 1979 (U.S.S.R.), arts. 7, 15 & 16.
80. Art. 164 of the FEDERAL CONSTITUTION of 1977 provides that:
The supreme supervision of the exact and uniform execution of the laws
by all the ministries, state committees, and departments, enterprises, institu-
tions and organizations, executive and administrative organs of the local Soviet
of People's Deputies; the koijoses (collective farms); cooperatives and other
social organizations, and public officials as well as citizens, is to be undertaken
by the Procurator General of the USSR and the Procurators that are
subordinate to him.
81. Regulatory Law of 1979, art. 15.
82. Id. at art. 34.
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as the Communist Party which exercises control over the activities of
Procurators, are also exempt from the scrutiny of the Procurator.
The procedures by which the Procurator General and the remaining
Procurators at various levels exercise supervision of socialist policy can be
classified in two categories. The first is the "protest," which can be de-
fined as a complaint made by a Procurator in order that an official or his
immediate superior may correct a violation or remedy an error or defi-
ciency in order to enforce socialist policy. The protest can also be brought
to the courts as a means of challenging allegedly illegal decisons8s Sec-
ond, Procurators, at their respective levels, can present a proposal or rec-
ommendation before the organs of state, public officials, or social organi-
zations, with the purpose of putting an end to violations of the law and
the causes which make such violations possible. The necessary measures
to eliminate such violations and underlying causes are taken within a pe-
riod of one month. 4 This activity can be compared to that of the
Ombudsman in Scandinavia (examined infra). As was previously men-
tioned, the Procurator system has penetrated all of the socialist legal sys-
tems inspired by the Soviet model and has been regulated in a manner
similar to that which has just been described. 5
2. Procurator General of the Republic
We refer briefly to the office of the Fiscalia Generdl (Prosecutor
General of the Republic) provided for in the Cuban Socialist Constitution
of February 24, 1976.8' This institution, clearly inspired by the Soviet
Procurator and socialist laws, was first introduced in the 1973 amend-
ments to the previous Constitution of 1959.7 In accordance with the So-
viet model, these constitutional provisions provide that the office of Pros-
ecutor General include the prosecutors (fiscalias) of the provinces,
municipalities, and the military, with the highest officials appointed by
the General Assembly of Popular Power; the next level by the Council of
State; and the lowest level by the same Prosecutor General, all for a pe-
riod of five years with possible reappointment by the appointing organs."
83. Id. at arts. 29 & 30.
84. Id. at art. 28.
85. CONSTrrTION OF ALBANIA arts. 84-88 (1946); CONsirrV'UON OF THE GERMAN DEMO-
CRATIC RmUBLIC arts. 97-98 (1967) (as amended 1974); CONSTITUTION OF BULGARIA art. 97,
para. 1 (1960) (as amended 1968); CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC O CHINA art. 43
(1978); CONSTITUTION OF HUNGARY arts. 42-44 (1954); CONSTITUTION OF POLAND arts. 45-46
(1952); and CONSTITUTION OF RUMANIA arts. 105-08 (1965).
86. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA art. 130, Feb. 24, 1976.
87. FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF THE REPUBLIC of 1959 (1973).
88. Law of Court Organization, arts. 106-42, Aug. 10, 1977. Authors Harold J. Bermand
and Van R. Whiting in Impressions of Cuban Law, 29 AM. J. CoMp. L. 475, 480 (1980) note:
[t]he Cuban Fiscalia Generdl must investigate and answer any complaint
whether from an individual or a government agency, within 20 days; if the Fis-
calia finds that there has been an administrative violation or deficiency, the
officials charged must correct it within 20 days or the Fiscalia will protest their
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II. THE EXECUTIVE SOLUTION: THE OMBUDSMAN
A. Overview and Background
The Ombudsman has a clearly Scandinavian origin. Its name comes
from a Swedish word that signifies representative, delegate or agent. It
usually refers to one or more officials who have been appointed, in accor-
dance with the original model, by the parliament, although there is a
growing tendency for the Ombudsman to be named by the executive
branch. The Ombudsman's principal functions are to investigate viola-
tions of fundamental rights of individuals by administrative authorities
and to propose, although without binding effect, the most effective solu-
tions to avoid or remedy these violations.
The Ombudsman emerged in the Regerisform (the Swedish constitu-
tional law on the form of government) of June 6, 1809. With antecedents
in the Chancellor of Justice, an Ombudsman was created by the Crown in
the 18th century as a representative of the king for the supervision of
administrative officials. 9 At first, the Swedish Ombudsman was chosen
by the Parliament (Riksdag) for the purpose of supervising the function
of the courts, from which it has derived its present name, Justi-
tieombudsman. Slowly, its supervision was extended to administrative
authorities and thus it remained until 1915, when an Ombudsman for
military affairs, or Militieombudsman was established.9 0 Thereafter, the
institution experienced a slow but gradual evolution so that at present it
has acquired a very complex structure.
In effect, in accordance with chapter 12, article 6 of the constitu-
tional document called the Instrument of Government, 91 there exist four
Ombudsmen (Justitieombudsmen). They deal with separate matters (in-
cluding military subjects, as the Military Ombudsman was eliminated in
1967), and one of the four serves as President. 2
In Sweden there also exist two other officials, as well as a representa-
failure to do so to their superiors. The Fiscalia cannot compel an agency or
organization to change its practice; however, the authors were told that the
possibility of protest to superiors alone is usually sufficient to induce the offi-
cial to accept the Fiscalia's warning or recommendation.
Presently, the Fiscalia is regulated by Articles 130-33 of the Constitution of February
24, 1976, which provides for "a fundamental purpose, the control of the socialist legality by
supervising the organs of the state, social and economic entities, and the citizens to ensure
their strict compliance with the law and other legal requirements."
89. See A. LEGRAND, L'OMBUDSMAN SCANDINAVE; ETUDES COMPAR9ES SUR LE CONTR6LE
DE L'ADMINISTRATION 15-26 (1970).
90. See Kenkow, El Ombudsman de Asuntos Militares, in D. ROWAT, EL OMBUDSMAN:
EL DEFENSOR DEL CIUDADANO 89-97 (E. Suitrez trans. 1973).
91. Law of Court Organization, arts. 106-42, Aug. 10, 1977.
92. The article Ombudsman and Other Complaint-Handling Systems Survey in 9 IN-
TERNATIONAL OMBUDSMAN INSTITUTE (1979-80) states that "[e]ach (of the four) Ombudsman
has a field of supervision." Briefly, their activities are divided into criminal justice, the mili-
tary, social welfare, and general government administration.
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tive of press organizations, who have received the name of Ombudsman
because of the similarity of their powers to those possessed by the au-
thentic Parliamentary Commissioners. The first, the Ombudsman for
Protection of the Freedom of Trade, initiated its activities in 1954, for the
purpose of protecting against restrictive trade practices."' The Consumer
Ombudsman emerged in 1971 with the purpose of ensuring that such laws
as the Marketing Act, the Unfair Contract Terms Act and the Consumer
Credit Act are observed.14 Both of these officials are appointed by the
King for the Council of Ministers. Since 1959, the Ombudsman for the
press has been chosen by the journalists' organizations and has remained
independent and autonomous in carrying out its oversight of professional
ethics and the protection of individuals from invasion of privacy. An
Equality Ombudsman has also been created to prohibit discrimination
based on sex. In certain circumstances, he will be able to take a case to
court on behalf of an individual.96
B. Diffusion of the Ombudsman
In the years following World War I and more extensively after World
War II, the Ombudsman system was implemented in other Scandinavian
countries and subsequently in various Western legal systems. It has been
said that there is a true need for the establishment of the Ombudsman in
even the most diverse systems. The French writer, Andre Legrand, has
classified it as a "universal institution."9
A simple description of the accelerated development of the institu-
tion of the Ombudsman would be difficult. Solely for the purposes of this
survey, the following division of the material will be made: the remaining
Scandinavian countries; the countries of the Commonwealth; the United
States; the laws of Continental Europe; the possibility of its establish-
ment in Latin America; and finally, its emergence in developing countries.
1. Other Scandinavian Countries
In the first group of those which have been heavily influenced by the
Swedish model, the Scandinavian countries, the following is noted:
a. Finland, in obtaining its independence from Russia and in writ-
ing the Constitution of July 17, 1979, introduced the Ombudsman in arti-
- 4, AAIh. follows the Swe ih model very closely. The Ombudsman's
activities have been regulated by the law of January 10, 1920, with subse-
quent modifications.
b. By reason of the amendment to the Constitution of Denmark in
93. H. Fix Zamudio, supra note 29, at 287.
94. See Stemberg, L'Ombudsman Sukdas pour les Consommateurs, REVUE INTERNA-
TIONAL DE DROIT COMPARA 577-81 (1974).
95. Fix Zamudio, supra note 29, at 287.
96. Law of Dec. 13, 1979.
97. Legrand, supra note 89, at 3.
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1953, the figure of the Parliamentary Commissioner was created in article
55,98 which establishes the organization and functions of the Ombudsman
des Foketing along the lines of the Swedish model and Finnish precedent.
c. In Norway, two Parliamentary Commissioners were established
with diverse responsibilities. The first was created to receive complaints
regarding the military (Ombudsman for Forsvaret).99  Another
Ombudsman was established to deal with civil administrative matters
(Sivil Ombudsman for Forvaltningen).'0 0 In addition, in 1973 a consumer
Ombudsman, to be appointed by the government, was created according
to the Swedish example.'
0
'
Generally, in the Scandinavian countries, Ombudsmen are selected
by the Parliament (with some exceptions in Sweden and Norway), but
retain a certain autonomy. Citizens have direct access to the Ombudsmen,
and the Ombudsmen have complete authority to accept or reject petitions
and the full power to carry out all types of investigations. They can for-
mulate recommendations that are non-binding, but that are accepted in
the majority of cases by the respective officials. They must also submit
annual reports to the Parliament and, when necessary, certain special
reports.'10
2. The British Commonwealth
The Ombudsman has been established in the legal systems of the
British Commonwealth. Within this second group, the laws of the United
Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and India have the greatest importance.
a. New Zealand
The first common-law country to establish a Parliamentary Commis-
sioner following the Scandinavian model was New Zealand, whose institu-
tion has had a considerable influence in other countries of the British
Commonwealth. The institution was introduced in legislation called the
Parliamentary Commissioner Ombudsman Act of 1962,03 culminating in
the Ombudsman Act of June 26, 1975, which entered into effect the be-
ginning of April 1976. The new law of 1975 established a collegial system
of three Ombudsmen, each with a defined territorial scope (Wellington,
Christ Church and Auckland). They are appointed by the Governor Gen-
eral at the proposal of the New Zealand Parliament for a period of three
years (which equals the term of that legislative body). They also may be
98. Ombudsman Act of Sept. 11, 1954 (amended 1959 and 1961).
99. Law of April 21, 1952 (as amended).
100. Law of June 22, 1962 (amended Mar. 22, 1968, 1980); Regulation of June 8, 1969.
101. H. Fix Zamudio, supra note 29, at 292.
102. Rowat, supra note 90, at 39.
103. This act was modified in 1968, 1969, and in 1970. It later culminated in the
Ombudsman Act of June 26, 1975, effective April 1976.
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reappointed.10
b. Great Britain
The office of Ombudsman was introduced in Great Britain under a
law called The Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration Act that
became effective April 1, 1967 for England, Wales and Scotland. 101 This
Commissioner possesses special powers by virtue of being appointed by
the Crown. At the request of the two houses of Parliament, the
Ombudsman is elected for an indefinite term. However, he must retire at
age 65. He is not subject, even indirectly, to the duration of a Parlia-
mentary appointment. In addition, what is most important is that, unlike
the Scandinavian model, this Commissioner cannot act on behalf of, nor
directly receive complaints from, citizens who have been affected by the
administrative authorities. Instead, a citizen must present his or her
claim to a member of the House of Commons, who in turn reviews it and
sends it on to the Commissioner. The Commissioner then undertakes an
investigation and formulates the pertinent recommendations which are
communicated to the member who solicited such intervention.'"
Notwithstanding these limitations, the Commissioner has played an
important part in the solution of problems emanating from government
administration. Through the National Health Services (Scotland) Act,
passed in 1972,107 and the National Health Services Act of 1973,18 a Par-
liamentary Commissioner for Health was established with jurisdiction in
England, Scotland and Wales. This Ombudsman function is carried out
as an additional activity of the Commissioner for Administration. Those
affected by the activities of public institutions, such as medical social se-
curity, can go directly to the Commissioner of Health after having gone to
their respective government agencies.109
The evolution of the British Ombudsman culminated in the estab-
lishment of the Commissioners for Local Administration, in accordance
with the Local Government Act of 1974.110 At the present time, five com-
missioners have been designated, three for England, and the other two for
Wales and Scotland. Their functions are similar to those of the Parlia-
mentary Commissioner for Administration, except that they deal with
problems arising in local government administration. A further difference
is that if citizens have first gone to their local government representative
(such as a city council member) who is obligated to receive complaints,
and the complaint is not sent on to the Commissioner, the complaining
citizen may go directly to the Commissioner to request an investigation
104. H. Fix Zamudio, supra note 29, at 298.
105. Parliamentary Commissioner Act, 1967, ch. 13.
106. Id. §§ 1, 6, 7 & 10(1).
107. National Health Service (Scotland) Act, 1972, ch. 58.
108. National Health Service Reorganization Act, 1973, ch. 32.
109. Id. Pt. III, § 35.
110. Local Government Act, 1974, ch. 7.
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and to make recommendations to the appropriate authorities. " '
c. Northern Ireland
With regard to Northern Ireland (which is legislatively autonomous
from Great Britain) two parliamentary commissioners' positions were cre-
ated. The first, the Northern Ireland Parliamentary Commissioner for
Administration, is similar in organization and function to the Commis-
sioner in Great Britain. He can be directly approached only by members
of the Irish Parliament." 2
The second, the Northern Ireland Commissioner for Complaints, was
created for complaints against local authorities, and provides for the pos-
sibility of immediate access by those who have been injured. " 8 In accor-
dance with legislation passed in 1969, these two functions are carried out
by the same person, which is similar to the British model."
d. Australia
The Australian legal system, a federal system, has been influenced by
the New Zealand Commissioner (which is closer to the Scandinavian
model than to the British model) and has followed its essential features
with some variations. The office has been gradually established in the
Australian states as well as in the Northern Territory." 5
A federal law, the Ombudsman Act of 1976, introduced the commis-
sioner at a national level and the first Commonwealth Ombudsman initi-
ated activities upon being appointed in March 1977. The Commonwealth
Ombudsman had two assistants, one of them having jurisdiction in the
Federal Capital of Canberra, and the other in the Northern Territory un-
til 1978.116 In 1978 Australia granted legislative autonomy to the North-
ern Territory, at which time the law establishing its own Ombudsman
came into effect." 7
e. Canada
Canada has experienced an evolution of this institution similar to
111. Id. Pt. III, § 26.
112. Parliamentary Commissioner Act, 1969 (Northern Ireland). See H. Fix Zamudio,
supra note 29, at 297.
113. Parliamentary Commissioner Act, 1969 (Northern Ireland).
114. Id.
115. The Ombudsman was first established in West Australia through the Parliamen-
tary Commissioner Act of 1971, in Southern Australia by the Ombudsman Act of 1972
(amended 1974), in Victoria by the Ombudsman Act of 1973, in Queensland by the Parlia-
mentary Commissioner Act of 1974, in New South Wales by the Ombudsman Act of 1974
(amended 1976), and in the Northern Territory by the Northern Territory Ombudsman Or-
dinance of 1978 (effective Jan. 31, 1979).
116. Ombudsman Act, 1976, art. 14.
117. Ombudsman (Northern Territory) Ordinance, 1977.
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that of Australia. Due to its federal structure, the office was first estab-
lished in the provinces, beginning in New Brunswick and Alberta in 1967.
Quebec followed in 1968 with the creation of the Protecteur du Citoyen.
Nova Scotia and Manitoba established the office in 1969, and Ontario and
Newfoundland did so in 1975, the latter designating an Ombudsman in
accordance with a law first approved in 1970 but amended in 1975. Fi-
nally, British Columbia created the office by law, effective September 1,
1977.11
At the national level, various proposals have been presented for the
creation of a national Ombudsman. There has been success only in the
establishment of two officials with very specialized responsibility: the
Commissioner of Official Languages, who investigates complaints of the
failure to fulfill official requirements for the use of English and French in
public agencies; 1 9 and the Correctional Investigator, who receives com-
plaints from those detained by the federal penitentiary authorities.12
f. Israel
Israel's legal system has been greatly influenced by Anglo-American
law, and a discussion of Israeli Ombudsmen seems appropriate in this
section. In Israel the Ombudsman was established in 1971 as Controller
General, a special position within the state controller's office. 2 ' Since this
controller is appointed by the Israeli Parliament (Knesset), the
Ombudsman ought to be considered as a Parliamentary Commissioner.
The Controller General operates as commissioner for complaints from the
public and is assisted by a special unit whose director is appointed by a
Knesset committee upon recommendation of the Controller. In order to
facilitate access by citizens, who are permitted to make complaints di-
rectly to the Controller General, offices have been established in the cities
of Haifa, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv.' A Soldier's Complaint Commissioner
was also appointed under the Military Justice Law of 1972 to receive
complaints from armed forces personnel. This Commissioner is appointed
by the Minister of Defense in consultation with the Minister of Justice
and with the approval of the Foreign Affairs and Security Committees of
the Parliament. 2 3
g. India
The Republic of India, with its federal structure, does not have the
designation of a national Parliamentary Commissioner. The institution,
with the name of Lokayuta or Upa Lokayuta, has been introduced in
118. H. Fix Zanudio, supra note 29, at 31516.
119. Official Languages Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. 0-2 (1970).
120. Penitentiary Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. P-6, § 12 (1970).
121. H. Fix Zarnudio, supra note 29, at 304.
122. Id. at 30405.
123. Id. at 305.
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various states, such as Bihar (1973), Maharashtra (1971), Rajasthan
(1973) and Uttar Pradesh (1975)."24
3. The United States
The Ombudsman has emerged in diverse forms in the United States
due to the country's federal structure. Many of these agencies and their
officials have only a superficial similarity to either the basic Scandinavian
model or to one of its varieties.
In the United States, as in Canada, various proposals have been
presented to Congress to create a federal agency to function as an
Ombudsman, but as of this date, these efforts have not been successful.
In contrast, the states have been active in this area, and two types of
offices can be classified as Ombudsmen. The first contains the features of
the Parliamentary Commissioner of the Scandinavian model; the other,
which has proliferated at the local as well as at the state level, can be
characterized as an executive Ombudsman, i.e., appointed by the execu-
tive and not the legislative branch. This procedure can be explained by
considering the character of the system that exists in the United States.
The states that have introduced the institution in accordance with
the Scandinavian model are Hawaii (1967); Nebraska (1969); Iowa (1972);
New Jersey (1974); and Alaska (1975).'25 In all of them the official is ap-
pointed by and dependent upon the local legislature, although he retains
a certain autonomy. The office in these five jurisdictions is given the
power to receive complaints directly from citizens regarding the acts of
administrative authorities, and to investigate and formulate proposals or
recommendations, which have no binding effect. In addition, it must send
an annual report to the state legislature. Puerto Rico has also enacted an
Ombudsman Act (1977).1 26
The second type of Ombudsman, which is appointed by the Execu-
tive, is being created at various governmental levels throughout the
United States. A few examples are the Department of Neighborhood
Complaints in Chicago; the Office of Information and Complaints in Hon-
olulu; the Little City Hall Program in Boston, the Ombudsman of Nassau
County in New York City; the Lieutenant Governor's office in some
states; the Office of the State Citizen's Aid of Iowa; and the Ombudsman
of Oregon, which has officially been given the classic title.
4. Continental Europe
In Continental Europe, the Ombudsman has been established with
124. F. STACY, OMBUDSMEN COMPARED 231 (1978).
125. ALASKA STAT. tit. 24, ch. 55 (1978); HAWAII REV. STAT. tit. 8, ch. 96 (1976); IOWA
CODE ANN. ch. 601G (1934); NB. REV. STAT. §§ 818, 240 (1976); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-57G
(West Supp. 1982-83).
126. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 3, ch. 24, § 531 (1978).
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some variations. The Federal Republic of Germany has a national
Ombudsman for Military Matters, and in the German state of Rhineland-
Palatinate, there is an Ombudsman for Administrative Matters. In other
European nations the office carries various titles; for example, in France,
the Mediateur; in Switzerland, the Ombudsman in the Canton and city of
Zurich; the Promoter of Justice in Portugal; and the Public Defender in
Spain. This position arguably exists as well in the local laws of Catalan
and the Basque Region.
a. Federal Republic of Germany
The first country of Continental Europe to introduce the
Ombudsman according to the Scandinavian example was the Federal Re-
public of Germany, although this position dealt exclusively with military
affairs.197
The Parliamentary Commissioner of the Legislature of the Province
of Rhineland-Palatinate (Bidrgerbeauftragte des Landestages Rheinland
Pfalz) was established by the law of May 31, 1974 for the purpose of in-
vestigating either complaints made directly to it, or those that had been
presented to the Provincial Parliamentary Petitions Commission from
citizens of this state about local administrative authorities.
b. France
An Ombudsman of major importance in the development of this in-
stitution in Continental Europe is the French Mediateur. The special
characteristics of this office are partly a result of the semi-presidential
structure of the French Constitution of October 1958. The Mediateur is
appointed by the Executive for one term of six years under a decree is-
sued by the Council of Ministers, yet at the same time retains certain
autonomy from the government, since he cannot be dismissed except by
impeachment proceedings by the Council of State.1'28
The French have also followed the British system by declining to
permit direct claims by citizens to the Mediateur. Instead, such claims
must be made first to a member of the National Assembly or the Senate
and, if considered appropriate, will be sent to the Mediateur to carry out
an investigation and formulate the recommendations considered neces-
sary to resolve the issue. The Mediateur can also present general observa-
tions on administrative procedures in his annual report, including sugges-
tions to reform specific legislation."'9
Although the Mediateur has been received with skepticism doctri-
127. BASIC LAW OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY art. 45 (amended Mar. 19,
1956). This amendment introduced the Parliamentary Commissioner of Defense
(Wehrbeauftragte des Bundestages), who is regulated by the Federal Law of June 26, 1957.
128. Law No. 736, June 3, 1973, art. 2.
129. Id. arts. 6 & 14.
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nally, as well as by administrative officials, including members of the
Council of State, 130 the office has been very useful as an aid in the resolu-
tion of administrative problems and as a promoter of reforms in the pro-
vision of public services.
c. Switzerland
In Switzerland, Administrative Commissioners have been established
in the City as well as in the Canton of Zurich. The City's Commissioner
of Complaints, with the name of Beauftragte in Beschwerdensachen der
Stadt Zilrich, has been in existence since 1971 and is local in nature. He
is elected by the Municipal Council for a period of four years with the
possibility of re-election, but is autonomous from the Council as well as
from the City Government.' The cantonal legislature of Zurich on Sep-
tember 25, 1977 passed a law establishing a Parliamentary Commissioner,
who began functioning on June 5, 1978.132
d. Austria
The Austrian National Assembly approved a law creating the Volk-
sanwaltschaft (People's Advocate) which became effective July 1, 1977.
The Volksanwaltschaft is an autonomous organization comprised of three
persons and selected by the National Assembly for a period of six years to
receive complaints directly from citizens about the activities of federal
administrative authorities. "'
e. Italy
In Italy, there have been several proposals to create national and re-
gional "Civil Defenders" similar to the Scandinavian Ombudsman. Such
plans have been approved in the regions of Tuscany and Liguria8 4 as well
as in Campania,13 5 Lazio's Lombardi13 7 and Umbria.'8
These regional Civil Defenders are appointed by decree of the Re-
gional Council for a term of five years, with the possibility of re-election.
They have jurisdiction over complaints presented by citizens who have
come before"r'egional administrative agencies when the agency has not re-
sponded to the citizen within twenty days, or where an unsatisfactory re-
sponse has been given. "
130. H. Fix Zamudio, supra note 29, at 309.
131. Id. at 313.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 312-13.
134. Laws of Jan. 21 and June 6, 1974.
135. Law of Aug. 11, 1978.
136. Law of Feb. 28, 1980.
137. Law of Jan. 18, 1980.
138. Law of Aug. 22, 1979.
139. H. Fix Zamudio, supra note 29, at 314.
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f. Portugal
The first Ombudsman introduced in the Iberian peninsula was the
Portuguese Promoter of Justice under the Organic Law Decree of April
21, 1975, issued by the provisional government. Article 24 of the Consti-
tution of 1976 transformed the Promoter into a Parliamentary Commis-
sioner. In accordance with the Scandinavian model, the Commissioner is
elected by the National Assembly and citizens can present their com-
plaints directly about acts or omissions of public officials. The Commis-
sioner does not have the power to make any binding decisions, but can
make recommendations to competent bodies on how to remedy and pre-
vent further injustices. 4 0
g. Spain
The Spanish Democratic Constitution of December 29, 1978 followed
the example of Portuguese legislation and incorporated the figure of the
Public Defender in article 54. The Public Defender is a high commis-
sioner appointed by and accountable to the Cortes (legislative body), to
"protect the fundamental rights contained in Title I of the Constitution,
by supervising the functioning of the public administration." On April 6,
1981 an organic law for the actual creation of a Public Defender was ap-
proved by the Cortes.14 1 In addition, the possibility of establishing Re-
gional Defenders exists by virtue of the autonomy laws of the Basque
region and Catalonia, approved through simultaneous referendums car-
ried out October 25, 1979 and the autonomy law of Galicia, passed De-
cember 21, 1980.141
h. Centrality
Finally, it should be noted that there is some hope for the establish-
ment of a European Ombudsman. The Parliamentary Assembly of the
Community is to be chosen by direct, popular election.143 A large number
of member countries have already established the institution at a national
level. Recommendations to promote an international Ombudsman on a
community level were approved on November 29, 1974 by all the
Ombudsmen and Parliamentary Commissioners of member states of the
Council of Europe, together with experts and observers and by the Legal
Commission of the Council of Europe.:
140. The Organic Law Decree of 1975 was repealed and replaced by the Laws of No-
vember 22, 1977 and March 2, 1978.
141. H. Fix Zamudio, supra note 29, at 331.
142. Id. at 335-46.
143. Id. at 323.
144. Official Recommendation No. 757 of January 29, 1975 of the Parliamentary As-
sembly of the Council of Europe proposed to the Committee of Ministers that they invite
the governments of member states that have not adopted the institution to study the possi-
bility of appointing, at a national level, persons who have assumed the function of
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5. Latin America
Within Latin America, the prevailing attitude has been that an
Ombudsman, either executive or parliamentary, is an institution far re-
moved from the Latin American jurisprudential tradition, even though
the Constitutions of Portugal and Spain both provide for such an office.
It is foreseeable that a greater interest will awaken among Latin Ameri-
can jurists to study this means of protecting the rights of the governed.
It is notable that the figure of the Parliamentary Commissioner has
at least appeared in Colombian law recently, although in an indirect form.
After various projects for the creation of the classic Ombudsman with
such names as Overseer of the Administration, Parliamentary Attorney or
Defender of Human Rights were proposed, amendments to articles 142
and 143 of the Constitution by the Constitutional Reform of December 4,
1979 gave the Attorney General new power rather than creating a new
office. He is appointed for a period of four years by the House of Repre-
sentatives from among three names that are sent to that body by the
President of the Republic. Like the Scandinavian Ombudsman, he can
receive direct complaints from citizens regarding violations by officials
and public employees of human rights and social guarantees. The Attor-
ney General can carry out necessary investigations and present an annual
report to the Colombian Congress on the exercise of these functions.
An evolution has begun, however weak, to create Ombudsmen to pro-
tect the consumer. Although their activity is limited to investigating the
conduct of business and industry regarding complaints from injured con-
sumers, they may lead to the creation of more comprehensive institutions
of the sort described earlier in this study.1 4 5
6. Developing Nations
Finally, the Ombudsman has been introduced into the legal systems
of various developing countries because of its effectiveness. A few exam-
ples include Jamaica (The Ombudsman Act, November 13, 1977), Mauri-
tius (Constitution of 1968 and Ombudsman Act of 1969), Papua New
Guinea (Ombudsman Commission, Constitution of 1979), Tanzania (a
permanent Commission of Investigations established in the Provisional
Constitution of 1965, and the Law of 1966, amended in 1975), Trinidad
and Tobago (Ombudsman regulated by articles 91 to 98 of the Constitu-
tion of March 1976) and Zambia (Commission for Investigation, Constitu-
tion of 1973).
CONCLUSION
In every country examined, no matter what political philosophy gov-
Ombudsman or Parliamentary Commissioner at a regional or local level.
145. Several countries have enacted laws to protect and defend the consumer: Vene-
zuela (Aug. 5, 1974), Costa Rica (Feb. 28, 1975) and Mexico (Dec. 19, 1976).
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erns, there is some provision, usually constitutional, that provides for the
protection of certain fundamental human rights. These constitutional
provisions range from the Constitution of the United States and its Bill
of Rights to the amparo provided in Latin American constitutions to the
French Constitution and the Council of State and to the Procurator of
the Soviet bloc nations. A range of variations exists but no matter what
the system, there is some provision, organized by legislation, for the pro-
tection of the fundamental rights of citizens.
In turn, we have seen that each system provides a judiciary branch to
hear and decide cases of fundamental rights violations and the constitu-
tionality of laws. Furthermore, we have seen that each system has similar
instrumentalities, such as the writ of habeas corpus, by which to petition
the government and address the judiciary for redress of grievances of fun-
damental rights violations.
Finally, in addition to legislative and judicial sanctions, we are wit-
nessing an increasing role on the part of the executive branch in numer-
ous governments. This role has been most often patterned after the
Ombudsman of Scandinavia, although used in various capacities and
under a variety of guises. The Ombudsman model seems to be one that is
readily adaptable to diverse situations, political orientations and multifa-
rious tasks of government in pursuit of the protection of fundamental
human rights. The role of the Ombudsman has proven adaptable to di-
verse tasks and governmental functions from Scandinavia to Tanzania.
The fact that so many developing countries are using the Ombudsman
model clearly demonstrates its remarkable flexibility. As a result of this
global survey, we may obtain a better perspective of the most effective
and expedient means for the protection and resolution of fundamental
rights violations, namely the pursuit of domestic remedies rather than the
more idealistic and cumbersome methods of external world pressure cur-
rently advocated.
ADDENDUM
Since the time when this paper was first submitted, several modifica-
tions and amendments of the laws mentioned within have occurred,
which is to be expected with a subject as dynamic as governmental insti-
tutions for the protection of human rights. Briefly, we shall point out just
the most important reforms.
A. In relation to the special system in Latin America:
1. Two new laws of amparo have been passed: a Nicaraguan law,
enacted May 28, 1980 and the Peruvian Law of Habeas Corpus and
Amparo, promulgated Dec. 7, 1982 and published the following day in El
Peruano.
In spite of the new Constitution of Honduras, enacted by Decree
Number 131 of January 11, 1982, the Law of Amparo of April 14, 1933 is
still in force, although amended in January, 1982, because the new consti-
tution regulates the amparo in the same manner as the former
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consitutions.
2. The Chilean military government established an instrument for
the protection of fundamental human rights, called recurso de protecci6n,
which is regulated by the Constitution of 1925. The new recurso de pro-
tecci6n was enacted by Institutional Act Number 3, published September
13, 1976, and is regulated by the Supreme Court of Justice judicial pro-
ceeding (Auto Acordado), published April 12, 1977; this remedy was in-
corporated into article 20 of the Constitution, passed by the plebiscite on
September 11, 1980 and enacted on October 21, 1980. A full treatment of
this topic may be found in the interesting book of the Chilean jurist
Eduardo Soto Kloss, EL RECUSRSO DE PROTECCI6N, ORIGENES, DOCTRINA Y
JURISPRUDENCIA (Santiago 1982).
B. There has been an important development in the continental Euro-
pean system of constitutional courts as embodied in the Latin American
constitutional courts:
1. The Constitutional Court established in the Republic of Chile by
the 1970 amendment to the Constitution of 1925 was abolished by the
military coup of September, 1973; however, it was restored with similar
characteristics by articles 81 to 83 of the Constitution passed by the pleb-
iscite on September 11, 1980. Although the legislative body has remained
suspended by the Transitory Arrangements of the same Constitution, the
Court has been established according to its Organic Law enacted by the
Governmental Junta on May 12, 1981, published May 19, 1981 in the
Diario Oficial.
2. The Court of Constitutional Guarantees, established by articles
296 and 297 of the Peruvian Constitution of 1979, was created by its Or-
ganic Law, enacted by the Congress of the Republic on May 19, 1982 and
published the following day in El Peruano.
3. The Ecuadorean Court of Constitutional Guarantees was also re-
formed through the constitutional amendments published on September
1, 1983, which, inter alia, added article 141 of the Constitution of Janu-
ary, 1978 in order to encourage the functioning of the Court. Article 141
treats as an offense any contempt of the Court's unconstitutional law dec-
larations and any violation of human rights. These amendments will be in
force beginning August 10, 1984.
4. There have also been important reforms in the Portuguese sys-
tem of constitutional justice through the constitutional amendments en-
acted September 24, 1982 and published September 30, 1982 in the
Diario Rep~lblica. These amendments abolished the Council of the
Revolution, which had a military character, and its advisory body, the
Constitutional Commission. The new articles 284 and 285 established a
Constitutional Court, comprised of thirteen justices, ten of whom are to
be chosen by the Assembly of the Republic and the remaining three to be
appointed by the Court itself. The Constitutional Court is empowered
with the function of constitutional control, which formerly belonged to
the abolished bodies.
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5. Changes have also occurred within the socialist countries. Follow-
ing the example of the specialized courts of Yugoslavia (which are actu-
ally functioning) and of Czechoslovakia (which were established by the
consitutional amendment of 1968, but which are still lacking the neces-
sary organic law), the People's Republic of Poland established a Constitu-
tional Court by the constitutional amendment of March 26, 1982, which
reformed articles 30 and 33 and added articles 33a and 33b. The essential
function of the Court is to make binding decisions regarding the compati-
bility between laws and the general decrees of the Constitution. As in
Czechoslovakia, however, the necessary organic law for this judicial body
has not yet been passed.
Legislative Reform of U.S. Extradition
Statutes: Plugging The Terrorist's
Loophole
WILLIAM M. HANNAY*
The United States has been in the forefront of those nations advocat-
ing mandatory extradition or prosecution of terrorists, the concept em-
bodied in the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Air-
craft' and in other multilateral agreements. Flaws in our own extradition
procedures, however, make it difficult for us to practice what we preach.
Indeed, recent U.S. court rulings have appeared to put the imprimatur of
our judicial system on the violent acts of terrorists who have no respect
for human life, for democratic process or for the Rule of Law. Extradition
procedures that allow such dangerous precedents must be reformed as an
essential step in improving U.S. antiterrorism efforts.
Legislation was almost enacted during the second session of the 97th
Congress that would have recodified and modernized all U.S. extradition
procedures. The Senate version of this legislation (S. 1940) was developed
over a two-year period in cooperation with the Departments of State and
Justice and was passed by the Senate with amendments in August of
1982.2 In June of 1982, the House Judiciary Committee reported out its
own version of the legislation, which was also based in large part on the
executive branch's recommendations.' Many of the proposed changes in
* William M. Hannay is a member of the firm of Schiff, Hardin & Waite of Chicago,
Illinois and an adjunct instructor at IIT/ChicagoKent College of Law.
1. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, done Dec. 16, 1970,
entered into force Oct. 14, 1971, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192, 860 U.N.T.S. 105.
2. S. 1940 was first introduced by Senator Strom Thurmond, chairman of the Judiciary
Committee, on December 11, 1981 after hearings. See Extradition Act of 1981: Hearings on
S. 1639 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 334 (1981) [here-
inafter cited as 1981 Sen. Hearings]. The text of the earlier bill (S. 1639), correspondence
from the Departments of State and Justice, and a detailed Memorandum on Extradition
Legislation were published in the Congressional Record. See 127 CONG. REc. 89952 (1981).
Some changes were made in the "political offense" provisions of S. 1940 by the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee in April of 1982. See also Amendments to Title 18 of the United States
Code Relating to International Extradition, S. REP. No. 331, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2638
(1982) [hereinafter cited as S. RaP. 331]. A different approach to the "political offense"
determination, fundamentally changing the Judiciary Committee's approach, was recom-
mended by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in June of 1982. See Senate Comm.
on Foreign Relations, Extradition Act of 1981, S. REP. No. 475, 97TH Cong., 2d Sess. 79
(1982) (adopted on the floor of the Senate without debate on Aug. 19, 1982) [hereinafter
cited as S. REP. No. 475). See also 128 CONG. REc. 810,884 (1982).
3. H.R. 5227 was introduced by Representative William J. Hughes, Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Crime of the House Judiciary Committee on December 15, 1981. See 127
CONG. REc. E5877 (1981). The bill was subsequently reintroduced as H.R. 6046 on April 1,
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
the existing statutory scheme were similar in both the House and Senate
versions.4 There were, however, significant differences in the two versions
with respect to the "political offense" exception to extradition treaties.
The controversy surrounding the varying approaches to the "political of-
fense" issue effectively prevented floor action in the House. Thus, it re-
mains for the 98th Congress to consider resubmitted extradition reform
legislation.
I. BACKGROUND TO THE "POLITICAL OFFENSE" ISSUE
Extradition treaties universally contain a list of enumerated offenses
for which extradition is authorized. Extradition treaties of the United
States, like those of virtually all other nations, also incorporate an excep-
tion or exclusion prohibiting extradition in two circumstances related to
politics: (1) where the offense for which extradition is requested is a "po-
litical offense" and (2) where the extradition request is politically moti-
vated, even though the offense charged is not itself a "political offense."
Typical of the language of such an exclusion is that in the extradition
treaty between Great Britain and the United States, which states:
1982 after the Subcommittee on Crime approved an amendment in the nature of a substi-
tute and reported it as such to the House Judiciary Committee. The full committee ordered
H.R. 6046 favorably reported on May 18, 1982; the accompanying report was printed on
June 24, 1982. See HousE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, EXTRADITION ACT OF 1982, H.R. RP.
No. 627, Pt. 1, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) [hereinafter cited as H. Rep. 627, Pt. 1]. The bill
was sequentially referred to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, which recommended pas-
sage on July 29, 1982 and reported it on August 3, 1982. See H.R. REP. No. 627, Pt. 2, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) [hereinafter cited as H. Rep. 627, Pt. 2]. The House took no further
action upon the bill. 2 CONG. INDEX (CCH) 34,519 (1981-82).
4. Section 3195 of both the House and Senate versions would correct a long-standing
anomaly in extradition by creating a right of appeal for the government as well as the per-
son faced with the extradition. Traditionally, the defendant could seek appellate review by
habeas corpus, but the government had no means of review at all. Another curious proce-
dural practice would also be changed in both versions. Under current law, extradition re-
quests are heard by U.S. magistrates. Under § 3194(0(1) of both the House and Senate
versions, either party can have the political offense issue heard by a district judge instead of
a magistrate due to the importance and complexity of that issue.
Other major changes in extradition procedures contained in S. 1940 include the follow-
ing (the corresponding provisions of H.R. 6046 are noted in parentheses): § 3193 (§ 3191)
rco-uizes tha1t a U.S. ubigatiun e -x0adi parucuiar classes of ulonders is creaLed by
certain multinational agreements, such as the Hague Convention, as well as by bilateral
agreements; § 3192(d)(1) codifies existing standards for bail in extradition cases, permitting
release only if the fugitive can demonstrate "special circumstances" warranting it (however,
§ 3192(d)(2) of H.R. 6046 takes a different approach, using the standards in the Bail Reform
Act with slight modifications); § 3194(d) (§3194(g)(1)) simplifies procedures for the authen-
tication of documents and also establishes that extraditability can be determined solely on
hearsay or documentary evidence (§ 3194(g)(3) of H.R. 6046 only permits a court to "con-
sider" such evidence); § 3196(a)(3) (§3196(a)) authorizes the Secretary of State to extradite
U.S. nationals unless such surrender is expressly prohibited by the applicable treaty, thus
reversing the effect of Valentine v. U.S. ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5 (1936). Differences
between the original Senate version and the House version were discussed by Rep. Hughes
in the Congressional Record. 128 CONG. REc. E2241 (May 13, 1982).
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(1) Extradition shall not be granted if. . . (c)(i) the offense for which
extradition is requested is regarded by the requested Party as one of a
political character; or (ii) the person sought proves that the request
for his extradition has in fact been made with a view to try or punish
him for an offense of a political character.'
For sound policy reasons, it has long been considered the exclusive
province of the Secretary of State to determine whether the extradition
request is politically motivated.6 On the other hand, for no particularly
apparent reason, American courts have exercised jurisdiction over the
"political offense" issue since the case of In re Ezeta in 1894.7
Congress is attempting to revise U.S. extradition laws, spurred in
part by recent efforts of international terrorists to use the "political of-
fense" exception as a loophole to avoid extradition. The decisions in sev-
eral recent extradition cases involving terrorists illustrate the problem.
These cases reveal serious flaws in the existing judicial test for determin-
ing what constitutes a "political offense" and make clear that such a de-
termination involves foreign policy choices that should be made by Con-
gress and the President, not the courts.
The traditional Anglo-American test for defining a "political of-
fense," as reflected in these decisions, represents a grave danger to world
order. It is not so much thatthe United States may well become a more
5. Treaty on Extradition, Oct. 21, 1976, United States-United Kingdom, art. V., 28
U.S.T. 227, T.I.A.S. No. 8468.
6. The rationale for deferring to the executive branch is described in the leading case
on this point:
[Ilt is not a part of the court proceedings ... to exercise discretion as to
whether the criminal charge is a cloak for political action, not whether the
request is made in good faith. Such matters should be left to the Department
of State.
... It is thought by the court that application to the Secretary of State of
the United States will furnish full protection against the delivery of the ac-
cused to any government which will not live up to its treaty obligations, and
that the Secretary of State will be fully satisfied (before delivering the accused
to the demanding government) that he is wanted (in the legal sense of that
term) upon a criminal charge, that it is not sought to secure him from a coun-
try upon which he is depending as an asylum because of political matters, and
that the treaty is not actually used as a subterfuge.
In re Lincoln, 228 F. 70, 74 (E.D.N.Y. 1915), affd per curiam sub nor., Lincoln v. Power,
241 U.S. 651 (1916). Accord Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 (5th Cir.
1971); In re Gonzalez, 217 F. Supp. 717, 722 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
7. 62 F. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1894). In Ezeta, the particular treaty specified that "the provi-
sions of this treaty shall not apply to any crime or offense of a political character." Id. at
997. The district judge held that he could not leave it to the executive branch but rather
had to determine the question, because the treaty "terminates [the magistrate's] jurisdiction
when the political character of the crime or offense is established." Id. Until recently, the
Government did not challenge the courts' exercise of jurisdiction over the political offense
issue. When Government attorneys finally began to question jurisdiction, they were met
with the courts' response that the practice was not too traditional to be changed without
legislative approval. In re Mackin, 668 F. 2d 122, 13237 (2d Cir. 1981); Earn v. Wilkes, 641
F.2d 504, 51317 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981).
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attractive refuge for members of the Palestinian Liberation Organization
(PLO), Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), the Bader-Meinhoff
gang, the Italian Red Brigade and other terrorists, though that is possi-
ble. Rather, the danger lies in the impact of these decisions overseas. Re-
cent U.S. court decisions have sent out a message to the world that the
American judicial system accepts the notion that the end justifies the
means and that political violence is an acceptable method of accomplish-
ing political goals. These decisions appear to place a stamp of approval
on, and thereby sanctify, terrorist activities of all kinds. A legislative rem-
edy to counter this danger is essential.
In each of these recent U.S. cases, the test of a "relative" political
offense set forth in the nineteenth-century English case of In re Castioni8
was blindly accepted and mechanically applied. The court in Castioni
stated that a political offense is a crime which is "incidental to and
formed a part of political disturbances."9
In the McMullen case, Peter McMullen was charged with the bomb-
ing of a British army installation in England. In the Mackin case,
Desmond Mackin was charged with the attempted murder of a British
soldier dressed in civilian clothes who had been standing at a bus stop in
Belfast.1 In the Quinn case, William Quinn was charged with the murder
of a London police officer and participating in at least eight bombing inci-
dents. 2 Dutifully applying the Castioni test, the magistrates in both
8. (1891] 1 Q.B. 149. In Castioni, Switzerland sought the extradition of a man charged
with murder. The death had occurred during a riot and appeared to have been more acci-
dental than intentional. The court justified the decision not to extradite by stating that,
after a civil war, "one cannot look too hardly and weigh in golden scales the acts of men hot
in their Dolitical excitement." Id. at 167.
9. Id. at 153.
10. In re the Extradition of McMullen, No. 37-81-099 MG (N.D. Cal., filed May 11,
1979) (Woelflen, Magis.), reprinted in 1981 Sen. Hearings, supra note 2, at 294. See also
McMullen v. I.N.S., 658 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1981) (deportation stayed on ground that the
Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) was likely to "persecute" him as a defector if he
was returned to Ireland).
11. In re Extradition of Desmond Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1 (S.D.N.Y., filed Aug. 13,
1981) (Buchald, Magis.), reprinted in 1981 Sen. Hearings, supra note 2, at 140, appeal
dismissed sub noam. U.S. v. States v. Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981). The magistrate
concluded that the PIRA, or "provos," were conducting a violent political uprising in one
area of Beftt. The U.S. executive brarnch tok the position that PIRA activity consisted of
individual acts of violence aimed frequently at civilians and designed to destabilize society
rather than overthrow the government directly and accordingly fell outside the political of-
fense exception, but the magistrate rejected this sensible analysis. 1981 Sen. Hearings,
supra note 2, at 214-22. The author has been informed by the prosecutor in this case that,
in return for the government's agreement to drop any further extradition proceedings,
Mackin consented to be deported to the Republic of Ireland in December, 1981.
12. Quinn v. Robinson, No. C-82-6688, slip op. (N.D. Cal., filed Oct. 3, 1983) (Aguilar,
J.). The district court granted Quinn's petition for habeas corpus and set aside an earlier
decision by a magistrate ordering extradition. Crim. No. CR-81-146 Misc. (N.D. Cal., filed
Sept. 29, 1982) (Langford, Magis.). U.S. District Judge Robert Aguilar concluded that the
conspiracy to cause explosions charge against Quinn was "incidental to and in the course of"
a political uprising because the bombings were intended "to protest British rule in Northern
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Mackin and McMullen and the district court in Quinn concluded that
extradition was prohibited since a political "disturbance" or "uprising"
was taking place in Northern Ireland and the attempts by Mackin, Mc-
Mullen, and Quinn, as members of the outlawed Provisional Irish Repub-
lican Army, to kill British security personnel, were "incidental to" these
disturbances.
In the Abu Eain case, Ziyad Abu Eain, an alleged member of the
Palestinian Liberation Organization, was charged with planting a bomb
which killed or injured several children in an Israeli resort town.' On
habeas corpus review, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
upheld the magistrate's original determination that the "political offense"
exception was inapplicable, because the bombing was not "incidental to"
the PLO's objectives and "solely implicates anarchist-like activity.""
While the result is entirely correct, the Seventh Circuit's application of
the Castioni test in Abu Eain was ultimately just as mechanical as that in
Mackin, McMullen and Quinn. Indeed, the court appeared to accept the
proposition that "acts that disrupt the political structure of a State, and
not the social structure" would be exempt."'
The absurdity and ultimate cruelty of the Castioni test is illustrated
by the statement of the magistrate in McMullen that "[e]ven though the
offense be deplorable and heinous, the criminal actor will be excluded
from deportation [sic] if the crime is committed under these
prerequisites.""6
Ireland and to bring the British to the bargaining table." Slip op. at 36. Judge Aguilar
added that "any violence coming to the general civilian population was incidental to the
political goal of seeking an end to Northern Ireland". Id. In rejecting the applicability of
Abu Eain, the district court criticized the Seventh Circuit as "emotion[al]," and stated that
"liberal application of the Eain decision could result in the extradition court making judg-
ments as to the goals of a particular uprising group and the appropriateness of the acts of
the uprising group." Id. at 3739. The district court also attacked the magistrate's conclusion
that Quinn, who is an American, had to be a member of the uprising group in order to gain
the protection of the political offense exceptions. Judge Aguilar held this requirement to be
without precedent and "unwarranted." Id. at 17.
13. In re Extradition of Eain, Magis. No. 79 M 175 (N.D. Ill., filed Dec. 18, 1979)
(Jurco, Magis.), writ of habeas corpus denied sub nom. Eain v. Wilkes, note 7 supra. On
Dec. 12, 1981, UnderSecretary of State William P. Clark signed a surrender warrant which
was accompanied by a memorandum decision, which is reprinted in 1981 Sen. Hearings,
supra note 2, at 133. After his return to Israel, Eain was found guilty of murder by a three-
judge court and, in June of 1982, sentenced to life imprisonment. Christian Sci. Monitor,
Aug. 18, 1982, at 13, col. 1.
14. 641 F.2d at 52021.
15. Id. Moreover, it is a measure of how far the "political offense" exception can be cut
loose from ethical moorings that Abu Eain's defense team could argue in apparent good
faith that terror bombing of civilians is a legitimate technique in an "insurrection-libera-
tion" struggle and that the political offense exception prevents extradition for such a crime.
The defense argued that for the PLO to achieve its political purpose in Israel, it is necessary
for it to engage in acts of violence such as bombings in public places, since "an occupied
people regards every occupier as part of the usurping state's political being." Petitioner's
Brief in Support of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 9, Eain, 641 F.2d 504.
16. McMullen, No. 37-81-099 MG, reprinted in 1981 Sen. Hearings, supra note 2, at
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The Castioni test used by the courts in the cases discussed above is
seriously flawed. The courts in the relatively few English and American
cases dealing with the "political offense" exception 7 have repeated this
test without once questioning its fundamental validity.
The unsettling results in McMullen, Mackin and Quinn and the im-
plications of Abu Eain suggest that much of what has previously been
written about the "political offense" exception by the courts is misleading
or just plain wrong. The error may be accounted for because the "right"
result in early cases seemed so obvious or was reached so intuitively that
the courts were lulled into accepting the first "test" that fit the facts
without giving much thought to its ramifications. Indeed, some of the
cases suggest that the courts, despite their purported reliance on such a
test, were actually engaged in making political judgments, not legal
ones.-I
No court has ever questioned whether an all-encompassing, objective
"test" is appropriate, and yet the "test" formulated by Anglo-American
courts in the 1890s is in fact based on assumptions which, when extended
to their logical conclusion, seem fundamentally at odds with the likely
intent of the treaty draftsmen and our present beliefs. As modern courts
carefully and conscientiously have applied the letter of this earlier case
law, absurd and dangerous results have become more frequent, and the
divergencies from the probable intent of the treaty writers has become
more and more apparent. Neither before, during nor after the decisions
that run from In re Ezeta to In re Quinn have the considerations in mak-
ing a "political offense" determination been as simplistic as these cases
have indicated. Certainly, there has never been any intellectually-ac-
cepted definition for a "political offense." Other countries do not accept
the mechanical Castioni test, either. 19
294.
17. For a discussion of the older cases as well as of McMullen and Abu Eain, see Han-
nay, International Terrorism and the Political Offense Exception to Extradition, 18
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 381 (1980).
18. See United States ex rel. Karadzole v. Artukovic, 170 F. Supp. 459 (S.D. Fla. 1959)
and Ramos v. Diaz, 179 F. Supp. 459 (S.D. Fla. 1959). These cases can only be explained as
efforts by the courts to avoid cooperating in any way with Communist regimes of which they
did not approve; indeed, the court in Abu Eain characterized Artukovic, in which a Croatian
war criminal was Judged immune from extradition to Yugoslavia on political offense
grounds, as "one of the most roundly criticized cases in the history of American jurispru-
dence." 641 F.2d at 522.
19. See, e.g., Ruling on the Requests for the Extradition of Tomas Linaza-Echevarria,
No. 57781 (Court of Appeals of Paris, filed June 3, 1981), reprinted in Dept. of State, Div.
of Language Services, Translation No. 81/16601. There, the Chambre d'Accusation of the
French Court of Appeals upheld the extradition of Linaza-Echevarra, a reputed Basque ter-
rorist, for the murders of an alderman and six members of the Civil Guard in Spain. The
fugitive claimed that the acts with which he was charged "were perpetrated as part of the
struggle for political autonomy waged by a segment of the population in the Basque prov-
inces of Spain." Id. at 8. The Court rejected this claim, stating:
Irrespective of the objective sought or possible context, most of these offenses
are too serious to be regarded as having a political character or as being related
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As extradition treaties became prevalent in the nineteenth century,
democratic nations undoubtedly found themselves facing the unpleasant
task of sending political dissenters or activists back to tyrannical regimes
to stand trial for acts which democracies did not perceive as "criminal" in
any ethical or moral sense. Through the mechanism of the "political of-
fense" exception, a conflict between the affirmative obligation to extradite
under a treaty and the desire to grant political asylum was avoided. The
fugitive newspaper editor or political candidate charged with sedition or
treason merely for expressing his opinions could be sheltered from extra-
dition for such a "pure" political offense, the sort of offense directly im-
plicating cherished democratic values. Similarly, the fugitive dissident
charged with criminal trespass or property damage during a protest rally
could be sheltered from unjust persecution for his "relative" political of-
fense, the sort of offense that smacks of a "trumped up" charge.20
In addition to, and wholly apart from, its function of sheltering those
whose only crime is speaking out, the "political offense" exception func-
tions as a useful mechanism by which states may avoid becoming entan-
gled in the internal political upheaval of other nations.2 1 Through the ex-
ception, states may avoid being forced to favor one side over another
during uncertain civil wars or being compelled to assist the winners wreak
vengeance on the losers after a political coup.
It is important to keep in mind that we are not dealing with the sub-
stantive rights of a fugitive. The "political- offense" exception, just as the
concept of political asylum, is not a recognition of some inalienable right
of the fugitive to commit crimes in another country and escape extradi-
tion merely because the offenses were committed with a political purpose.
The right involved is that of the state which has an interest in being able,
when the state deems it appropriate, to give political asylum for humani-
tarian reasons or simply to refuse to become involved in the domestic
to a political offense.
The less serious acts cannot be disassociated from others, for they either
contributed to their perpetration or were the immediate consequence thereof.
By reason of the means employed, these acts are all too serious in nature
to be covered by the nonextradition exception ....
Id. at 89.
20. See text at notes 49-52 infra. Purely political offenses "encompass acts directed
against the state which contain none of the elements of ordinary crime." Garcia-Mora, The
Nature of Political Offenses: A Knotty Problem of Extradition Law, 48 VA. L. REV. 1226,
1230 (1963). The "pure" offenses have generally been thought to be treason, sedition, espio-
nage, and the like. Cantrell, The Political Offense Exception in International Extradition:
A Comparison of the United States, Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland, 60 MARQ.
L. REv. 777, 780 (1977). A "relative" political offense is one "in which a common crime is so
connected with a political act that the entire offense is regarded as political." Garcia-Mora,
supra, at 1230-31.
21. See E. STOWELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A RESTATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES 272 (1931),
cited in H.R. REP. No. 627, PT. 1, supra note 3, at 23, who states: "The underlying rationale
for the political offense exception is that the requested State should not be forced into a
position of actively participating on one side or another of a country's political dispute."
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political disputes of other states.
The "political offense" exception thus serves as a useful shorthand or
euphemism for these concerns of the state. There is widespread agree-
ment for the abstract proposition that a state should refuse to send a
dissident back to unjust persecution or refuse to allow the mechanism of
extradition to be used for mere vengeance. The difficulty comes in prop-
erly categorizing particular fact situations in such terms. The attempt to
define what constitutes a "political offense" by using a single "test" has
created problems and led to an unfortunate confusion between the two
different purposes of the exception.
The Castioni test seems to imply acceptance of a "right to rebel." It
is doubtful, however, that a study of nineteenth-century diplomatic
sources would corroborate the notion that the "political offense" excep-
tion was intended as a recognition of such an absolute and unqualified
"right." Despite broadly-phrased statements by philosophers such as
John Stuart Mill2 and by some of our founding fathers," democratic na-
tions have never accepted the principle that any politically disaffected
group anywhere can take up arms for the purpose of replacing the ex-
isting government and thereby be automatically protected from extradi-
tion for common crimes of violence. A situation in which "good" rebels
are trying to overthrow "bad" rulers, such as the American Revolution,
may be acceptable and even laudatory. But what about "bad" rebels and
"good" governments? Do fair ends justify unfair means? And who is to
judge? None of these questions can be thought to have been answered
with unanimity in either the nineteenth or the twentieth century. The
court in Castioni confused the two different purposes of the political of-
fense exception and produced a "test" that, in the eyes of the later courts,
appears to confer absolute and unqualified immunity from extradition on
violent revolutionaries. Yet the judges who sat on the Castioni case would
surely be shocked by the statement of the magistrate in McMullen, that
their test precludes extradition "[elven though the offense be deplorable
and heinous."24
Such a conclusion could never have been intended by the diplomats
22. "Political liberties or rights which it was to be regarded as a breach of duty in theru -.1 o;-... and wich, if he did infringe, o_,ec;A ,-s*anco or ....erol r-hell n WA
tf~ tD 5' - o~-~-------- - ---- ----- 0 _
to be held justifiable." J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 2 (1847). As the counsel for the defense in
Castioni noted, Mill once suggested the following definition of a political offense: "Any of-
fense committed in the course of or furthering of civil war, insurrection, or political commo-
tion." In re Castioni, [1891] 1 Q.B. at 153.
23. E.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Jan. 30, 1787) ("I hold it
that a little rebellion, now and then, is a good thing, and as necessary in the political world
as storms in the physical.") and First Inaugural Address by Abraham Lincoln (Mar. 4, 1861)
("Whenever [the people] shall grow weary of the existing government, they can exercise
their constitutional right of amending it, or their revolutionary right to dismember or over-
throw it.")
24. McMullen, No. 37-81-099 MG, at 3, reprinted in 1981 Sen. Hearings, supra note
10, at 294.
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who negotiated our extradition treaties or the Senators who consented to
them. No possible value could be thought to accrue either to this country
or to the international legal order from a rule that prevents the extradi-
tion of any and all who use political violence to achieve political ends.
25
The test applied by the magistrates in McMullen and Mackin and
the district court in Quinn was the same as that applied by the Seventh
Circuit in Abu Eain and by other courts reaching back to Ezeta. Yet the
ramifications of this test have not been clearly seen until now. There is no
good reason to continue the unquestioned repetition of the Castioni test,
for it more often leads courts away from a just result rather than towards
one. A better test must be fashioned.
II. EXECUTIVE DETERMINATION OF THE "POLITICAL OFFENSE" ISSUE: THE
ROAD NOT TAKEN
The original version of S. 1940 prohibited the courts from exercising
jurisdiction over the "political offense" issue" and provided that the Sec-
retary of State alone shall determine the matter.2 7 Although this ap-
proach was recommended by the administrations of both President
Carter and President Reagan,"' it was met by a barrage of criticism, par-
25. A recent student note suggests that "genuinely politically motivated terrorism can
induce genuinely politically motivated prejudice at trial, so that asylum for the terrorist is
not so clearly outside the purposes of the exception." Note, American Courts and Modern
Terrorism: The Politics of Extradition, 13 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 617, 623 (1981). See
also Cantrell, supra note 20, at 782. That possibility is no justification for imposing a blan-
ket rule that prevents extradition of those perpetrating violence for political reasons in
countries where the Rule of Law is strong enough to prevent public or governmental outrage
from interfering with fair procedures. The Executive Branch of this country, for example,
has shown itself perfectly capable of refusing extradition when a fair trial cannot be ex-
pected in the requesting state. See, e.g., M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 424 n.121 (1974), noting the refusal of the Department of State to
extradite the fugitive General Huertas to Mexico because of both the political nature of the
crimes with which he had been charged and "the lack of an orderly machinery of justice by
which a fair trial could be accomplished."
26. Section 3194(a) of S. 1940, as introduced by Sen. Thurmond, states in part as
follows:
The court does not have jurisdiction to determine the merits of the charge
against the person by the foreign state or to determine whether the foreign
state is seeking the extradition of the person for a political offense, for an of-
fense of a political character, or for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing
the person for his political opinions.
1981 Sen. Hearings, supra note 2, at 340.
27. Section 3196(a) of S. 1940 as introduced by Sen. Thurmond provides: "The Secre-
tary of State ... (3) shall decline to order the surrender of the person if the Secretary is
persuaded, by written evidence and argument submitted to him by the person sought, that
the foreign state is seeking the person's extradition for a political offense." Id. at 346. Sec-
tion 3196(a) of the bill also provides: "[a] decision of the Secretary of State under paragraph
(3) ...is final and not subject to judicial review." Id.
28. An identical version of S. 1639 had been introduced by Sen. Kennedy as a floor
amendment to Chapter 32 of S. 1722, the 1980 version of the Criminal Code Reform Act, in
the waning days of the 96th Congress. Correspondence supporting the changes from officials
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ticularly from civil liberties groups who were generally suspicious of the
executive branch and perceived the legislation as a direct assault on due
process and other Constitutional protections for extradition targets."
Hearings were held by both Houses, 0 and battle lines were drawn on
the issue of whether the executive "model" was superior to the judicial
model.8 ' In reporting out a new version of S. 1940, the Senate Judiciary
Committee rejected the criticism and recognized the strong and obvious
policy considerations justifying the elimination of the courts'
jurisdiction. 2
The McMullen, Mackin, Abu Eain, and Quinn cases have revealed
something more than the flaws in the Castioni test. They have shown
that the determination of the "political offense" issue is a major foreign
policy determination which is ill-suited to the judiciary. The flaw per-
meating those cases cannot fully be corrected by drafting a statute to give
courts more guidance. The "political offense" exception defies the crea-
tion of judicially manageable standards. The analysis called for, whatever
the test, inevitably thrusts the courts into foreign waters, both literally
of the Carter administration accompanied the bill. See 126 CONG. REC. S. 13,233 (daily ed.
Sept. 23, 1980).
29. See, e.g., Letter from American Civil Liberties Union to Sen. Thurmond, dated De-
cember 8, 1982, reprinted in 1981 Sen. Hearings, supra note 2, at 80. The ACLU expressed
the following fear:
With regard to extradition, the exigencies of diplomatic relations render the
exclusive determination of the political offense exception particularly unsuited
to the executive branch; conflicting interests would undoubtedly result in an
inconsistent and unfair application of standards. The integrity of such a pro-
cess would be difficult, if not impossible, to preserve.
1981 Sen. Hearings, supra note 2, at 90.
Far from being confined to mere paper-shuffling, as some critics think, our courts would
have continued to play a central role in the extradition process. Under S. 1940, as in current
practice, a judicial hearing before a neutral magistrate must be held to determine whether
there was evidence establishing probable cause to believe that an offense had been commit-
ted and that the person sought had committed it. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3184 with § 3194 of
S. 1940. Thus, the most basic protection from spurious or "trumped up" charges would have
remained intact.
30. The Senate hearings were published (See 1981 Sen. Hearings, note 2 supra), but
the House hearings were not.
31. Professor Steven Lubet of Northwestern University, who testified at House hearings
on extraditon 1-1 usfuynlyl c the deba.s in tern - ..f "xutivjdcil n
synthesis models" of deciding the political offense question. See Lubet, Extradition Reform:
Executive Discretion and Judicial Participation in the Extradition of Political Terrorists,
15 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 247 (1982).
32. The Senate Judiciary Committee concluded that the Executive Branch should
make such a determination because 1) most modern United States extradition treaties spec-
ify that the Executive Branch of the requested country shall decide the applicability of the
political offense exception (e.g., Extradition Treaty, United States-Mexico, May 4, 1978, en-
tered into force Jan. 25, 1980, art. 5(1), 31 U.S.T. 5059), 2) such decisions do not lend them-
selves to resolution through the judicial process, and 3) the U.S. government needs to take a
public position on the applicability of the political offense exception before all the evidence
and arguments are in to avoid a "devastating impact" and a "potentially crippling effect on
the nation's foreign relations." S. REP. No. 331 at 1415.
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and figuratively. In order to apply the "political offense" exception,
courts have been increasingly drawn into the most searching analyses of
the social, political and economic histories of the foreign countries re-
questing extradition. Such analyses lead to lengthy and time consuming
proceedings which delay extradition for months and even years. More-
over, the process creates a dangerous interference with the conduct of our
foreign policy, as judges, distant from the diplomatic and political arena,
make findings on political situations in foreign countries which are sub-
ject to misinterpretation and misuse abroad.
In the Mackin case, for example, the magistrate went far beyond the
facts surrounding the alleged shooting incident and received lengthy tes-
timony and elaborate documentary evidence bearing on the entire history
of Anglo-Irish relations. 8 After reviewing this evidence the magistrate
concluded that "there was a political conflict in Andersontown, Belfast,
Northern Ireland in March of 1978 which was part of an ongoing political
uprising."3 ' The magistrate in Quinn went through a similar historical
odyssey and was even more sweeping in his conclusions. In analyzing
whether the political offense exception applied to Quinn's alleged crimes
in London, the magistrate concluded that the element of a "violent politi-
cal uprising" was satisfied, even by isolated incidents of violence in
London, reasoning as follows:
[I]n a constitutional sense Northern Ireland is a part of the United
Kingdon, and offenses committed in Northern Ireland are offenses
against the same sovereign, though the Court notes that different sets
of laws apply. In Northern Ireland, before, during, and after the pe-
riod in question, there was what can only be described as a severe
armed insurrection with a political basis .... [T]he violence was of
such intensity that it brought down one government and forced its
replacement to impose severe curbs on personal liberty. 8
The potential detriment to our relations with the United Kingdom as
well as the danger of interference in the domestic political affairs of an-
other country from this sort of pronouncement is very real.86 Indeed, it
33. After hearings on the "political offense" issue lasting seven days and consuming
more than a thousand pages of transcript, the magistrate issued a 100-page opinion that
discussed the political and historical heritage of Northern Ireland, a treatment of the reli-
gious underpinnings of the past and present disturbances there, references to supposed
abuses by various governmental authorities, a lengthy discussion of the general level of vio-
lence in Northern Ireland, a description of British legal procedures for the prosecution of
suspected terrorists, and an assessment of the support for IRA activities within the Catholic
community at large. See Magistrate's Opinion, No. 80 Cr. Misc. at 40, reprinted in 1981
Sen. Hearings, supra note 2, at 188-218.
34. Id. at 83, reprinted in 1981 Sen. Hearings, supra note 2, at 222.
35. Magistrate's Opinion, Crim. No. CR81146 Misc. (N.D. Cal., filed Oct. 3, 1983).
36. "Finally, a decision on the political offense exception can have a devastating impact
on United States relations with the requesting country. The potentially crippling effect of
such decisions on foreign affairs is particularly great where it could compromise United
States efforts to combat international terrorism." S. REP. No. 331, supra note 2, at 15.
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appears that the magistrate's opinion in Mackin was widely circulated in
Northern Ireland on behalf of the hunger strikers in British custody who
sought to be recognized and treated as "political" offenders, thus inflam-
ing an already tense situation.3 7
The flaw in the present approach is precisely illustrated by testimony
during hearings in the House on H.R. 5227. Arguing that the new legisla-
tion should not flatly exclude murder or other violent crimes from the
"political offense" exception, one scholar pointed out to a Congressional
committee: "We may not now wish to extend [political offense] protection
to factions such as the Red Brigades of Italy, but we should not fashion a
definition which also serves to exclude rebels such as the anti-Soviet par-
tisans currently fighting in Afghanistan.13  The witness went on to sug-
gest that a definition should be devised which "[tihe courts would main-
tain .. . the ability to extend the protection of the exception to those
whom we might wish to call legitimate rebels or actual contenders in a
national struggle for power."3 " The United States should certainly be able
to distinguish between "legitimate" rebels and "bad" ones and to grant
asylum when appropriate, but judges should not be the ones to make that
sort of political choice.
Any approach to the "political offense" exception which leaves to
courts the determination of whether we extradite Red Brigadiers or Af-
ghan guerrillas perpetuates a serious misalignment of responsibility. For
example, the United States magistrates in the Mackin and McMullen
cases and the district court in Quinn held that an unprovoked attack on
British security personnel or installations by IRA gunmen constitutes a
"political offense" and hence an act worthy of immunity from extradition.
If such a dangerous policy is to be adopted, judges should not be the ones
to do it. As the New York Times said in an editorial favoring the elimina-
tion of court jurisdiction, "Leaving diplomacy to diplomats provides bet-
ter and speedier justice." 0
The question of whether an improper political motivation underlies
an extradition request has always been decided by the Executive
Branch."1 No critic of the Senate approach has offered a single instance in
which a Secretary of State has unjustly exercised his discretion over the
.7. See Brief for Appellant at 32, United States v. Mackin, 669 .R2d 122 (2d Cir. 19R1).
38. Lubet, Statement before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Crime,
reprinted in S. REP. No. 475, supra note 2, at 10.
39. Id. at 11.
40. New York Times, Dec. 29, 1981, at A14, col. 1. As Professor Lubet points out,
"[t]here is no uniform international practice regarding the procedure for applying the politi-
cal offense exception." Lubet, supra note 31, at 290 n.251. E.g., Canada, Australia, and West
Germany follow a strictly executive approach. Id.; accord S. REP. No. 331, supra note 2, at
1415. But see H.R. REP. No. 627, supra note 3, Pt. 1 at 22 n.52, citing an unpublished
Library of Congress report which asserts that the courts in all countries surveyed except
Canada and Australia play at least some part in determining whether a person is extradita-
ble or not because of the political or nonpolitical nature of his offense.
41. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
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political motivation question."" There is no good reason not to entrust to
executive discretion the equally "political" question of the nature of the
offense.
Despite these strong arguments, the House Judiciary Committee
opted to retain court jurisdiction over the political offense determination
in reporting out its extradition reform bill. 8 The House committee iden-
tified four reasons for this decision:
(1) It accords with the "statutory and administrative practices of the
past one hundred and forty years in the United States"; (2) The De-
partment of State can always "share" with the courts its unique ex-
pertise and specialized knowledge about conditions in the requesting
country; (3) Extradition matters generally, and the political offense
determination specifically, should take place before an independent
judiciary because to do otherwise would be "highly dangerous to lib-
erty"; and (4) Having the initial determination made by the judiciary
allows our diplomats to "avoid . . . embarrassment" and, in effect,
blame the courts when an ally's extradition request is denied.44
The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, which acted essentially con-
temporaneously with the House Committee, also adopted the judicial
"model," recommending fundamental changes in the original version of S.
1940. 41 The Senate adopted these amendments without any floor
debate."'
While this writer testified in support of the original version of S. 1940
42. If anything, political pressure is more often brought to bear on the Secretary of
State not to grant extradition than to grant it. For example, a number of Arab ambassadors
unsuccessfully pressured Secretary Haig to harbor PLO terrorist Ziyad Abu Eain after the
courts in Chicago ordered him extradited to Israel. Washington Post, Dec. 13, 1981, at A8,
col. 1. Under such pressure, other countries may be less willing than the United States to
honor their international committment to extradite terrorists, even where courts have ruled
that their crimes are not "political offenses." For example, despite the French Court of Ap-
peals decision in the Linaza-Echevarria case, the Socialist government of President Fran-
cois Mitterand announced its refusal to extradite any Basque terrorists. Note 19 supra. See
also The Economist, June 20, 1981, at 53. There is no more basis for the fear that our
diplomats will capitulate to requests from authoritarian regimes for extradition of their po-
litical opponents than there is for a fear that judges will be bribed by the accused fugitive.
Loose speculation about public officials' motivation is no good ground for opposition to a
useful and needed piece of legislation.
43. See H.R. 6046, reprinted in H. R. RE. No. 627, Pt. 1, supra note 3, at 48.
44. H.R. REP. No 627, Pt. 1, supra note 3, at 21-22.
45. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee expressed similar reasoning:
Most countries with whom the U.S. has extradition agreements permit the
courts to make such determinations. Moreover, American courts have reviewed
political offense questions for nearly one hundred years. Preserving limited
court jurisdiction to interpret the exception pursuant to legislative guidelines
would continue this well-established tradition. It would also provide a check
against an executive authority that could, depending upon the political sensi-
tivities involved in a given case, result in inconsistent and unsound application
of the political offense exception.
S. REP. No. 475, supra note 2, at 7.
46. 128 CONG. REC. S10,884 (1982).
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at hearings in October of 1981"' and continues to believe that the execu-
tive model is the best approach to the "political offense" determination, it
is unlikely that Congress will reconsider this fundamental issue. The cen-
tral issue, therefore, is what legislative guidance should be given to the
courts in exercising jurisdiction.
III. REPLACING THE Castioni TEST WITH NEW GUIDELINES
Both S. 1940 (the extradition reform bill passed by the Senate) and
H.R. 6046 (the House Judiciary Committee version) set forth "negative"
guidelines for the courts to use in determining what is not a "political
offense." The Senate version identified certain crimes that could never be
political offenses and certain other crimes that could only be political of-
fenses "in extraordinary circumstances." Section 3194(e) of S. 1940 pro-
vides in pertinent part as follows:
(1) For purposes of this section a political offense does not include:
(A) an offense within the scope of the [Hague] Convention . ..
(B) an offense within the scope of the [Montreal] Convention
(C) a serious offense involving an attack against the life, physical
integrity, or liberty of internationally protected persons ... , in-
cluding diplomatic agents;
(D) an offense with respect to which a ... multilateral treaty ob-
ligates the United States either extradite or ... prosecute a per-
son accused of the offense;
(E) [a narcotics] offense ...
(F) an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense described [in
A through E . . . above];
(2) For the purposes of this section a political offense, except in ex-
traordinary circumstances, does not include:
(A) an offense that consists of homicide, assault with intent to
commit. . . serious bodily injury, rape, kidnapping, the taking of
a hostage, or a ... serious unlawful detention;
(B) an offense involving the use of a firearm ... if such use en-
dangers a . . . person other than the offender... ;
(C) an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense described [in
A or B . . . above].
If an extradition bill had been passed in the 97th Congress, it would most
likely have included a "political offense" provision in the form set forth
above.4" The question then becomes whether these guidelines would do
47. See Testimony of William M. Hannay, 1981 Sen. Hearings, supra note 2, at 25-64.
48. H.R. 6046 had the same list of crimes quoted in the text, but applied the "ex-
traordinary circumstances" concept to all of them. The sponsor of the House bill subse-
quently agreed that the Senate's language was preferable. See Letter from William J.
Hughes, Chairman, House Subcomm. on Crime, to Clement J. Zablocki, Chairman, House
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the job.
At this stage, both Houses have rejected the approach of enunciating
a new, positive definition of what constitutes a "political offense." This
makes sense. First, the "pure" political offenses, such as advocating the
overthrow of a government and other conduct punishable as seditious or
treasonous, so implicate free speech and other democratic ideals that no
extradition treaty to which the United States is a party even includes
them as extraditable offenses. Moreover, any attempt to list or define
such "pure" offenses runs the risk of quickly becoming overbroad, as the
House Judiciary Committee has concluded."9 Similar problems of over-
breadth afflict any attempt to define "relative" political offense. Indeed,
it is the overbreadth inherent in the Castioni test that produced the furor
that, in large measure, produced the impetus for new legislation.
Even in eschewing a positive definition of political offense, Congress
is making one thing clear: the traditional Castioni test is no longer to be
viewed as the only (or even the best) guide to what a political offense is.
Regardless of their views on which particular crimes should be excluded
from the political offense exception, the Congressmen involved in the
drafting process are unanimous in their desire for courts to apply the con-
cepts of "predominance" and "proportionality" in deciding whether a
crime is a political offense. These concepts were developed in the legisla-
tive history, as follows.
While the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations "recognizes that
current case law continues to apply" to crimes not specified on the list of
nonpolitical offenses, the Committee took pains to draw attention to the
"commonly-used standard" that bars extradition "when the state from
which extradition is sought determines that the political content of the
act outweighs the harm that may have been done in committing the of-
fense."5 Similarly, the House Judiciary Committee stated its expectation
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, (July 23, 1982), reprinted in in H.R. Rep. No 627, supra note 3,
Pt. 2 at 45. Rep. Hughes adopted the Senate language in H.R. 2643, which was introduced
in the House of Representatives on April 20, 1982.
49. A predecessor version of H.R. 6046 listed certain acts which would "normally" con-
stitute political offenses. See H.R. 5227, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3194(e)(2) (1981). The list
included "sedition," "treason," and "unlawful political advocacy, but only if the advocacy is
not to engage imminently in violence under circumstances in which it is likely that such
advocacy will imminently incite such violence." These positive definitions were eliminated
by the House Judiciary Committee as overbroad, stating that "although treason and espio-
nage have traditionally been considered as political offenses, some conduct that is encom-
passed within these types of crimes will also constitute a violation of generally recognized
international law, and therefore not be appropriate to always treat as a political offense." H.
R. REP. No. 627, Pt. 1 supra note 3, at 24.
50. S. REP. No. 475, supra note 2, at 3 & 8. The Committee also quoted with approval
the testimony of Professor Lubet, who explained that "[a] broad definition need not be a
mechanistic or all-inclusive one. The word 'political' may have different meanings in differ-
ent contexts, and the United States is under no legal or moral obligation to shelter a fugitive
from extradition simply because he claims a political motive for his crime." Lubet, State-
ment before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Crime, supra note 38, re-
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that, except for the enumerated offenses, "courts will continue to apply
the traditional political offense test as enunciated in In re Castioni," but
the Committee prefaced this statement by pointing out that:
[T]he traditional definition of political offenses encompasses too many
crimes. In the nearly one hundred years since the first political offense
cases were decided, the international legal community has come to
recognize that certain offenses, even if they involve an offense of a
political character, are too heinous to escape prosecution and punish-
ment. Recognized examples of these offenses include killing a head of
state. "
In addition, the House Judiciary Committee expressly stated its expecta-
tion that courts will "examine existing French and Swiss motivation
precedents in this area" in determining whether crimes not listed in the
new legislation are to be deemed "political."52
Turning to the approach of enumerating crimes that are not political
offenses, the first question is whether there are crimes that should never
be considered political offenses. For several reasons, the answer to that is
certainly "yes." As the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has recog-
nized, "it is inappropriate to apply the political offense exception to con-
duct that the international community has taken formal steps to prohibit
and punish." s Thus the political offense exception should not even be
considered by the court if applying it would have the effect of protecting
behavior that is specifically outlawed by international treaties, such as
the Tokyo,54 Hague,"5 and Montreal 56 conventions with respect to aircraft
printed in S. REP. No. 475, supra note 2, at 3.
51. H. R. REP. No. 627, Pt. 1, supra note 3, at 23-24.
52. Id. at 26. The Committee specifically referred courts to the discussion of those
precedents discussed in a seminal article by Garcia-Mora, The Nature of Political Offenses:
A Knotty Problem of Extradition Law, 48 VA. L. REV. 1226, 1249-57 (1962). There, Profes-
sor Garcia-Mora quoted the rule in In re Giovanni Gatti, [1947] Ann. Dig. 145 (No. 70)
(Fr.): "The offense does not derive its political character from the motive of the offender but
from the nature of the rights it injures." Id. at 145-46. He also described "the celebrated
Swiss theory of predominance, which essentially means that ... the political element must
predominate over the common crime," i.e., must not be out of proportion to the end sought.
Garcia-Mora, supra, at 1249-50. In discussing the Swiss proportionality test the author re-
lied on the Wassilieff case, where the murder of a police chief was held not to be a political
offense "since other means of redress were available." Id. at 1254. For further discussion of
the Swiss proportionality test, see generally Abu Eain, 641 F.2d at 521 n.21 ("proportional-
ity and predominance may be unarticulated concepts in the existing Anglo-American frame-
work of extradition") and Note, Bringing the Terrorist to Justice: A Domestic Law Ap-
proach, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 71, 82-83 (1978).
53. S. REP. No. 475, supra note 2, at 7.
54. Convention on Offenses Aboard Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S.
No. 6768, 704 U.N.T.S. 220.
55. Convention for the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641,
T.I.A.S. No. 7192, 860 U.N.T.S. 105.
56. Convention on Civil Aviation Safety, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, T.I.A.S. No.
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hijacking, the Internationally Protected Persons (IPP) Convention,5 the
Hostage Convention," and any future multilateral treaties obligating the
United States either to extradite or prosecute. The absolute prohibition
approach is also appropriate for crimes such as rape and narcotics viola-
tions, which could never have any meaningful nexus to a political
controversy.5
9
An absolute prohibition, of course, has the procedural advantage of
sure and quick application, for courts can decide the political offense is-
sue "on the pleadings," as it were. It would be a great boon to prosecutors
and defendants alike if time-consuming exercises in history, sociology,
and philosophy, such as those conducted in Mackin, McMullen, Abu
Eain, and Quinn, could be avoided and the time devoted to reviewing
these complex issues on appeal reduced.10 Unfortunately, Congress has
been unable to devise either an all-encompassing positive definition or a
complete list of negatives that will relieve courts of that burden. Some
flexibility in the area of "relative" political offenses seems necessary, and
the approach excluding crimes of violence or the use of firearms except
"in extraordinary circumstances" is acceptable when read in light of the
legislative history.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which amended the origi-
nal version of S. 1940 to include the "extraordinary circumstances" con-
cept, makes clear that the burden of demonstrating such circumstances is
on the person resisting extradition and that this burden is "a considerable
one."' The Committee explained the criteria for applying the concept as
follows:
It should not be the policy of the United States to encourage or con-
done violent or other criminal behavior simply because it is the view
of the persons committing such acts that they are somehow connected
with a political activity or have an obstensible [sic] political purpose
or justification. However, it should also not be the policy of the
United States to render up automatically to foreign authorities an in-
dividual who, in the course of seeking to exercise legitimate civil or
57. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, adopted Dec. 14, 1973, entered into force
Feb. 20, 1977, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532. This convention has been implemented in
the U.S. by the enactment of 18 U.S.C. §§ 878, 1116-1117, & 1201.
58. International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/146
(1979), ratified by the United States July 30, 1981. See 127 CONG. REc. S8808-09 (daily ed.
July 30, 1981).
59. In S. 1940, rape was unintentionally listed among the crimes that could be deemed
a political offense "in extraordinary circumstances." That error has been corrected in the
version of the legislation now pending in the 98th Congress. See S. 220, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 3194(e)(1)(F), introduced by Sen. Strom Thurmond on Jan. 27, 1983.
60. See, e.g., note 34 supra. Each of the trials in these cases lasted more than a week
and produced some two thousand pages of transcripts and documents. The possibility of
delay is great. For example, Ziyad Abu Eain was arrested on August 21, 1979 and finally
extradited to Israel on December 12, 1981. Wash. Post., Dec. 13, 1981, at A8, col. 3.
61. S. REP. No. 475, supra note 2, at 8.
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political rights in a nonviolent manner, is placed in such a position
that he has no reasonable choice except to commit an otherwise crimi-
nal act. For the court to make such a determination the test should be
focused upon the individual and whether the offense for which he is
sought was a consequence of the violation of his internationally recog-
nized civil or political rights by the state requesting extradition. Acts
of indiscriminate or excessive violence or acts of deliberate brutality
would presumably never fall within the exception. 2
The Senate Committee's focus on the lack of any "reasonable choice,"
i.e., any alternative means of redress, is the correct focus for what consti-
tutes an "extraordinary" circumstance. It has also been urged by an influ-
ential voice on the House side."
In reporting out H.R. 6046, the House Judiciary Committee sug-
gested that courts should "evaluate a large number of factors" when ap-
plying the "extraordinary circumstances" language.64 These factors in-
clude whether the victim is "civilian, governmental or military," what
relationship exists between the person whose extradition is being sought
and any political organization, whether the crime allegedly committed
was done in furtherance of such organization's political goals, and what
the relative seriousness of the offense is.65 The House Committee's sug-
gestion, however, leaves the matter too open-ended and fails to provide
courts with sufficient guidance at the very point they most need it.
The critical question is what kind of conduct is being protected by
the use of the "extraordinary circumstances" language. The Senate Com-
mittee protects one kind of conduct-unavoidable violence occasioned by
a violation of civil or political rights-and gives adequate guidance to
courts as to when to invoke the political offense exception. The House
Committee is obviously trying to protect, or at least to keep, the U.S.
from becoming embroiled in another kind of conduct: civil war. 6 More
precision in defining the intended result can be achieved without the risk
of courts sweeping too much into the political offense exception or ex-
cluding too much from its protection. This can be accomplished by two
steps: first, by creating an additional absolute prohibition and, second, by
clarifying the circumstances in which the Castioni test should apply.
As explained above, both Houses appear to agree that violence out of
proportion to the political end sought cannot be defined as a "political
62. Id.
63. Rep. Paul Findley has suggested that "extraordinary circumstances" include "acts
committed as a last resort by a person who has been subjected, in the state where such acts
occurred, to serious violations of internationally protected human rights and for whom such
acts are the only reasonable means of protection or flight from such conditions." H.R. REP.
No. 627, Pt. 2, supra note 3, at 7. (Statement of Hon. Paul Findley).
64. H.R. REP. No. 627, Pt. 1, supra note 3, at 24.
65. Id. at 2425.
66. The House Committee defined the "underlying rationale" of the political offense
exception as keeping out of "another country's political dispute." H.R. REP. No. 627, Pt. 1,
supra note 3, at 23. See also note 22 supra.
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offense." Therefore, a new provision should be added to the absolute
prohibitions in Section 3194(e)(1) of S. 1940, such as the following: "An
offense that consists of intentional, direct participation in a wanton or
indiscriminate act of violence with extreme indifference to the risk of
causing death or serious bodily injury to persons not taking part in armed
hostilities." This provision would draw a sharp line between hostile acts
against a state and mere terrorism.6 7 Such a salutory rule would plainly
have covered the situation in Abu Eain and eliminated the drawnout ef-
forts of apologists for the PLO to characterize "a random bombing in-
tended to result in the cold-blooded murder of civilians" as a political
offense."s It would also cover cases in which the victims include civilians
even though the targets are governmental facilities or officials. This new
exclusion alone, however, is not enough.
The second step to improving the legislative guidelines contained in
S. 1940 involves clarifying the circumstances in which the Castioni test
should be applied. This in turn involves a clarification of two factors: the
type of behavior that is not to be protected even in an armed conflict, and
the type of armed conflict that should trigger the Castioni test at all.
Recent work in this area by the American Bar Association is enormously
helpful and points the way to the correct resolution of the problem.
At its 1983 Annual Meeting in Atlanta, Georgia, the House of Dele-
gates of the American Bar Association adopted a resolution "strongly rec-
ommend[ing]" that extradition legislation be passed which will:
exclude all acts of terrorist violence from the application of the politi-
cal offense exception . . . [and] preclude the application of the politi-
cal offense exception to offenses which constitute serious breaches of
the norms established under international humanitarian law applica-
ble in international and noninternational armed conflicts, without
subjecting to extradition combatants for warlike acts which do not
transgress those norms. ' "9
67. Such a provision embodies the rationale of the Seventh Circuit's decision in Abu
Eain, 641 F.2d at 521 ("an offense having its impact on the citizenry, but not directly upon
the government, does not fall within the political offense exception") and responds to the
well-founded belief of many Congressmen that attacks on civilians can never be justified;
see, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 627, Pt. 2, supra note 3, at 8 (Statement of Hon. A. Erdahl) ("politi-
cal offense does not include acts of violence involving wanton, indiscriminate, or reckless
bodily injury to persons in order to generate terror within a civilian population").
68. Abu Eain, 641 F.2d at 521. The proposed amendment would also slam shut the
loophole that the Seventh Circuit arguably left open in Abu Eain when it held that the
bombing was not "incidental to" the political conflict in Israel because there was no "direct
tie between the PLO and the specific violence alleged." Id. at 520. Though the court quoted
with approval a United Nations Secretariat study which stated that "the legitimacy of a
cause does not in itself legitimize the use of certain forms of violence especially against the
innocent," id. at 521, it left unclear what result would follow if the evidence had established
such a "direct tie." The correct answer is, of course, that the crime would still not be a
political offense because it fails the "proportionality" test. See note 53 supra. See also In re
Meunier, [1894] 2 Q.B. 415, discussed in Hannay, supra note 17, at 388-90.
69. American Bar Association, Report No. 104A (1983) (adopted as a resolution by the
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To accomplish these goals, the ABA's Section of International Law and
Practice proposed certain amendments to Section 3194(e) of S. 1940.0
The ABA's proposed amendments would first of all delete "the taking of
a hostage" from the offenses subject to the "extraordinary circumstances"
test and add it to the list of absolute prohibitions in Section 3194(e)(1).
This change makes sense because such conduct is now expressly forbid-
den by the 1979 Hostage Convention7 1 and because, as the ABA points
out, "[i]t is difficult to conceive of any circumstance which would justify
this offense.
72
Second, the ABA's proposed amendments would specifically incorpo-
rate into the political offense definition the international laws of war
which have "developed limitations on the methods, means, and measures
of coercion and violence which may be used by the parties in any armed
conflict. '7' The ABA's proposed amendment would retain the prefatory
language in Section 3194(e)(2) of S. 1940, "[flor the purposes of this sec-
tion a political offense, except in extraordinary circumstances, does not
include . . . ," but would substitute the following in place of Section
3194(e)(2)(A) and (B):
(A) except for acts [that are] committed in the course of a non-
international armed conflict in furtherance of the objectives of the
party to the conflict to which the person belongs and [that] do not
violate the norms referred to in subparagraph (B), an offense that
consists of homicide, assault with intent to commit serious bodily in-
jury, kidnapping, serious unlawful detention, or an offense involving
the use of firearms . if such use endangers a person other than the
offender;
(B)(i) an offense consisting of conduct which violates the provi-
sions of subparagraph (1) of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conven-
tions of 12 August 1949 and any Protocol additional thereto Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflict to
which the United States is a party."
This approach is first-rate. Subsection (B)(i), of course, should logically
House of Delegates of the American Bar Association on Aug. 3, 1983).
70. See American Bar Association, Report of the Section of International Law and
Practice, appended to ABA Report No. 104A (1983) [hereinafter cited as ABA Section Re-
port.. The Proposed Amendmant- are Gct forth inT, ,clc,,ur A tn the .pction Report (Incl.
4). The report was drafted by the Section's International Criminal Law Committee under
the co-chairmanship of Waldemar A. Solf and James D. Clause.
71. ABA Section Report, supra note 70, at 6, para. c.
72. Id. at 12 n.6.
73. Id. at 78.
74. Id. at Incl. 4. See, e.g., Geneva Convention for the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, re-
printed in 72 AM. J. INT'L. L. 457 (1978). A detailed discussion of the standards of interna-
tional humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict, including the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions and their relationship to the political offense exception, was attached to the ABA
Section Report as a separate inclosure (Incl. 3). That portion of the report is reprinted as
Appendix A to this article.
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be listed among the "absolute prohibitions" of Section 3194(e)(1), but the
idea is right on the mark. When combined with one other piece of the
definitional puzzle and with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's
interpretation of "extraordinary circumstances," the ABA proposal ac-
counts for all of the situations that present hard cases or produce bad
results under the Castioni test.
Importantly, the ABA report recognizes the absence of a proportion-
ality dimension to the Castioni test, stating:
The difficulty with the simple formula of the Castioni case is that it
did not recognize that there are limitations on the conduct of internal
armed conflict and that revolutionary violence which trangresses these
limitations is not tolerable under the political offenses exception.
Moreover, every political disturbance does not provide justification for
violent criminal acts."
This fundamental flaw in the prevailing test of a "relative" political of-
fense would be remedied by reference to the normative humanitarian
rules established by 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Protocol II,
which prohibit murder, cruel or degrading treatment, hostage-taking, ter-
rorism, and pillage directed at persons not, or no longer, taking an active
part in hostilities.7
6
With the outer limit of conduct permissible under the political ex-
ception established by the first part of the ABA's proposed amendment,
there remains one other piece of the puzzle necessary for an acceptable
guideline: a definition of "non-international armed conflict" establishing
the lower limit or threshold for invoking the exception. The ABA's pro-
posed amendment sets forth such a definition, and it is generally a satis-
factory one. The ABA definition has two parts. First, it expressly excludes
certain situations from the definition stating that the term "armed con-
flict" does not apply to "situations of internal disturbances and tensions,
such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a
similar nature."' 7 This aspect of the definition is eminently correct, for
the purposes behind the political offense exception are not achieved by
applying the Castioni test to such situations. As the ABA report accom-
75. ABA Section Report, supra note 70, at Incl. 3.
76. Id. In support of its approach, the ABA quotes with approval the French extradi-
tion treaty which excludes from the political offense exception "acts committed in the
course of an insurrection or a civil war" that constitute "acts of odious barbarism and van-
dalism prohibited by the laws of war." Id. at 9. See also German Extradition Law of Dec.
23, 1929, which provides in part, "Extradition is permissible if the act constitutes a deliber-
ate offense against life, unless committed in open combat." Harvard Research in Int'l. Law,
29 AM. J. INT'L L. 385 (Supp. 1935).
77. ABA Section Report, supra note 70, at Incl. 4. This provision is taken directly from
Article 1.2 of the 1977 Protocol II, 72 Am. J. Int'l L. 502, 503 (1978). The ABA explained
that the proposed amendment "uses the negative provisions of Protocol II to make certain
that acts of violence against the police of a State in situations falling short of 'armed con-
flict' do not benefit from the political offenses exception." ABA Section Report, supra note
70, at 7.
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panying the proposed amendment recognizes: "[T]errorist acts of violence
in situations falling short of armed conflict even when directed against
the security forces of a state, such as those perpetrated by the Red Bri-
gade of Italy or the Bader-Meinhoff gang of Germany and similar groups
should . . . be excluded [from the exception] ."78
The second and most critical part of the definition in the ABA's pro-
posed amendment is the positive portion defining the threshold for what
constitutes a "noninternational armed conflict." The model for the ABA's
definition is contained in article 1.1 of the 1977 Protocol II to the 1949
Geneva Conventions, which states:
This Protocol . . . shall apply to all armed conflicts . .. which take
place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed
forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups
which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part
of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted
military operations and to implement this Protocol.
79
The ABA essentially adopted this definition but modified it slightly in
the proposed amendment, omitting the latter part which refers to dissi-
dent armed forces exercising "such control over a part of [the State's]
territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military
operations."80 For the sake of consistency and clarity, the entire defini-
tion from Protocol II should be built into the legislative guidelines. How-
ever, even if the ABA's definition is adopted in haec verba, the effect is
the same, for the proposed definition, just as the language in Protocol II,
plainly contemplates: "[s]ufficient statelike characteristics on the part of
the rebels, as to suggest a level of organization and violence to be found
in a classicial civil war, where one might expect international armed con-
flict rules to apply, either under recognized belligerence or a prudent ex-
pectation of reciprocity.""1 It is in precisely the circumstances of a "class-
ical civil war," and only in those circumstances, that the theory of the
political offense exception embodied in Castioni and in the Ezeta deci-
sion in the U.S. should come into play. In such circumstances, and only
therein, does the rationale of those cases have validity. During a "classical
78. ABA Section Report, supra note 70, at 8.
79. 72 AM. J. INT'L L.502, 5 .02-003. 9 ,07001.
80. Including the excerpt set forth in the text at note 76, the ABA definition in its
entirety states as follows:
(ii) for purposes of this subparagraph a non-international armed conflict
within the meaning of Common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Convention shall
be an armed conflict which takes place within the territory of a foreign state
between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other armed groups
which are under a command responsible to a party to the conflict for the con-
duct of its subordinates. The term "armed conflict" does not apply to situa-
tions of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic
acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature.
ABA Section Report, supra note 70, at Ind. 4.
81. Id. at 10.
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civil war" or revolution (such as in Lebanon, El Salvador, or Afghani-
stan), other nations should be able to avoid becoming embroiled in an
unstable internal dispute by extraditing c9mbatants, no matter whether
revolutionaries or tyrants, who have not breached the 1949 Geneva Con-
ventions or the 1977 Protocol II. At the other end of the spectrum, where
no such condition pertains and where the forms of meaningful democratic
process exist, other nations should remain free to extradite those who use
violence to try to gain their goals despite the existence of other means of
redress. In the absence of civil war, political violence directed at govern-
mental officials or security personnel should be deemed a "political of-
fense" only in the "extraordinary circumstance" that no other means of
political redress is available. By enacting S. 1940 with the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee's view of "extraordinary circumstances," with the
new absolute prohibition suggested above, and with the ABA's proposed
amendment, combatants in armed conflicts would be protected; mere ter-
rorists would not.
The measure of the effect of this approach is to ask what would have
happened in McMullen and Mackin if the ABA amendments had been in
place. The answer is that the opposite results would have obtained, and
properly so. Much as the PIRA would like it otherwise, the "troubles" in
Northern Ireland do not constitute a civil war and do not justify invoking
the exception.
The political offense exception could never have been intended to
provide blanket immunity and asylum to every politically disaffected in-
dividual who in the company of a few others of like mind wishes to take
the law-and a gun-into his own hands. Where the institutions of demo-
cratic governance exist as they do, for example, in Northern Ireland, it ill-
serves the interests of those who live in a free and open society to cast a
cloak of protection over impatient extremists who demand their own way
now and will kill anyone who stands in their way-whether policeman,
politician, soldier, or civilian. There is no rule of international law that
sanctifies political murder merely because the victim wears a uniform.
There is no open season on soldiers or policemen, nor should the city
streets and village lanes of a democratic nation be considered a war zone
merely because there are a hundred terrorists at large rather than one.
CONCLUSION
While the best approach is to defer to the Secretary of State in deter-
mining whether or not a particular crime is a "political offense" under our
extradition treaties, it appears that Congress has moved past this stage of
the argument. The decision to leave the matter in the courts' hands seems
irreversible; the task that is left is to provide more detailed guidance to
the courts in their interpretive task.
Section 3194(e) of S. 1940, as passed by the Senate in 1982, provides
excellent guidance and would be entirely satisfactory if it is recognized
that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has set forth the correct
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standard for interpreting "extraordinary circumstances," if a new prohibi-
tion excluding terrorist attacks on civilians is added, and if the American
Bar Association's proposed amendment is adopted. Such a statute will
give courts the necessary tools with which to separate the truly downtrod-
den from the merely dissatisfied, to distinguish the rebel from the terror-
ist. By enacting such legislation, Congress will ensure that the balancing
of interests inherent in the political offense determination will be made
with a sense of proportion and in a manner consistent with our demo-
cratic notions of decency, world order, and the Rule of Law.
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Appendix A
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
PRACTICE:
Report to the House of Delegates/Inclosure 3.
EXTRADITION IN RELATION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICT
1. The International Law rules applicable in armed conflict consist of
restraints formulated to prevent, or at least to mitigate, the destruction of
shared values occasioned by armed conflict. The underlying stimulus for
the development has been the realization that violence and destruction
which is unnecessary to actual military requirements is not only immoral
and wasteful of scarce resources, but also counterproductive to the attain-
ment of the political objectives for which military force is used.
2. Breaches of the norms developed under customary and Conven-
tional International Law are war crimes. The 1949 Geneva Conventions
designate certain aggravated breaches as universal and extraditable of-
fenses within the criminal jurisdiction of each contracting party. As of
January 1, 1983, 152 nations are parties to those conventions.
Each of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions obliges the contracting
parties:
a. To enact any legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanc-
tions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the
grave breaches defined therein.
b. To search for alleged offenders of such grave breaches, and to sub-
mit them for prosecution before its own courts, regardless of their nation-
ality; or, in accordance with its own legislation, to extradite them to an-
other contracting party concerned, provided the requesting party has
made out a prima facie case. (Common Articles 49/50/129/146).
As there are now 152 parties to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, grave
breaches denounced therein are universal crimes subject to the jurisdic-
tion of each party to the conventions. They would be extraditable of-
fenses, not subject to the political offenses exception, under the proposed
standard of S. 220(e)(1)(D) and H.R. 2643, Section 3194(e)(2)(D) which
prescribe that an offense with respect to which a treaty obligates the
United States to either extradite or prosecute a person accused of an of-
fense is not a political offense.
c. The grave breaches defined in the 1949 Geneva Conventions are
the following, if committed in an international armed conflict against pro-
tected persons and objects:
in the case of all four Conventions: willful killing, torturing or inhu-
man treatment, including biological experiments, willfully causing great
1983
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
suffering or serious injury to body or health;
in the case of the First, Second and Fourth Conventions: extensive
destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military neces-
sity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;
in the case of the Third Convention: compelling a prisoner of war to
serve in the forces of the hostile Power, or willfully depriving him of the
rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in the Convention;
in the case of the Fourth Convention: unlawful deportation or trans-
fer or unlawful confinement of a protected person, compelling a protected
person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power, or willfully depriving a
protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed by the
Convention; taking of hostages.
(Common Articles 50/51/130/147).
"Protected persons" within the meaning of the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tion are the wounded, sick and shipwrecked persons of the armed forces,
medical personnel, prisoners of war and civilians in the power of a party
to the conflict of which they are not nationals. (Fourth Convention, Art.
4).
3. The 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflict (Protocol I), adds several new offenses as grave breaches
including:
willful and unjustified acts of omissions which seriously endanger the
physical or mental health or persons in the power of an adverse party, by
medical procedures not indicated by the medical needs of that person, or
not consistent with generally accepted medical standards, including muti-
lations, medical experiments, and removal of organs for transplantation
(Protocol I, Art. 11(4));
willfully causing death or seriously injury to body or health by:
making the civilian population the object of attack;
launching an indiscriminate attack or an attack against works
or installations containing dangerous forces (dams, dykes, nuclear
electric power generating stations), knowing that it will cause civilian
casualties, excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated;
making nondefended localities or demilitarized zones the
object of attack and;
the perfidious use of the Red Cross emblem. (Protocol I, Art. 85).
The United States has signed, but not ratified, the 1977 Protocols.
Protocol I is now effective as to twenty-seven states.
4. In international armed conflicts, prisoner of war status flows from
the combatants' privilege. Those who are entitled to the juridical status
of "privileged combatant" are immune from criminal prosecution for
those warlike acts which do not violate the laws and customs of war but
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which might otherwise be common crimes under municipal law. This is a
concept recognized by the classic publicists, including Belli, Grotius,
Pufendorf, and Vattel. It was recognized in Article 57 of the Lieber In-
structions of 1863, which states that "[slo soon as a man is armed by a
sovereign government and takes the soldier's oath of fidelity, he is a bel-
ligerent; his killing, wounding, or other warlike acts are not individual
crimes or offenses." Under the law of the United States, any killing while
on combat operations which is not violative of the laws of war is recog-
nized to be justifiable homicide. Civil law courts recognized this concept
in the post-World War II trials when they provided immunity to those
defendants charged with violations of domestic criminal law if it was es-
tablished that their acts were privileged under international law.
In view of the clear distinction between grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions and legitimate acts of combat by privileged combatants, the
standards developed in S. 220 and H.R. 2643 can be applied without diffi-
culty as to acts of violence performed in the course of an international
armed conflict. Grave breaches are not political offenses; legitimate acts
of combat are not offenses at all and thus do not come within the scope of
extradition treaties.
5. Acts of violence occurring in the course of a non-international
armed conflict (insurrection, rebellion or civil war) pose a more difficult
problem. Although the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Protocol II
establish normative humanitarian rules applicable in non-international
armed conflict, they do not provide for any enforcement measures. More-
over, they do not oblige states affected by an internal armed conflict to
recognize the combatants' privilege or to accord prisoner of war treatment
to captured combatants of the other side. For self-evident reasons, gov-
ernments (particularly those which may be affected by an emerging dissi-
dent or separatist movement) are unwilling to concur in any international
law which would, in effect, repeal its treason laws and confer on its do-
mestic enemies a license to kill, maim or kidnap its security personnel
and destroy its security installations subject only to honorable detention
as prisoners of war until the conclusion of the internal armed conflict.
They fear that any international rule establishing the combatants' privi-
lege and prisoner of war status in internal armed conflicts would tend to
encourage insurrection by reducing the personal risks of rebels. It follows
that within the scope of the domestic law of a country affected by such an
armed conflict, the rebels have committed treason and their acts of vio-
lence may be punished as common criminal offenses. As a matter of pol-
icy, States sometimes apply international armed conflict practices to a
civil war and are generous with amnesty in order to facilitate a restora-
tion of peace, or in a prudent expectation of reciprocity, but international
law does not require such a policy except with respect to recognized bel-
ligerency, a rare event in this century.
6. Without affecting the legal status of the parties to a noninterna-
tional armed conflict, Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Convention
applies certain minimum human rights standards applicable to persons
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not, or no longer, taking an active part in the hostilities as follows:
ARTICLE 3.
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character oc-
curring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each
Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the fol-
lowing provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including
members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those
placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other
cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any ad-
verse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth
or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at
any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the abovemen-
tioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds,
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and
degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions
without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted
court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as in-
dispensable by civilized peoples.
(2) The wounded, sick and shipwrecked shall be collected and
cared for.
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the
conflict.
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into
force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provi-
sions of the present Convention.
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the
legal status of the Parties to the conflict.
These standards have been extensively elaborated and particularized
in the 1977 Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Relevant por-
tions provide:
Article 4 - Fundamental guarantees
1. All persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to
take part in hostilities, whether or not their liberty has been re-
stricted, are entitled to respect for their person, honour and convic-
tions and religious practices. They shall in all circumstances be
treated humanely, without any adverse distinction. It is prohibited to
order that there shall be no survivors.
2. Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, the follow-
ing acts against the persons referred to in paragraph 1 are and shall
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remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever;
(a) violence to the life, health and physical or mental wellbeing
of persons, in particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as
torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment;
(b) collective punishments;
(c) taking of hostages;
(d) acts of terrorism;
(e) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating
and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of
indecent assault;
(f) slavery and the slave trade in all their forms;
(g) pillage;
(h) threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.
Article 6 - Penal prosecutions
1. This Article applies to the prosecution and punishment of
criminal offenses related to the armed conflict.
2. No sentence shall be passed and no penalty shall be executed
on a person found guilty of an offense except pursuant to a conviction
pronounced by a court offering the essential guarantees of indepen-
dence and impartiality. In particular:
(a) the procedure shall provide for an accused to be informed
without delay of the particulars of the offense alleged against him and
shall afford the accused before and during his trial all necessary rights
and means of defence;
(b) no one shall be convicted of an offense except on the basis
of individual penal responsibility;
(c) no one shall be held guilty of any criminal offense on ac-
count of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal of-
fense, under the law, at the time when it was committed; nor shall a
heavier penalty be imposed than that which was applicable at the
time when the criminal offense was committed; if, after the commis-
sion of the offense, provision is made by law for the imposition of a
lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby;
(d) anyone charged with an offense is presumed innocent until
proved guilty according to law;
(e) anyone charged with an offense shall have the right to be
tried in his presence;
(f) no one shall be compelled to testify against himself or to
confess guilt.
In addition to the foregoing, Protocol II includes standards for hu-
mane treatment of persons deprived of their liberty for reasons related to
the armed conflict (Art. 5); the care of the wounded, sick and shipwreck-
ed, (Arts. 7-12); and the protection of the civilian population against di-
rect attack and other effects of hostilities (Arts. 13-18).
7. Because common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions are the
Conventions' only articles relating to non-international armed conflicts,
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none of the provisions of the conventions relating to the enforcement, in-
cluding the prosecute or extradite provisions are applicable to the norms
of Article 3. It follows that the only basis for extradition under U.S. law
for offenses violative of Art. 3 are the various bilateral extradition treaties
relevant to common crimes. These are subject to the political offenses ex-
ception. Indeed the political offenses exception was invented in 1840 for
the purpose of shielding from extradition the participants in the liberal
and nationalistic revolutions which occurred in mid-nineteenth century
Europe and the Americas.
8. Although there is no mandatory combatants' privilege and prisoner
of war status or treatment in internal armed conflicts within the scope of
any nation's municipal law, a qualified combatants' privilege has been
recognized by third states in matters relating to asylum and extradition.
The dichotomy between the state of municipal law and transnational
practice in this regard was vividly expressed by Sir James Stephen in his
explanation of the British Extradition Act of 1870:
[I]f a civil war were to take place, it would be high treason by levying
war against the Queen. Every case in which a man was shot in action
would be murder. Whenever a house was burnt for military purposes
arson would be committed. To take cattle ... by requisition would be
robbery. According to the common use of language, however, all such
acts would be political offences, because they would be incidents in
carrying on a civil war. I think, therefore, that the expression in the
Extradition Act ought (unless some better interpretation of it can be
suggested) to be interpreted to mean that fugitive criminals are not to
be surrendered for extradition crimes, if those crimes were incidental
to and formed a part of political disturbances." (J. Stephen, A History
of the Criminal Law of England (1883), Vol II, at 70-71).
This reasoning was applied in the case of In re Castioni [1891] 1 Q.B.
149, 167 which became the leading influence on the application of the
political offenses exception in American courts. The difficulty with the
simple formula of the Castioni case is that it did not recognize that there
are limitations on the conduct of internal armed conflict and that revolu-
tionary violence which transgresses these limitations is not tolerable
under the political offenses exception. Moreover, every political distur-
bance does not provide justification for violent criminal acts.
A 1907 French law comes much closer to the recognition of these lim-
itations. it provided:
[Extradition is not granted] when the crime or offense has a political
character or when it is clear [resulte] from the circumstances that the
extradition is requested for a political end.
As to acts committed in the course of an insurrection or a civil war by
one or the other of the parties engaged in the conflict and in the fur-
therance ... of its purpose, they may not be grounds for extradition
unless they constitute acts of odious barbarism and vandalism prohib-
ited by the laws of war, and only when the civil war has ended. (Law
of March 10, 1927, Tit. 1, Art. 5, para. 2, as quoted in Hannay, Inter-
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national Terrorism and the Political Offense Exception to Extradi-
tion, 18 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 381, 386 (1979).
Similarly, the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (606
U.N.T.S. 267, 19 U.S.T. 6223) which prohibits the expulsion or return of
a refugee to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality or membership of
a particular social group or political opinion, does not apply to persons
with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that he has
committed a war crime or a serious nonpolitical crime (Arts. 2F, 33).
The gap between normative prohibitions and measures of enforce-
ment in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and its Protocols is plugged with
respect to hostage taking by the 1979 Convention Against the Taking of
Hostages. (Senate consent completed, but treaty not yet in effect).
Common Article 3 and Article 4 of Protocol II prohibit the taking of
hostages in a non-international armed conflict. Article 75 of Protocol I,
which lays down fundamental human rights for persons who do not qual-
ify as "protected persons," also prohibits this act. But the grave breach of
the Fourth Convention applies only to "protected" civilians in the power
of an adverse party in an international armed conflict. The effect of Arti-
cle 12 of the 1979 Hostage Convention, however, is to make the Hostage
Convention with its very strong prosecute or extradite provisions applica-
ble to acts of hostage taking in armed conflicts, whenever the Geneva
Conventions and its Protocols do not establish the obligation to submit
[?] for prosecution or to extradite.
In view of the practice of states in regard to applying the political
offenses exception to normal combat activities occurring in a non-interna-
tional armed conflict occurring in another country, the provision of S. 220
and H.R. 2643 which excludes all acts of violence from the benefits of the
exception, should be modified.
9. There remains for consideration, the issue whether a particular sit-
uation amounts to an armed conflict.
The 1977 Protocol II Applicable in Non-International Armed Conflict
has a very high threshold. Under Art. 1, that Protocol (which includes
rules regulating combat activities as well as basic human rights provi-
sions) is applicable to armed conflicts:
... which take place in the territory of a high Contracting party
between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organ-
ized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such
control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sus-
tained and concerted military operations and to implement this Pro-
tocol. (Protocol I, Art. 1(1)).
In view of the sophisticated provisions of Protocol II its implementa-
tion requires sufficient statelike characteristics on the part of the rebels
as to suggest a level of organization and violence to be found in a classical
civil war, where one might expect international armed conflict rules to
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apply, either under recognized belligerence or a prudent expectation of
reciprocity.
Protocol II also establishes a negative limitation which is relevant to
Common Article 3 (despite the express disclaimer that Protocol II does
not modify its existing application). Art. 1(2) provides: "This Protocol
shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as
riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar
nature, as not being armed conflicts."
The term "armed conflict" is not defined in Common Article 3,
mainly because no definition was able to command a consensus in the
1949 Geneva Conference. Presumably, in view of its basic minimum
human rights provisions it should be much lower than the threshold for
Protocol II. There is nothing in paragraph 1 of Common Article 3 which
is not already demanded by the procedure of penal law of "civilized"
states in relation to the treatment of common criminals.
Nevertheless, as the application of Common Article 3 acknowledges
the existence of an "armed conflict," many states have refused to admit
its application to insurgencies occurring in their territories. Thus, France
refused to apply Common Article 3 until late in the Algerian war; Paki-
stan denied its applicability to the Bengladesh secession. The U.K. has
never conceded that the troubles in Northern Ireland constitute an armed
conflict, despite its declaration, in justifying its derogation of certain pro-
visions of the European Convention on human rights, that an emergency
exists threatening the life of the nation.
Insofar as foreign governments do not consider themselves bound to
refrain from applying the combatants' privilege as it applies to extradi-
tion cases involving violent acts occurring in an internal armed conflict, it
would seem that they are similarly not bound to follow the de jure gov-
ernment's determination as to whether an armed conflict exists for pur-
poses of the political offenses exception.
The threshold article proposed for initial application (Incl. 4) con-
sists of the minimum requirements that the dissident armed forces:
a. be linked to a party to the conflict;
b. be organized;
c. be under a command responsible to the party for the conduct of
subordinates, and;
d. that, the government's armed forces (rather than the civil po-
lice) be committed to suppress the insurrection.
It also uses the negative provisions of Protocol II to make certain
that acts of violence against the police of a State in situations falling
short of "armed conflict" do not benefit from the political offenses excep-
tion. The "extraordinary circumstances" clause, however, remains in the
draft proposal in order to allow courts to apply the exception to meritori-
ous cases involving the use of violence in situations falling short of armed
conflict. The burden of establishing extraordinary circumstances by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence is on the person sought.
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The recognition of environmental disruption as an issue demanding
political action has become a worldwide phenomenon.1 There is growing
recognition that the continued use of watersheds, land resources and the
atmosphere as sinks for the disposal of human residuals results in unac-
ceptable social costs, such as increased illness, crop losses, ecosystem dis-
ruption and the creation of low-level, long-term health risks such as can-
cer. Moreover, there is a growing societal preference, especially in the
developed nations, for increased amenity levels.2 This preference has led
to demands for greater governmental protection of the natural landscape
from developmental "insults," for the maintenance of a "human scale" in
urban planning and for a greater role for social and aesthetic considera-
tions in developmental planning of all kinds.3
Public health protection and amenity enhancement are often
achieved by either the reduction of residual discharge levels or the pro-
motion of less polluting activities. Environmental problems are present to
some degree in all nations, independent of the political, economic, and
social organization of the country. Pollution and the demand for amenity
enhancement are largely functions of the levels of industrial development
and education, and of the distribution of population within a country. For
example, one can trace the evolution of air and water pollution laws in
* A. Dan Tarlock is Professor of Law at the Illinois Institute of Technology/Chicago-
Kent College of Law.
**Pedro Tarak is Professor of Environmental Policy and Law, Institute of Natural Re-
sources Law, University of Buenos Aires, Argentina.
1. For a comparative survey of environmental issues in four industrialized coun-
tries-Great Britain, Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United States-which stresses the
differences and similarities in environmental constituencies within and without government,
see, C. ENLOE, THE POLITICS OF POLLUTION IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: ECOLOGY AND
POWER IN FOUR NATIONS (1975).
2. The increased desire for cleaner, more aesthetically pleasing environments has been
noted by all major studies concerned with global resource needs. See, e.g., W. HXFELE, J.
ANDERER, A. McDONALD & N. NACKICENOVIC, ENERGY IN A FINITE WORLD: A GLOBAL SYSTEMS
ANALYSIS (1981).
3. In this article, the standard three-part classification of environmental planning and
management objectives has been collapsed into two parts. The three traditional environ-
mental planning objectives are (1) the protection of physical and mental health, (2) the
enhancement of economic value and (3) the preservation of sensory pleasure. See T.
O'RORDAN, ENvIRONMENTALIsM 202 (1976).
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the United States as well as in both Eastern and Western Europe from
general prohibitions against harmful discharges to technology-forcing li-
censing laws that specify the parameters of lawful air and water
emissions."
Despite common environmental problems and similarities among the
institutional responses to environmental degradation and threats to
human health, environmental protection is still primarily the responsibil-
ity of individual sovereign nations. This is true even though regional orga-
nizations, such as the European Economic Community (EEC), are playing
an increasingly active role in policy formulation and coordination.' In the
foreseeable future, however, the persistence of differing economic and po-
litical goals suggests that there will be great variations among nations in
the balances struck between the costs of maintaining environmental qual-
ity and the opportunity costs of achieving this objective.' Some countries
accord greater weight to the benefits of industrial development and
wealth redistribution while others emphasize the benefits of a stable and
healthy environment. These differences manifest themselves in the insti-
tutional structures and legal regimes devised to govern environmental
quality.
This article attempts a brief comparative analysis of the different in-
stitutional responses to the various types of environmental degradation.
The common types of environmental insult which have been the subject
of legislation are initially classified and a model of the evolution of envi-
ronmental strategies is proposed. The general schemes of environmental
regulation utilized in various countries are identified by an examination
of the different institutional arrangements which have been created to
enforce such schemes. The different methods of pollution reduction and
public health protection are compared in order to identify common ap-
proaches and to point out unique features of the methods employed by
the countries surveyed. For the sake of brevity, selected examples from
4. An illustration of this general development can be seen in the evolution of Poland's
water pollution control law from the Water Act of 30 May 1962, Dz V (Pol.), No. 34, at 158,
to the Water Act of 24 October 1974, Dz V (Pol.), No. 74, at 430 (Trybuna Ludu), described
in S. ERCMAN, EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC APPRAISAL 89-93 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW]. For a more extended discussion of
enviruninuital proLecLiun planning in socialist systems, see Somer, Legal Ways and Means
of Environmental Protection in the Legal System of Industrial Investments in Socialist
Countries, 3 EARTH L.J. 7 (1979).
5. See note 94 infra.
6. Considerable debate exists about the priority to be given to environmental issues in
developing countries. Many of these nations view stringent environmental protection poli-
cies as luxuries they cannot afford or, worse yet, as a plot by the developed nations to per-
petuate the present unequal distribution of wealth throughout the world. For an early expo-
sition of this theme, see Castro, The Case of the Developing Countries, in WORLD
EcoCRISIS: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN RESPONSE 237 (D. Kay & E. Skolnikoff eds.
1972). There is some evidence that the attitudes of the developing nations are changing. See
Bassow, The Third World: Changing Attitudes Toward Environmental Protection, 444 AN-
NALS 112 (1979).
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the three major legal systems of the Americas and Europe-the common
law, civil law, and socialist law-will be used to illustrate such approaches
and the impact of differing economic and social priorities on environmen-
tal law. To a lesser extent, the institutional responses to environmental
degradation in countries on the road to development will be explored and,
at the risk of emphasizing common aspects of environmental protection
against the particular circumstances which influence the institutional re-
sponses to demands for environmental quality in a specific country, a
generally applicable model of legal and environmental protection will be
sketched.
II. CATEGORIZATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL INSULTS AND THEIR LEGAL
CONSEQUENCES
Environmental insults which threaten public health may usefully be
categorized as either episodic or persistent in nature. Different institu-
tional responses are required depending on whether the problem is one of
redressing past harm by compensating victims of isolated incidents or
preventing future risks arising from persistent discharges.
Episodic insults are discrete pollution events occurring on a large or
small scale. An accidental discharge of toxic effluents into a stream that
kills fish and closes recreation areas or an air inversion which traps pollu-
tants over a city for several days or perhaps weeks are typical episodic
insults. The harm done by these discrete insults is measured by short-
term exposure to the pollution. In contrast, persistent insults are more
diffuse and more difficult to measure. They result from continuing, poten-
tially harmful emissions produced by economically valuable activities and
are exemplified by untreated sewage discharges, sulphur dioxide emis-
sions from coal burning facilities, automobile exhausts, low level radiation
emissions, and acid rain. Further complications arise from the potential
irreversibility of such pollution phenomena as acid rain.7
Discrete environmental insults may be further classified into three
types, and legal systems often respond differently to each of these. Harm
from an environmental result may be past, imminent, or long-term and
merely possible. All legal systems permit individuals injured by a discrete
episode of pollution to seek a remedy in damages and, in some instances,
an injunction against an activity which threatens immediate harm." Col-
lective responses, however, are generally required to prevent persistent
pollution since it is this type which often does not go unredressed by indi-
viduals' private actions. As a result, persistent pollution has increasingly
become the subject of administrative regulation, although the regulations
tend to focus on the prevention of measurable, known harms as opposed
7. See G. WETSTONE & A. ROSENCRANZ, ACID RAIN IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA: NA-
TIONAL RESPONSES TO AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM (1983) and I. VAN LIER, ACID RAIN AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1981).
8. See, e.g., BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] arts. 906 & 1004 (W. Ger.).
1983
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
to the minimization of serious, persistent, but unquantifiable public
health threats."
An increasingly accepted justification for the regulation of persistent
pollution sources derives from the notion that often no one individual will
suffer sufficient damage to make a threshold showing of injury under ap-
plicable private law doctrines. Even if a number of persons suffering le-
gally cognizable harm were to aggregate their claims so as to give each
more incentive to litigate,10 such incentive would more than likely be in-
sufficient, given the paucity of each individual's potential share of any
recovery.
Perhaps a more powerful justification for regulating activities such as
pesticide use or the discharge of toxic substances into the air, water, or
earth is the fact that those who are involuntarily exposed to the risk of
future ill health often have little or no idea of the dangers of such expo-
sure. While intervention by a government to protect the citizenry from
unwitting exposure to subtle health risks is increasingly accepted, it re-
mains controversial because of the opportunity costs of risk minimization.
Attempts to reduce substantially societal exposure to certain risks will
increase the costs of bringing new products to market and may thus serve
to deprive society of those products' benefits. For this reason, some coun-
tries, such as Japan, emphasize after-the-fact compensation for environ-
mental disasters,1 rather than the prevention of future harm.
In the public mind, the impairment of public health and welfare is
associated with discharges of residuals, commonly described as "pollu-
tion." This appellation gives rise to the normative inference that govern-
ment intervention is justified to reduce or eliminate such discharges.
While there is some basis for using the term "pollution" to refer loosely
to any undesirable concentration of chemicals or particulates, the term is
not truly self-defining. Two reduction goals exist which have sharply dif-
9. One commentator has written of acid rain:
[air pollution] standards are especially ineffective in addressing long range
transport because concern for compliance focuses on ground level concentra-
tions, not on higher altitudes more relevant to the transportation process ....
[Tihe laxity of present standards is largely due to poor documentation of the
health effects associated with exposure to low levels of the pollutants.
^& ~t Ii l r-u&&itto, UU0i i -LUa If -t Ui Ai -MeuibCii. li SC-Jb~
Snow, 10 ENVTL. L. REP., Mar. 1980, at 50001, 50005.
In comparison, U.S. regulation of pesticide use focuses both on the problems of acute
and chronic toxicity in evaluating the safety of various chemical compounds. The primary
focus is on screening out those compounds that present a substantial, but highly probabilis-
tic, risk of producing cancer in persons exposed to pesticide residues. See NATIONAL ACAD-
EMY OF SCIENCES, REGULATING PESTICIDES (1980).
10. See Krier, Environmental Watchdogs: Some Lessons from a "Study" Council, 23
STAN. L. REV. 623 (1971).
11. The 1973 Japanese Law for the Compensation of Pollution-Related Damage: An
Introductory Assessment, 5 ENVTL. L. REP., Dec., 1975, at 50229. See also J. GRESSER, K.
FUGIKURA & A. MORISHIMA, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN JAPAN (1981) (discussing the develop-
ment and current status of Japan's environmental law).
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ferent consequences, and the goal chosen by a government controls the
operative definition of "pollution." 2 A conservative goal defines pollution
as any concentration of a substance that degrades the air or a watershed
below its natural background level; in short, the term is defined as any
artificial change. A rational goal, by contrast, defines pollution in terms
of the measurable or assumed costs of degradation. A rational strategy
does not define changes in natural backgound levels as pollution per se.
Rather, it requires that beyond proof of degradation, there must be some
level of aggregate damage beyond proof(?) of degradation, the reduction
of which will yield benefits in excess of the costs of reducing emissions.
The pursuit of a conservative goal, in sum, is equivalent to the imposition
of ambient air standards to eliminate or reduce substantially all known
and unknown risks, whereas the pursuit of a rational goal is tantamount
to following control strategies based on a social cost accounting approach
that stops short of eliminating all discharges.
Since the laws of most countries reflect a tension between conserva-
tive and rational goals, the term "pollution" can only be defined in the
context of specific regulatory programs. Unfortunately, legislatures,
courts and commentators generally do not use the term to describe pre-
cise emission reduction goals. Instead, it is used to refer to any degrada-
tion generally considered intolerable, a usage that obscures the hard
choices involved in formulating any emission reduction strategy. In this
article, however, the term will refer to receiving media content levels that
are in excess of emission levels deemed safe or reasonable by a court or
legislature with respect to the public health or other interests.
Pollution is said to result from historic assumptions that watersheds,
the air and many land resources are, in economic terms, free goods."3
Thus, water, air and land have historically been used without cost as
sinks for the disposal of wastes. In many cases, however, the use of these
resources in such a manner has imposed costs on both present and future
generations.1" Because their ownership has never been clearly defined, no
person or entity could charge for their use for waste disposal purposes.
Disposal costs were not, therefore, internalized by the disposer. As a mat-
ter of economic theory, the costs of waste disposal are no different from
those using other factors of production, such as labor and raw materials,
but these costs have been ignored because there has been no market to
discipline producers' waste production levels.' As a consequence, the
12. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE, Dec. 13, 1968, at 1243.
13. W. BAUMOL & W. OATES, ECONOMICS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, AND THE QUALrrY OF
LIFE 209-16 (1979).
14. Some costs, such as those to human health, are obvious-see L. LAVE & E. SESKIN,
AIR POLLUTION AND HUMAN HEALTH (1975)-but others are more subtle and longterm. See,
e.g., Georgescu-Roegen, The Entropy Law and the Economic Problem, in ECONOMICS, ECOL-
OGY, ETHICS: ESSAYS TOWARDS A STEADY-STATE ECONOMY 49, 57 (H. Daly ed. 1980).
15. For a readable introduction to this literature, see A. KNEESE & C. SCHULTZE, POL-
LUTION, PRICES, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1975).
One conspicuous example of a country's decision to allow the continued free use of
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price system which forced the efficient use of labor and raw materials did
not have the same effect on disposal sinks. The inevitable result of the
free use of natural resources as sinks has been overuse. Such overuse be-
comes a problem for the following reason: whenever an activity (e.g. pol-
lution), free to the market actor, imposes costs (e.g. health problems), the
market or market substitute will not guarantee the proper allocation of
resources, with the consequent risk that resources will be inefficiently al-
located. This is the standard explanation of the cause of the "pollution
problem," and it has provided a universally powerful rationale for public
intervention to protect public health. As a reformist rather than a radical
theory, however, such an explanation does not challenge the prevailing
assumption throughout the world that economic development (along with
the provision for national defense) should be given the highest priority by
a country. While this theory suggests only that gross abuses of develop-
ment should be curbed, other more radical theories based on the "les-
sons" of ecology argue that the world must squarely face the fact of lim-
ited resources and decrease its overall consumption levels to ensure
environmental quality and human survival. 6
What follows from the welfare economics approach is a rational pol-
lution strategy, and the laws of many countries, as will be discussed be-
low, are premised on the goal of allocating resources efficiently. Achieving
this goal requires balancing the costs and benefits of pollution reduction.
The notion that the control of pollution is a simple cost-benefit problem,
however, is being increasingly rejected. It is often argued that certain dis-
charges are potentially so harmful that the public should be protected
from them regardless of the opportunity costs of the regulation. 7 Simply
put, rationales for pollution reduction to achieve a conservative goal exist,
apart from improved efficiency.
III. FACTORS INFLUENCING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION LEVELS
The desired level of environmental protection and the method of
seeking public health protection and environmental quality enhancement
vary from country to country. Ultimately, a detailed knowledge of each
country's culture, history, and political organization is necessary to un-
derstand fully its environmental laws and policies, but common variables
exist which can be used to predict both the level of environmental protec-
tion and the ,,means choen to reach it Thpgp vnrin lp. can initinlly be
airsheds as sinks was Brazil's environmental policy in the 1970s. The city of Cubat-Wao was
at one point described as the "valley of death" because of high discharges of carbon monox-
ide, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and hydrocarbons from a petrochemical complex, but
the country seemed nonetheless to have accepted the argument that pollution control is a
luxury affordable only by developed countries. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1980, at 3, col. 2.
16. This literature is summarized in Duvall, The Deep Ecology Movement, 20 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 299 (1980).
17. See Rodgers, Benefits, Costs, and Risks: Oversight of Health and Environmental
Decisionmaking, 4 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 191 (1980).
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allocated among four categories: industrialization; political organization;
cultural and ideological values; and public awareness, demand and organi-
zation for governmental action to solve environmental problems, a cate-
gory which cuts across the first three categories but is sufficiently impor-
tant to merit separate discussion.
A. Industrialization
Of necessity, all countries desire economic growth and consequently
pursue or have pursued aggressive industrialization programs. In a few
countries, such as Norway and Sweden, the optimal degree of growth has
been debated politically, but in most countries the need for industrializa-
tion is assumed as an article of faith. Since pollution is caused by, among
other things, the discharge of residuals from industrial and associated ac-
tivities, it is found in all developing as well as developed countries, re-
gardless of political organization or ideology.
B. Political Organization
For environmental policy-making purposes, it may be easier for in-
terests without formal governmental representation to elevate environ-
mental issues to the level of important political questions in democratic
nations than it is in totalitarian regimes. Even though environmental
problems are no less serious in the latter, they are less likely to engage
the attention of the ruling elites, who are usually concerned primarily
with economic, military and internal security matters. 8 The recognition
of environmental interests is often seen as a generally destabilizing
force."
In countries organized on the basis of a federal administrative sys-
tem, a national government with specifically delimited powers governs,
with states or provinces possessing semi-autonomous authority.2" In these
countries, control over natural resources is often considered a state or
provincial, as opposed to a national, function 2' and thus states have con-
siderable discretion to define environmental priorities on self-interest
grounds alone unless the national government intervenes. In the United
States, states competed for industry by allowing lax pollution standards,
but this problem has been dealt with by uniform national standards
which set maximum levels for discharges into the water and air2 2 In con-
trast, Canada's federal system allows the ten provinces to enjoy greater
18. C. ENLOE, supra note 1, at 150.
19. Id.
20. In unitary systems, by contrast, as exemplified by the United Kingdom and France,
subunits of government exist as well, but only as administrative arms of the national gov-
ernment, which has complete authority to dictate policy to them. See G. LEFCOE, LAND DE-
VELOPMENT IN CROWDED PLACES (1979).
21. See Streibl, Environmental Policy in a Federal State, 1 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 13
(1975).
22. See, e.g., The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. I 1977).
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freedom to set nonuniform standards.2"
C. Political Ideology
A country's political ideology influences 1) the effective allocation of
environmental regulatory authority among different units of government,
2) the impetus with which environmental objectives are sought to be
achieved, 3) the division of power between formal institutions and the
public, and 4) the general receptivity of the government to popular pres-
sure for increased environmental protection. Both the Judeo-Christian
foundations of Western liberal democracy and the Marxist-Leninist the-
ory of socialism place man above nature.24 Additionally, both the Western
tradition of individualism and mainstream Marxist ideology and practice
stress the need for man to struggle against nature in order to better him-
self.25 However, two important minority currents in Western think-
ing-the theory of man's stewardship responsibility for preserving the
natural environment, and the theory stemming from the eighteenth-cen-
tury German transcendental idealist, Fichte, that one can only perfect na-
ture by cooperating with it-have proved to be important justifications
for environmental legislation in many Western countries.2 In contrast, it
is argued that in socialist countries with highly centralized bureacracies,
such as the U.S.S.R., the economic, political, and military benefits de-
rived from traditional (socialist) patterns of production far outweigh envi-
ronmental concerns, given-that increased production constitutes the only
acceptable measure of bureaucratic success.2 1 It has also been suggested
that Far Eastern values, which emphasize reverence for nature, animals
and inner self-fulfillment, are more compatible with environmental pro-
tection; however, the Japanese, with their tradition of respect for author-
ity, have allowed post-war governments to establish "industrial growth as
the formula for National happiness"28 and to deflect the rising concern
over the costs of unrestrained industrial development. Still, the anti-ma-
terialistic, spiritual values of grace and restraint in Japanese culture
23. See Weston, note 9 supra. See also Lutz II, The Laws of Environmental Manage-
ment: A Comparative Study, 24 AM. J. Comp. L. 447, 458-59 (1974).
24. See J. PASSMORE, MAN'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR NATURE 28-40 (1974).
25. A recent summary of the Western and other views of nature can be found in Calli-
cott, Traditional American Indian and Western European Attitudes Toward Nature: An
Overview, 4 ENVTL. ETHICS 293 (1982).
26. See E. FEDOROV, MAN AND NATURE: THE EcOLOGICAL CRISIS AND SOCIAL PROGRESS
146-47 (1980). What Marx has to say about environmental problems is debated in Lee, To-
ward A Marxian Ecological Ethic: A Response to Two Critics, 4 ENVTL. ETHICS 339 (1982);
Lee, On the Marxian View of the Relationship Between Man and Nature, 2 ENVTL. ETHICS
3 (1980); Routley, On Marx as an Environmental Hero, 3 ENMrL. ETHICS 237 (1981); and
Tolman, Karl Marx, Alienation, and the Mastery of Nature, 3 ENvTL. ETHICS 63 (1981).
27. See Paper presented by Robert W. Clawson at the Conference on Soviet Resource
Management and the Environment at the University of Washington (June 7, 1974) (entitled
Soviet Resource Management: Political Aspects of Water Pollution Control).
28. C. ENLOE, supra note 1, at 178. See also M. REICH, N. HUDDLE & N. STIDSKIN,
ISLAND OF DREAMS, ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS IN JAPAN (1975).
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played some role in the elevation of environmental concerns to a central
political issue in the early 1970s."'
D. Opportunities for Public Influence
In many countries, organized public action has influenced the politi-
cal process by generating debate about environmental problems and their
solutions. The extent to which a political system allows interest groups to
organize and participate in the political process influences responses to
environmental questions. For example, in the United States, the relative
openness of the political system facilitated the quick rise of influential
"public action" groups calling for new regulatory initiatives and allowed
these same groups to secure a prominent place for environmental issues
on the national agenda. In contrast, the relatively closed nature of the
political process in Japan has led to violence in popular expressions of
concern about environmental issues.3
IV. LEGAL STRATEGIES TO CONTROL ENVIRONMENTAL INSULTS
Any pollution control program designed to protect public health
must choose from among limited emission reduction or minimization
strategies. Any country's pollution control program will likely combine el-
ements from all of these strategies, but it is useful to analyze them sepa-
rately due to the different costs and benefits associated with each.
A. Private Actions
Every legal system allows those who suffer injury by living in close
proximity to a pollution source to seek redress. In civil law systems, pri-
vate actions against activities which cause damage to health and property
are based on the theory of abuse of established rights. An abuse occurs
whenever a right is "exercised in a manner contrary to the societal inter-
est,"" and the standard is an objective one. This same concept, i.e., that
law is for the benefit of the community, is expressed by the common law
maxim sic utere ut alienum non laedes (every person should use his own
property so as not to injure that of another), which allows courts to define
the correlative rights of landowners to use their property.3 2 The potential
for private actions to eliminate many environmental harms is limited,
however, because any system of private rights must decide which activi-
ties causing discomfort to others are legal and which are not. Were it oth-
erwise, every activity carried on in connection with land could be poten-
tially tortious. In both the civil law and common law systems, the
29. J. GRESSER, K. FUJIKURA & A. MOmSHIMA, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN JAPAN 45 (1981).
30. C. ENLOE, supra note 1, at 180.
31. L. JOSSERAND, DE L'EsPIRIT DES DROITS ET DE LEUR RELATIVrIt: TH.ORIE DITE DE
L'ABUS DES DROITS, cited in F. LAWSON, A. ANTON & N. BROWN, AMOS & WALTON'S INTRO-
DUCTION TO FRENCH LAW (3rd ed. 1967).
32. See R. ELLiCKSON & A. TARLOCK, LAND USE CONTROLS 564-70 (1982).
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granting of damages and specific relief is confined to "abnormal activi-
ties." 8 All systems of landowner rights and remedies are based on the
idea that normal levels of background activities for an area can be deter-
mined and that liability should only attach to those activities which ex-
ceed such levels. However, this standard for landowners' rights has given
courts considerable discretion to balance the costs and benefits of any
given activity. Because only those acts which exceed the normal back-
ground activity of a neighborhood constitute a nuisance, many environ-
mental harms go unredressed-especially those which first manifest
themselves to the sensitive person and those which are only considered
harmful once their cumulative impact is understood.
B. Public Actions
Private actions have been rejected as the sole means of controlling
pollution in many countries because of the technical difficulties of proving
harm and cause in fact, and because of disincentives to organizing suits to
reduce many serious but diffuse sources of pollution.' Still, in some
countries private actions remain an important means of obtaining relieP5
and of bringing regulatory gaps to public attention. 6 In fact, many public
regulatory programs actually rely on private actions for their effective-
ness. For example, the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act in the United
States allow citizens' suits against public officials who fail to carry out
their clearly defined statutory duties or against polluters who violate air
and water quality standards.3 7
In 1972, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized a federal common law of
water pollution that allowed direct actions against sources of pollution
that were alleged to cause injury despite compliance with applicable regu-
lations," but subsequently the Court held that comprehensive water pol-
lution control legislation preempted common law actions.39 Similarly, the
Court has also refused to recognize any implied private rights of action
under the pollution statutes.40 In civil law systems, the ability of private
plaintiffs to bring a public action is alien to the more rigid theory that
33. See, e.g., Greek Civil Code arts. 1003-05, reprinted in A. Mastorogamvraki, Envi-
ronmental Protection in Greece, in EUROPEAN ENVIRONmENTAL LAW, supra note 4, at 351.
34. See, e.g., T. Fleiner, Swiss Environmental Law-The Position at April 1976, in Eu-
ROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 4, at 431-32.
35. E.g., Spain's fragmentary law of air and water pollution control is basically a codifi-
cation of the civil law prohibitions against the maintenance of nuisances. Id. at 98-103, 165-
67.
36. A famous articulation of this position worldwide is J. SAx, DEFENDING THE ENVIRON-
MENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN ACTION (1971).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (Supp. IV 1980); and 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1976).
38. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
39. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. granted 445 U.S.
896 (1980), mem. 449 U.S. 813 (1980).
40. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
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rights must be either public or private.4 By way of exception, however,
such actions brought by recognized nature protection associations have
been allowed by statute in two states in the Federal Republic of
Germany.2
V. PUBLIC REGULATION
A. Environmental Policy Formulation and Expression
As noted above, significant variations exist among countries regard-
ing environmental goals and the means of accomplishing them. Some-
times these goals are expressed directly through substantive legislative
standards that state the weight given to environmental values relative to
other societal values. In other instances, the formal substantive standards
are less important than the means chosen to implement the goals. In gen-
eral, environmental goals and substantive standards are related to the
level of industrial and technological development of a country, while the
regulatory strategies chosen to implement the goals reflect the political,
economic and social organization obtaining there. Prior to the passage of
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969' (NEPA) in the United
States, countries had often devised natural resources use goals in terms of
the optimal level of development of a single resource, with environmental
values being relegated to a position of secondary concern. The early fore-
runners of modern comprehensive pollution control enactments were vari-
ous acts of public health legislation dealing with nuisance-like substances
such as sewage and smoke. A country's environmental policy, if one ex-
isted, was often directed against specific problems, for example, the killer
fog of 1952 in England.4
In 1963, a general model of the evolution of environmental policy was
proposed by Lynton K. Caldwell."" It was argued that environmental pol-
icy is "an outgrowth of the conservation movement, and often still ap-
pears under the names of conservation or natural resources administra-
tion in many countries." 6 This evolution was generally thought to have
three distinct stages: (1) a public awareness of values, as occurred in the
United States between the years 1890-1908; (2) the conservation of spe-
cific resources such as the water, air, soil, or forests;"' and (3) concern
41. See Rehbinder, Controlling the Environmental Enforcement Deficit: West Ger-
many, 24 AM. J. CoMP. L. 373 (1976). Citizens in the Federal Republic of Germany do,
however, have considerable rights to participate in administrative proceedings.
42. Act for the Protection of Nature and Landscape § 44, 1979 [BGBI] 345 (W. Ger.)
and Act for the Protection of Nature and Landscape § 36, [1980] I [GVBIJ 309 (W. Ger.).
See generally P. STORM, UNWELTRECHT (1980).
43. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4327 (1970).
44. L. BATTEN, THE UNCLEAN SKY 14 (1966).
45. Caldwell, Environment: A New Focus For Public Policy?, 23 PuB. AD. REv. 132
(1963).
46. L. CALDWELL, MAN AND His ENVIRONMENT. POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION 35 (1976).
47. In the United States, environmental policy was confined to conservation and the
preservation of nature until the late 1950s and early 1960s. See J. PETULLA, AMERICAN ENvI-
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with the totality of man's environmental relationships."'
The method of formulating an environmental policy, as the Caldwell
model indicates, is inevitably piecemeal and leaves many gaps. Generally,
if an agency has no express authority to deal with the environmental as-
pects of a problem, it will not do so until specific legislation forces it to
act." Although some countries continue to address specific gaps with spe-
cific legislation, others have tried to "short circuit" the process by adopt-
ing general policy statements. While policy statements do not, of course,
serve to commit the resources and political will necessary to cope with
environmental problems, they are nonetheless important becasue they
stimulate new efforts and reinforce existing ones. NEPA was adopted as
U.S. national policy with little debate, but it produced far-reaching, if
ambiguous, changes in federal decision-making processes.2
To effectuate a policy of giving environmental concerns equal weight
with developmental ones, NEPA declares "a national policy which will
encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his envi-
ronment; to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to
the environment . . . and stimulate the health and welfare of man
.. ."" While this statute has influenced other countries, many Euro-
pean nations have been more cautious in according environmental protec-
tion equal status with the goals of economic development, because of the
problems inherent in their integration with the former.52 The economic
RONMENTAL HISTORY: THE EXPLOITATION AND CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES (1977).
48. This third stage, symbolized in the United States by the enactment of NEPA, is
"concerned with the so-called artificial environment of the cities and buildings as well as
with the natural world. It differs from the narrower interpretations of natural resources
policy in that its criteria are ecological rather than economic." Caldwell, supra note 45, at
85.
49. E.g., the former U.S. Atomic Energy Commission took the position prior to the en-
actment of NEPA that it lacked the necessary jurisdiction to consider the impact on water
quality of the nuclear plants it was licensing. See Tarlock, Balancing Environmental Con-
siderations and Energy Demands: A Comment on Calvert Cliff's Coordinating Committee,
Inc. v. AEC, 47 IND. L.J. 645, 648-52 (1972).
50. NEPA forced agencies to consider factors that had not previously been considered
and to reassess procedural and substantive decisions. Institutional responses vary among
and within agencies, of course, but the impact on many agencies was substantial. See R.
LIROFF, A NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: NEPA AND ITS AFTERMATH. (1976).
151 a U.S&C: § 321.
52. For a comparative analysis of environmental versus developmental goals, see L.J.
Lundquist, Clean Air Policies in the USA and Sweden: What Matters Most, Technology,
Economics or Politics? (Paper presented at American Political Science Association, Seattle,
Wash., 1979).
See also Wimmer, Environmental Law in Austria-the Position of April 1976, in Eu-
ROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 4, at 289-90, where it is argued:
The unsatisfactory situation of environmental protection in Austria results
not so much from the lack of law but from the fact that the existing laws are
only partially applied in practice. The reason for this ... stems from the fun-
damental problems of the structure of environmental law as a whole. This con-
sists primarily in the fact that the provisions concerning the environmental
embodied in the various administrative texts are not exclusively and entirely
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consequences of such a policy were quickly perceived by these nations
and thus, when they enacted their own comprehensive acts, a more ex-
plicit balance was struck. For example, the Swedish Environmental Pro-
tection Act of 1969, drafted so as not to handicap the international com-
petitive position of Swedish industry, simply does not state general future
goals.5 3 The German Program for the Protection of the Human Environ-
ment of 1971 was drafted after extensive deliberations by ten project
groups, including different economic groups." The Program, although in-
fluenced by the American model, merely states ten general goals, leaving
it to the several German states (Liinder) to choose between economic and
environmental priorities. The most explicit legislative decision to pit en-
vironmental enhancement against industrial development was found prior
to 1970 in the Japanese Basic Act for Environmental Pollution Control of
1967. The listed goals of the Act were to be harmonized with "sound eco-
nomic development." 5  In the U.S.S.R., environmental goals are recog-
nized by supplemental economic planning. GOSPLAN, the State Plan-
ning Committee, was directed in 1974 to include conservation indices and
plans in its long-term and annual plans, especially in the 25th Five Year
Plan (1976-80)."
B. Institutional Arrangements For Environmental Regulation
Legislative declarations of environmental policies are meaningless
without the creation of institutions to implement them. Such policies
generally require industries and public entities to invest considerable
sums of money in pollution abatement technologies or in the development
of less harmful products, or to modify their behavior otherwise in costly
ways. Prior to the last decade, government institutions in almost all coun-
tries had only fragmented authority to deal with problems now called en-
vironmental. Moreover, these institutions often lacked sufficient geo-
graphical authority to deal with the scope of pollution spillovers or
administrative authority to attempt any kind of comprehensive manage-
ment approach to the problem posed by even one source of pollution.
Thus, countries desiring to respond to environmental problems were then
devoted to environmental protection, but also must satisfy other interests for
which the administration is responsible, whether of a technical, financial or
economic nature.
53. S. Westerlund, The Legal Control of Land Use and Environmental Quality in Swe-
den, in EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 4, at 401.
54. W. MANGUN, THE PuBLic ADMINISTRATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: A CoMEARA-
nvE ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED STATES AND WEST GERMANY (1977).
55. This phrase was stricken in the December 1970 amendments to this legislation. For
a brief but useful discussion of the background of the 1970 legislation, see generally AIR
POLLUTION CONTROL IN JAPAN 22-24 (1972), prepared for the U.N. Conference on the Human
Environment.
56. See W.E. Butler, Environmental Law and Water Legislation in the Soviet Union
(Paper presented at the Conference on International Environmental Law, arranged by the
British Institute of International and Comparative Law, London, Sept. 1-3, 1973).
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and are today confronted with two sets of potential problems. First, a
choice must be made among modes of institutional reform. The available
choices are (1) expansion of existing regulatory jurisdictions, (2) coordina-
tion of existing jurisdictions through a central coordinating body, and (3)
creation of new management institutions. Second, the choice of institu-
tional design is further complicated by the physical nature of environ-
mental problems, which often calls for action from progressively higher
levels of government, generally at the national level. The increased cen-
tralization of regulatory functions, however, may well create stresses in
federal systems; even in unitary forms of government, such a trend may
be controversial. Notwithstanding these problems, the move from the sec-
ond to third stages of the Caldwell model is often signalled by the expan-
sion of existing regulatory authorities or the creation of new, national reg-
ulatory institutions.
When strong, centralized institutions already exist at the national
level, a country may be able to respond to the need for increased regula-
tion of public health-threatening activities by the jurisdictional expansion
of existing agencies. Sweden's experience exemplifies this manner of regu-
lation. 57 Jurisdictional expansion is especially successful when a regula-
tory authority with jurisdiction coterminous with a physical problem is
already in place. This situation exists in France, where six extant river
basin authorities (agences du bassin) were given the power to control pol-
lution. The agence concept has also been used as a model for bilateral
institutions to deal with the related environmental problems of impacted
areas such as river corridors."8
Often, there is an interim step between the expansion of the jurisdic-
tion of existing regulatory bodies and the creation of a new, often central-
ized body: that is, the coordination of existing jurisdictions. The policies
of the various governmental agencies in most countries have environmen-
tal consequences of one kind or another and some mechanism is needed
to harmonize the nation's environmental and non-environmental goals.
While diverse functions should naturally be coordinated, any coordina-
tion without the prior resolution of underlying value conflicts is meaning-
57. A Natural Conservancy Act (Naturvardslag) was enacted in 1964 primarily to pro-
tect the scientific and amenity value of the country's parks and coastline-an atypical late
conservation era policy. In 1969, Sweden initiated a technology-forcing pollution control
program. A licensing system was enacted and the executive functions were given to the Na-
ture Conservancy Agency, which was renamed the Environment Protection Board. The En-
vironment Protection Act (Miljoskyddstag) created a new, quasi-judicial body, the
Franchise Board (Koncessionamnd), to issue licenses, but the real power to implement the
purpose of the act, i.e., to exempt and vary the terms of licenses (dispens), remained with
the Environmental Protection Board. Sand, Sweden: Basic Laws and Institutions, FAO
LEGIS. STUD. No. 4 (1974). See also S. Westerlund, supra note 53, at 392.
A similar expansion of regulatory jurisdiction occurred in the Soviet Union. See W. E.
Butler, note 56 supra.
58. See A. Kiss & C. Lambrechts, Legal Protection of the Environment in
France-The Position at April 1976, in EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 4, at
324-27.
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less. A classic coordination scheme is illustrated by the powers given to
the federal Minister of the Interior in the Federal Republic of Germany.59
The United States and Japan illustrate the third option, the creation
of new regulatory institutions. In 1971, the two countries more or less
simultaneously decided to create new environmental protection agencies.
At the federal level in the United States, responsibility for environmental
functions had previously been scattered among many government agen-
cies. For example, responsibility for air and water pollution was split be-
tween two Cabinet departments: Interior; and Health, Education and
Welfare (HEW). Allegations were made that some departments (such as
HEW) with jurisdiction over air pollution, but not over water pollution,
ranked air pollution abatement low on their list of priorities. In other
cases, the fundamental mission of the agency was simply inconsistent
with environmental regulation." As a consequence of the foregoing, a new
executive agency, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), was es-
tablished, which was neither a part of the Cabinet nor an independent
regulatory commission. Following the recommendations that agencies
with direct control over business conduct be administered by single ad-
ministrators with significantly reduced judicial authority, the EPA is di-
rected by a single administrator appointed by the President and directly
responsible to him."1 The hope was that the agency would be the vehicle
by which a clear and consistent executive environmental policy could be
executed. 62
C. General Forms of Environmental And Public Health Regulation
In most industrialized countries, regulation is the preferred method
of pollution control and public health protection. From an administrative
perspective, as opposed to an economic efficiency perspective, regulation
is often the least costly means of emission reduction and of behavior and
product modification strategy. Regulation allows uniform standards to be
formulated at relatively high levels of governmental decision-making. It
has also been suggested that regulation is popular with governments be-
cause the creation of new entities and the enactment of new standards of
conduct constitute the fastest ways of convincing an electorate that the
59. See H. STEIGER & 0. KIMMINICH, THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO POLLUTION IN
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (1976).
60. Environmentalists argued that the Department of Agriculture could not evaluate
the safety of chemical pesticides having substantial production benefits because of its mis-
sion to promote food production. See Rodgers, The Persistent Problem of the Persistent
Pesticides: A Lesson in Environmental Law, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 567 (1970).
61. President's Advisory Council on Executive Reorganization, A New Regulatory
Framework: Report on Selected Independent Regulatory Agencies (1971).
62. Japan undertook a similar consolidation of specialized environmental programs to
create the National Environmental Agency in 1971. Unlike the American system, the agency
head is a ministerial appointment-the Minister of State for Environmental Affairs. See Y.
NOMURA, THE CREATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN'S ANTI-POLLUTION LAWS (1976).
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government is responding to a "crisis."
At the outset, two fundamental choices must be made with respect to
any regulatory program. First, it must be decided whether emission stan-
dards will be based on the desired quality of the individual receiving me-
dium, such as an airshed or river basin, or whether the standards will be
based on the source of the emission. The first generation of pollution con-
trol programs often relied on receiving media standards, because emission
reduction was seen as a rational resource allocation problem similar to the
conservation of renewable and non-renewable resources. Second genera-
tion programs, as the widely studied and copied U.S. experience illus-
trates, often shift their basis to emission source standards." It has proved
very difficult, as a practical matter, to work backwards from general me-
dia quality standards to individual emissions in order to enforce source
standards against polluters. Governments have found it far easier to spec-
ify the allowable chemical contents of drainage pipe, smokestack, and in-
dustrial process effluents and the technologies which must be used to
achieve these results, and then to require that identifiable sources of
emission apply for some type of permit."
After the issue of receiving-media quality versus source-of-emission
standards is resolved, a choice between performance and specification
standards must be made." In practice, many pollution abatement and
control programs apply performance and specification standards simulta-
neously.6 7 Countries which desire significant pollution reduction often
seek performance goals through technology-forcing standards which spec-
ify increasingly sophisticated emission control technology by legislatively-
or administratively-set deadlines. This is a popular method of controlling
automobile pollution inasmuch as the concentrated nature of the industry
facilitates the establishment of uniform engine-design standards to meet
a performance goal.68
Pollution reduction standards are generally set to achieve one of
three goals: immediate public health protection, general welfare enhance-
63. J. KRIER & E. URSIN, POLLUTION AND PoLIcY 263-77 (1977).
64. The Federal Republic of Germany requires the use of emission limitation equip-
ment reflecting the state of the art. BundesImmissionsschutzgesetz [BIMSchG] 5 § 2. The
statute is described in Currie, Air Pollution in West Germany, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 355
(1982).
65. Currie, supra note 64, at 356-58.
66. Performance standards allow polluters to act as they wish, so long as their
emissions do not exceed specified limits for particular pollutants... and speci-
fication standards decree not what goal must be accomplished but how it must
be accomplished. Most commonly they require pollution control equipment
which meets certain design requirements ....
Krier, The Pollution Problem and Legal Institutions: A Conceptual Overview, 18 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 429, 463-64 (1971).
67. E.g., The Belgian Act of March 26, 1971 on the Protection of Surface Waters, re-
printed in EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 4, at 29.
68. See Currie, The Mobile Source Provisions of the Clean Air Act, 46 U. CHI. L. REV.
811 (1979).
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ment, or public health and safety risk minimization. Standards often at-
tempt to promote these goals simultaneously, but it is useful to distin-
guish among them because the distribution of costs and benefits
associated with attaining each may be radically different. Each goal either
takes the form of a statement of general objectives or precise numerical
limitations on the amount of pollutants that can be discharged over time.
Whatever the goal, standards must initially rest on a foundation of scien-
tific data, the first step of which is the development of common scientific
criteria and methodologies for measuring pollution damage and setting
emission reduction regulations.6 9 However, environmental standards can-
not ultimately rest on scientific criteria alone; the uncertainties surround-
ing the effects of various discharges on receiving media and those persons
exposed to such media remain too great. As a result, any standard
adopted ultimately reflects a value judgment about the degree of risk
minimization to be afforded society.
Public health protection standards are designed to protect the public
from known, immediate health and crop threats. Administrators are gen-
erally directed to base the standards on existing scientific knowledge of
cause and effect relationships between exposure to a particular pollutant
and resulting damage to health or crops. Because of the uncertainty of
scientific knowledge in many countries, the standards are conservative in
that "margins of safety" are included to protect the public from potential
underestimates of the harmful effects of pollutants. Nonetheless, public
health standards are still limited to the protection from serious harm of
people and the flora and fauna useful to them. Pollution which causes
aesthetic damage in the form of visibility impairment or historic building
decay, for example, is often excluded from this calculus.
However, the United States and other countries have adopted sec-
ondary standards to address this problem. Whereas under the Clean Air
Act primary standards are aimed at public health protection, secondary
standards, which in some cases may be more stringent, are aimed at
broader "general welfare" effects such as visibility impairment.70 These
latter standards are especially controversial because the causal link be-
tween emission and harm is more speculative and thus the ratio of quan-
tifiable benefits gained compared to the costs of achievement may be
small.7
1
The third goal of standards is to protect the public from long-term,
low probability, yet high-cost risks of health impairment. Unfortunately,
the kinds of controls that are effective for smoke reduction do not neces-
sarily work for substances such as pesticides, toxic chemicals, and hazard-
69. See S. JOHNSON, THE POLLUTION CONTROL POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
(1979).
70. W. RODGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 227 (1977).
71. See B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR OR How THE CLEAN AIR
ACT BECAME A MULTIBILLION DOLLAR BAILOUT FOR HIGH SULPHUR COAL PRODUCERS AND
WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT (1981).
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ous wastes. These latter are diffused into the environment in ways that
make it impossible to trace causal relationships between exposure and
harm. As such, science can only demonstrate that various risk levels of
future harm are thereby created. 72 These risk levels are intensely contro-
versial because of the regulatory consequences of standards designed to
minimize long-term, low probability risks.73 There is increasing recogni-
tion that because toxic pollutants are inorganic and tend to concentrate
in food chains, such chemicals differ from conventional organic pollu-
tants. To protect the public from the health hazards associated with toxic
pollutants, the burden is increasingly being placed on those who seek the
benefits of a chemical to prove its safety.7 Further, discharge and use
limitations need not be restricted by the current findings of scientific re-
search; rather, regulators may deal with uncertainty by establishing stan-
dards with wide margins of safety.75
As noted above, any pollution control strategy must make an initial
choice between reliance on the assimilative capacity of the receiving me-
dia and the application of technology to eliminate the alleged harmful
effects of the discharges. Prior to the worldwide recognition of the harm-
ful consequences of pollution, use of the assimilative capacities of air-,
water- and landsheds was the primary means of waste disposal, and this
strategy is still often followed in developing nations, if only by default.
Reaction against the social costs of the overuse of free goods has led to
the adoption of the "polluter pays" principle, based on the ambiguous
notion that the discharger is responsible for all costs of his activity,7 and
consequently to a rejection of the assimilative capacity of receiving media
as the primary pollution control strategy. However, such capacity is still a
factor to be considered in setting technology-based standards for individ-
ual discharges (which generally are used to force the internalization of
external costs by the polluters). The quality of the receiving media is also
considered in designing laws to influence the location of industrial
processes and other polluting activities. Where an activity is located may
not only determine the degree of pollution hazard that it poses but may
influence the cost of emissions-reduction as well.77
72. The problem of agency ability to do more than specify potential risks within a wide
range of probability is discussed in Latin, The "Significance" of Toxic Health Risks: An
Essay on Legal Deciqinnmaking Under Uncertainty. 10 ECOLOGY L.J. 339 (1982).
73. See W. LOWRANCE, ON ACCEPTABLE RISK (1976).
74. The shift of the burden of proof is the result of many statutory changes and more
subtle changes in administrative attitudes. The idea has received formal legal recognition in
the United States in a series of cases holding that the EPA need not prove that a substance
is harmful in order to limit substantially its use and discharge; the agency's decisions need
only rest on respectable, even though disputed, scientific evidence. See, e.g., Envtl. Defense
Fund v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62, 82-83 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
75. An important U.S. judicial decision establishing this principle is Ethyl Corp. v.
EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 24 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
76. For a concise discussion of the ambiguities in cost assessment, see S. Ercman, supra
note 4, at 489.
77. See D. MANDELKER, ENVIRONMENTAL AND LAND USE CONTROLS LEGISLATION 169-221
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Pollution reduction planning throughout the world often consists of
the designation of pristine or relatively clean areas, where new industrial
development and other polluting activities are discouraged, and the desig-
nation of relatively dirty areas, where stringent, technology-forcing stan-
dards or other pollution reduction strategies, such as fuel substitution,
apply."'
Some types of pollution which threaten public health may be mini-
mized simply by locating the polluting activity in a place where the as-
similative capacity of an air-, water- or landshed can deal effectively with
the pollution, thus consuming rather than conserving clean media. This
theory, however, "has no validity at all for synthetics like petrochemicals,
to say nothing of radionucleides. . . .[T]here is little or no safe assimila-
tive capacity for such unnatural compounds. ' 7 9 Land use planning pro-
grams are the primary means of implementing such a consumption strat-
egy: basically, industry is steered to geographic areas of the country
where the receiving media are able to minimize the impacts of pollution,
so that already overloaded media elsewhere will not be further stressed.
Of course, such planning often conflicts with other environmental goals
which seek to preserve environmentally sensitive areas from
degradation.80
Environmental planning encompasses a number of functions, which
include the making of background assessments, the measurement of ex-
isting pollution levels and the likely impact of regulatory measures. There
(1976).
78. In the United States, regulations have been enacted to preserve the air quality of
relatively pristine areas such as national parks and Indian reservations. Excessively dirty
areas are designated as non-attainment areas, i.e., areas where the primary and secondary
standards cannot be met, and stringent limitations are placed on the construction of new
pollutant-emitting facilities. See Currie, Nondegradation and Visibility Under the Clean
Air Act, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 48, 51 (1980).
Pursuant to EEC recommendations, Belgium has designated its heavy industrial con-
centrations as special protection areas for the purposes of imposing special controls. Royal
Order of 26 July 1971, MB (Belg.), No. 150, at 9258 (5 Aug. 1974).
Bulgaria has established a special program for the capital city of Sofia and various in-
dustrial areas, which provides for air quality monitoring, the installation of filters and other
purification devices, and the substitution of natural gas for oil. Decree on the Sanitary Clas-
sification of Industrial Activities and the Minimum Health Protection Areas of 13 Feb. 1970,
Dz V (Bulgaria), at 3.
79. W. OPHULS, ECOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF SCARcrrY 81 (1977).
80. The problems of implementing such programs are illustrated by the Swedish expe-
rience. Since 1966, Sweden has undertaken "National Physical Planning" to determine the
areas where major industrialization is likely to stress valuable ecological resources. While
the government lacks the power to compel an industry to locate in a place which is consis-
tent with national planning objectives, three coastal regions have nonetheless been with-
drawn from development. Lundquist, Sweden's National Physical Planning for Resources
Management, 2 ENvTL. AFF. 487, 496-98 (1972). While industrial growth is encouraged
outside of existing major metropolitan areas to promote equal regional development, this
goal conflicts with a concentration policy which dictates that, insofar as it is compatible with
the regional dispersion policy, new polluting industries should be concentrated in already
industrialized regions.
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has been widespread dissatisfaction with single resource or single pollu-
tion source planning and consequently, in the past decade, there have
been ambitious, though largely futile, attempts to mandate holistic, ra-
tional environmental planning. In 1970, the United States attempted to
mandate formal national planning procedures for all federal activities
which have a significant environmental impact. These procedures in-
cluded consideration of all likely impacts of these activities and mitiga-
tion possibilities with respect thereto, and even study of a no action alter-
native."' Because of the gap, under NEPA, between the costs of
compliance and the environmental benefits received and the fact that
mandatory planning leaves administrators no discretion to concentrate
their resources on truly significant issues, among other reasons, most
countries which have examined the U.S. experience have been reluctant
to adopt the American model fully. 2 However, environmental assessment
exists in various countries by administrative decree, and in Japan a trial
court has held that the civil tort law allows plaintiffs affected by the
health hazards of a lake development project to require the government
to prepare an environmental assessment of the project and consult with
interested citizens.8 3
Inorganic chemical products and wastes are often toxic, and all radio-
active materials present possible health hazards if not carefully managed.
Toxic substances are generally defined as wastes from chemical and other
manufacturing processes, and products which present serious, often unas-
certainable health and other environmental hazards, even when used for
their intended purposes. Increasingly, nations and international organiza-
tions subject toxic substances to special regulation. Regulatory regimes in
industrialized countries share the following common features: (1) a regu-
latory authority with the power to screen products for health hazards
before they reach the marketplace;8 (2) governmental authority to re-
81. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 43 U.S.C. §§ 4331, 4335, 4341, 4342, &
4344. The duty to study no-action alternatives was first announced in Nat. Defense Council,
Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
Morton was trimmed in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Resources De-
fense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978), but the duty to study no action alternatives remains
quite strict. See State of California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1982).
82. See generally, 2 INT'L ENVTL. REP. 651 (1979).
83. Upham. After Minamata: Current Prospects and Problems in Japanese Environ-
mental Litigation, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 213 (1979).
84. In Sweden, the government has been allowed since 1973 to control the manufacture,
import, trade, and use of poisons and other dangerous products. See S. Westerlund, supra
note 53, at 392.
In the United States, the authority to screen pesticides is conferred by the Environmen-
tal Pest Control Act of 1972, 7 U.S.C. § 135 (1970), as amended 7 U.S.C. § 136 (Supp. IV
1980). In 1976, the EPA was given the power to screen all potentially toxic products in
advance of their manufacture. Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976).
For a discussion of pre-market screening of hazardous products, see COUNCIL ON ENVIRON-
MENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY-10TH ANNUAL REPORT 215-21 (1979).
In June 1980, OECD nations reached agreement on pre-market data and testing re-
quirements for toxic substances, which the EPA plans to integrate into its rules for pre-
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quire testing protocols involving the use of laboratory animals, on which
inferences that a substance is potentially harmful may be based in lieu of
epidemiological evidence; (3) authority to base conclusions about sub-
stance safety on risk-benefit analyses;"5 (4) the shifting of the burden of
proving a substance unsafe away from the governmental authority be-
cause of the often inconclusive nature of the evidence about public health
hazards;86 and (5) the requirement of stringent management practices for
toxic and other hazardous wastes as the only way to balance the interests
of industrial development and public safety in modern economies that
require the use of many dangerous substances. Management options in-
clude recycling, storage, disposal, and treatment to alter the chemical
content of the substance. Disposal practices are being tightened in many
countries, more attention is being paid to the siting of hazardous waste
management facilities8 7 and incentives are being provided for recycling
action.
D. Alternatives to Regulation
Two powerful charges have been directed at regulatory programs
based on across-the-board standards. First, standards often require re-
ductions in emissions which cannot be economically justified in terms of
the emissions' social costs. Second, uniform standards are an inefficient
means of achieving administratively-mandated pollution reduction levels
because they do not encourage the least costly method of emission reduc-
tion.88 In fact, such standards can work to lock industries into using inef-
ficient technologies. Two alternative methods of emission reduction have
been proposed to cure these deficiencies and at the same time protect the
public from environmental harm: pricing mechanisms and subsidies. Pric-
ing mechanisms take the form of charges or taxes on the amounts of
waste disposed. The theory behind this strategy is that the more the pol-
luter is charged, the greater his incentive to reduce the amount of his
market notification by American industries. See Note, Control of Toxic Substances: The
Attempt to Harmonize the Notification Requirements of the U.S. Toxic Substances Con-
trol Act and the European Community Sixth Amendment, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 417 (1980).
85. Such authority is required because of the great difficulties in determining whether
and how a substance will actually cause harm to whom and at what time. A risk-benefit
analysis substitutes state-of-the-art evidence about possible future harms for traditional
concepts of cause-in-fact and immediate personal injury.
86. The Swedish hazardous products law expressly provides that public officials do not
bear the burden of proving a product dangerous. See S. Westerlund, supra note 53, at 411.
In the United States, the courts have approved the use of sensitive evidentiary triggers
to allow the government to ban a substance from the market and shift the burden of proving
its safety to the manufacturer. See Envtl. Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 548 F.2d 998, 1004
(D.C. Cir. 1976) and Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91, 106 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
87. See SITING NoN-RADIOAcTIvE HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT FACILITIES: AN OVER-
viEw, FINAL REPORT OF THE FIRST KEYSTONE WORKSHOP ON MANAGING NON-RADIOACTIVE
HAZARDOUS WASTES (1980).
88. See Krier, The Irrational National Air Quality Standards: Macro- and Micro-Mis-
takes, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 323 (1974).
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waste discharges and to do so efficiently.8 9 On the other hand, subsidies
can take the form of either tax incentives or direct government payments
for the construction of abatement facilities.
The United States has made use of these strategies only sparingly,
preferring to try to correct the economic inefficiencies which allegedly re-
sult from its standards. This has been done through assorted variance
procedures applied on a case-by-case basis and through flexibility devices
such as "bubbles."90 In France and the Federal Republic of Germany,
however, where pollution control is more integrated with industrial devel-
opment planning than in the United States, there has been much more
widespread use of charges and subsidies.9
In deciding whether to adopt a pricing strategy, it is important for a
country to distinguish between the two uses of charge systems. In the first
instance, those polluters who fail to comply with applicable effluent or
emissions standards may be subject to criminal fines. The payment of
such fines, however, often costs less than implementing any serious pro-
gram aimed at reducing the pollution. To prevent the creation of a low
cost right to pollute, many countries have moved to set higher fines to
encourage compliance.92 This theory of charges, though, still relegates
such penalties to the role of backstop for emission level standards. In the
second instance, many economists who have studied environmental
problems urge that pollution charges be used as the primary rather than
the secondary or tertiary method of reducing unwanted discharges.9 " It is
posited that an entity with functional geographic boundaries and the ca-
pabilities of treating wastes and imposing charges on dischargers will
force public entities and private industry alike to consider waste disposal
costs and pollution control technology in choosing product mixes and
plant locations. The expected result would be a reduction in emissions to
more efficient levels. Various models based on the water management as-
sociations (Genossenschaften) operating in the Ruhr region of the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany have been proposed.9
Many environmentalists are suspicious of effluent charges and taxes
89. A. KNEESE & C. SCHULTZ, POLLUTION, PRICES AND PUBLIC POLICY (1975).
90. The EPA allows operators of a single plant or plants in close proximity to one an-
other to treat an entire complex, as opposed to its component parts, as a single source of
emissions. All emission sources are thus put under a "bubble" for the purpose of allowing
tradeoffs, i.e., a reduction in the emission levels of certain pollutants in exchange for higher
allowable levels for others.
91. A. Kiss & C. Lambrechts, supra note 58, at 324.
92. E.g., factory managers in the Soviet Union may be deprived of bonuses which re-
present fully half of their personal income. Louchs, Water Quality Management in the So-
viet Union, 1977 J. WATER POLLUTION CONTROL FED'N 176-78.
93. See, e.g., J. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY & PRICES (1968) for an influential early
statement of this position.
94. See F. ANDERSON, A. KNEBSE, P. REED, R. STEVENSON & S. TAYLOR, ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPROVEMENT THROUGH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES (1977) and A. KNEESE & B. BOWER, MANAG-
ING WATER QUALITY: ECONOMICS, TECHNOLOGY, INSTITUTIONS (1968).
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on the ground that such schemes will only legitimize generous rights to
pollute. This argument has influenced the widespread governmental pref-
erernce for licensing regulation95 with the result that a different use has, in
recent years, been made of the taxing power from that advocated by
economists. Environmental disasters, such as oil spills and the abandoned
hazardous chemical waste site at Love Canal in Niagara Falls, New York,
often leave large property and health losses uncompensated. Liability
standards are often unclear, though there is a general global trend toward
the adoption of strict liability for environmental accidents," and the
problems of proving that a given entity caused the harm inflicted are for-
midable. One variant of the "polluter pays" principle requires the indus-
try reaping the benefits of activities that pose high risks of environmental
damage to bear the collective responsibility for those accidents which are
seemingly inevitable. Industrywide responsibility is fixed by taxes im-
posed on the risk-causing activities-for example, the levy of a certain
charge for each barrel of oil unloaded at a port. Such taxes inflate a fund
upon which governments (and sometimes private individuals) may draw
for cleanup and damage costs in the event of an accident. 7 Industry gen-
erally argues that since society as a whole benefits from its high-risk ac-
tivities, responsibility ought thus to be borne by all citizens, or at least
shared, and indeed, some funds are supported by activity taxes and gen-
eral tax revenues.98 In addition to their use in compensating victims of
environmental disasters, such funds, especially those with strict liability
rules, may have a beneficial deterrent effect against loose risk-manage-
ment practices.
As environmental quality goals have increased in number and strict-
ness, governments have had to cooperate with public and private entities
to induce the construction and use of treatment facilities. Such coopera-
tion of state and private enterprises has been facilitated through grants
from various levels of government and resource management authori-
ties.99 Subsidies are usually granted through legislation, although the
French water basin agencies grant them through private arrangements as
well. 100 The United States has established a substantial, though chroni-
cally underfunded, federal grant system for the construction of municipal
95. See Latin, Environmental Deregulation and Consumer Decisionmaking Under Un-
certainty, 6 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 187, 236 (1982).
96. S. Ercman, supra note 4, at 488.
97. Maine Oil Discharge Prevention and Pollution Control Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 38, §§ 541-57 (Supp. 1981).
98. See generally J. McLAUGHLIN, THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO POLLUTION
CONTROL IN THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 508 (1976).
99. A. Kiss & G. Lambrechts, note 58 supra.
100. An exception to the use of general legislation or subsidies granted by the central
government is the Japanese concept of administrative contracts between local governments
and private industry. See Sand, Legal Systems for Environmental Protection: Japan, Swe-
den, United States, FAO LEGIS. STUD. No. 4 (1974).
1983
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
waste treatment facilities."' Other countries provide special depreciation
rules in their tax laws for the installation of pollution abatement equip-
ment by private firms.
1 0 2
VI. CONCLUSIONS
At the risk of overgeneralization, a country's political structure and
legal system should incorporate three essential features in order to pro-
mote effective protection against environmental hazards. First, an arm of
the central government, whether in the context of a federal or unitary
system, should have an exclusive mandate to promote environmental
goals. At least for the foreseeable future, it will not be sufficient to merely
decree that all governmental agencies shall consider environmental values
in executing their missions. Second, this arm of government must have
delegated to it the power to decide how pollution costs are to be allocated
as between public and private entities. In most countries, this translates
into the ability to license discharges or mandate what fuels, chemicals,
and other necessary inputs to industrial processes may be used and under
what conditions. While it might be argued that these "structural" solu-
tions should be accompanied by strong mechanisms to allow the public
and the courts to serve as watchdogs of the regulators, the problem of
insufficient diligence in the promotion of environmental goals, as serious
as it is, is less important than achieving the third feature of an effective
system for environmental protection. Although an exclusive mandate to
promote environmental values is necessary, at some point the protection
of those values must become integrated into the country's general policy-
making processes, which is the third essential feature. Otherwise, policies
protective of the public health and the earth's fragile life support systems
will remain too vulnerable to pressures that they be ignored or made less
restrictive. The integration of such values requires that regulatory agen-
cies have the flexibility to vary the degree of emission reduction and sub-
stance use they require, according to the severity of the situation. Where
toxic chemicals and radioactive wastes are concerned, severe restrictions
may be in order regardless of the costs of regulation. In some instances,
however, it may be useful merely to create standards based on a state of
the art cost-benefit analysis, while charges, taxes, or post-occurrence com-
pensation may in other situations be the most effective remedy for public
health protection.
101. Id.
102. See Thiem, Environmental Law in the Federal Republic of Germany-The Posi-
tion at April 1976, in EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 4, at 362.
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Stopping Drug Traffic On The High Seas:
Jurisdiction Over Stateless Vessels Under
21 U.S.C. § 955a
I. INTRODUCTION
In an effort to curb drug traffic, the United States has demonstrated
a growing judicial willingness to exercise jurisdiction over stateless vessels
on the high seas. This article will focus on three issues raised by recent
statutory interpretations of section 955a of the Marihuana on the High
Seas Act' (hereinafter referred to as section 955a).
The first issue relates to the use of section 955a by courts to obtain
jurisdiction over stateless vessels suspected of transporting illegal drugs.
The second issue involves an analysis of general definitions of stateless
vessels as applied to section 955a and how this has affected the exercise of
jurisdiction. A third issue explores the consequences of denying Fourth
Amendment rights to persons aboard stateless vessels on the high seas.
The article concludes with a few observations by the writer concerning
probable trends and solutions to the constitutional and jurisdictional
problems raised by section 955a.
II. THE USE OF SECTION 955A AS A MEANS OF OBTAINING JURISDICTION
There are a number of principles by which jurisdiction over a vessel
on the high seas can be obtained.2 Those cases involving stateless vessels
most often use the protective or objective territorial principles.8 These
1. Marihuana on the High Seas Act, 21 U.S.C. § 955a-d (Supp. V 1981). Section 955a of
this Act embodies the enforcement provision; sections 955b-955d relate to definitions used
throughout the Act, offenses and punishments, and the seizure and forfeiture of property,
respectively.
2. These theories of jurisdiction are part of international customary law. For example,
the "law of the flag" theory recognizes that a vessel on the high seas is subject to the juris-
diction of the state of the flag it flies. The universality principle recognizes that some
crimes, such as piracy, are of such a universal character that any nation may participate in
their suppression. For a thorough treatment of these and other bases of jurisdiction, see N.
LEECH, C. OLIVER & J. SwEENEY, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SvSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS
891-44 (2d ed. 1980).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Hayes, 653 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1981); United States v. Piz-
zarusso, 388 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1968); Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1967)
(applying objective territoriality principle); and United States v. James-Robinson, 515 F.
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principles require proof of a potential or actual effect in the nation assert-
ing jurisdiction. A nexus, or connection with the country, must be demon-
strated in order to maintain jurisdiction over the vessel.4
In stateless vessel cases, a nexus with the United States has been
established by showing an intent to distribute narcotics in the United
States. In the past, the prosecution's assertion of this intent was easily
rebutted by the defense that the drugs were not headed for American
shores.' In addition, the inadvertent repeal of a prior law had left prose-
cutors without a statutory basis for their argument." Section 955a
strengthens the prosecution's case by abrogating these traditional princi-
ples of jurisdiction and providing a long-awaited legal weapon against
smuggling.7
The scope of the statute was intended by Congress to reach acts of
possession, manufacture or distribution committed outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States.8 Furthermore, "[tihe intent element
Supp. 1340 (S.D.Fla. 1981) (applying the protective principle). See also The S.S. Lotus,
1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10 (Judgment of Sept. 7).
4. Note 3 supra.
5. H.R. REP. No. 323, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1979) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT]. See
also United States v. Hayes, 653 F.2d 8 (1st. Cir. 1981).
6. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 4. The 1st Session of the 77th Congress passed a bill
making it a crime to use narcotics on United States vessels on the high seas. The subsequent
passage of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act inadvertently re-
pealed that bill; thus, what was a crime on United States territory was not a crime on a
United States vessel on the high seas. See Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Con-
trol Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (pertinent sections codified in 21 U.S.C.
§§ 801-966). See also 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1275.
7. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 4, which states that:
"[A]dequate material support and sufficient minimal sanctions are necessary
to neutralize smugglers and provide a credible deterrent to smuggling through
uniformly high conviction rates in the criminal justice system. There is pres-
ently no potent legal weapon in our anti-smuggling arsenal with which to com-
bat drug offenses on the high seas."
See also Coast Guard Drug Law Enforcement: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Coast
Guard and Navigation of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1979). At these hearings, Morris Bushby, counsel for the U.S. Depart-
ment of State said that "[while ordinarily the United States does not favor a unilateral
extension of jurisdiction by the United States over activities of non-U.S. citizens on board
stateless vessels withouL proof of som.e connection *- th, Un.-xd State, the Eerie, At,,re
of this problem [dictates otherwise]."
8. 21 U.S.C. § 955a[h] (Supp. V 1981). At least one court has implied that the statute
may exceed the bounds of international law by extending jurisdiction beyond territorial lim-
its. In United States v. Howard-Arias, 679 F.2d 363 (4th Cir. 1982), defendants' ship became
disabled 60 miles off the coast of Virginia where they boarded an Italian vessel. The Coast
Guard searched the disabled vessel and found a large quantity of marihuana. The defense
argued proof of a nexus was required; otherwise, the exercise of jurisdiction via section 955a
would violate international law. The court recognized the potential conflict between section
955a and international law. Instead of justifying its decision in light of international law as
the court in United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373 (11th Cir. 1982) had done, the
court in Howard-Arias concluded that while international law is a part of United States law,
it must give way when in conflict with a federal statute. See also The Pacquette Habana,
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may be inferred by proof of a presence of a large quantity of the narcotic,
giving rise to an inference of trafficking."9 The statute passed as recom-
mended, and section 955a now reads:
It is unlawful for any person on board a vessel of the United States,
or on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States on
the high seas, to knowingly or intentionally manufacture or distribute,
or to possess with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled
substance.' 0
Subsequent interpretations of section 955a effectuated the intent of
Congress. Courts upheld convictions absent proof of an intent to cause
any effect in the United States." At first, these interpretations were lim-
ited to United States registered vessels, 12 but United States v. Marino-
Garcia'" was a natural extension of this interpretation to stateless vessels.
In Marino-Garcia, the vessel FOUR ROSES was apprehended by the
Coast Guard DEPENDABLE on the high seas, 300 miles south of Florida
and 65 miles west of Cuba. When the DEPENDABLE approached the
FOUR ROSES and requested identification, the Coast Guard was told
that the ship's home port was Miami, Florida. The words "Miami, Flor-
ida" were also stenciled on the bow. A subsequent document check re-
vealed that the vessel was not registered in the United States but in Hon-
duras. All nine crewmen aboard the FOUR ROSES were foreign
nationals. Upon discovery of 57,000 pounds of marihuana in the hold, the
crew was indicted and subsequently convicted under section 955a."
The Marino-Garcia court rebutted the defendants' assertion that
section 955a required a showing of a nexus to the United States. Section
955a prohibits any person aboard "a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States" from possessing a controlled substance with intent to
distribute or manufacture. As the statutory definition of "vessel subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States" includes stateless vessels,' 5 the
court concluded that "the statute does not require that there be a nexus
175 U.S. 677 (1900), which held that international law is binding on the United States, and
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161 (E.D. Pa. 1980)
for the rule that United States law takes precedence over international law.
9. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 16.
10. 21 U.S.C. § 955a (Supp. V 1981).
11. The Fourth Circuit followed suit in United States v. Alonzo, 689 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir.
1982). See also United States v. Riker, 670 F.2d 987 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Liles,
670 F.2d 989 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Quesada-Rosadal, 685 F.2d 1281 (11th Cir.
1982); and United States v. Stuart-Caballero, 686 F.2d 890 (11th Cir. 1982).
12. United States v. Julio-Diaz, 678 F.2d 1031 (11th Cir. 1982).
13. United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied 103
S.Ct. 948 (1983).
14. Id. at 1377.
15. 21 U.S.C. § 955b(d) provides that a "'vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States includes a vessel without nationality or a vessel assimilated to a vessel with-
out a nationality, in accordance with paragraph (2) of article 6 of the [United Nations]
Convention on the High Seas, 1958."
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between stateless vessels and the U.S. but instead extends this country's
jurisdiction to all such cases." 6 Thus, "[lurisdiction exists solely as a
consequence of the vessel's status as stateless. 1 7 By dispensing with the
traditional requirement of proving a nexus, prosecution becomes easier
not only for the United States, but for all nations. A vessel's stateless
status "makes [it] subject to action by all nations proscribing certain ac-
tivities aboard stateless vessels and subjects those persons aboard to pros-
ecution for violating the proscriptions."'"
III. DEFINITIONS OF STATELESS VESSELS As APPLIED TO SECTION 955A
Once the Marino-Garcia court held that a vessel becomes subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States if it is stateless, the next issue then
became how "stateless" was to be defined.
In America, stateless vessels have often been defined as "interna-
tional pariahs [without] any recognized right to navigate freely on the
high seas."19 They are considered modern-day pirates-men and vessels
without a country. 20
The United Nations Convention on the High Seas21 provides that
"[a] ship which sails under the flags of two or more states, using them
according to convenience . . .may be assimilated to a ship without na-
tionality. '22 Furthermore, an English court has held that "[n]o question
...of any breach of international law can arise if there is no state under
whose flag the vessel sails. '23 Based on this decision and on the fact that
commentators discussing the issue have unanimously agreed that all na-
tions have the right to assert jurisdiction over stateless vessels on the high
seas,24 the Marino-Garcia court concluded that the exercise of jurisdic-
tion did not transgress recognized principles of international law.25
The expanding jurisdictional base provided by section 955a and the
generalized definition of "stateless vessel" are indications that the crime
of transporting illegal drugs by ship is being treated as a universal crime
because "any nation" can prosecute.26 This "universal crime implication"
16. United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1379 (11th Cir. 1982).
17. Id. at 1383.
18. Id.
19. See United States v. Cortes, 588 F.2d 106 (5o.i Cir. 1979) u.dUn.ted States v. May-
May, 470 F. Supp. 384 (S.D.Tex. 1979).
20. HousE REPORT, supra note 4, at 3.
21. United Nations Convention on the High Seas, art. 6, para. 2, opened for signature
Apr. 29, 1958, entered into force Sept. 30, 1962, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450
U.N.T.S. 82.
22. Id. at art. 6, para. 2. "Flags of convenience" is a term of art denoting the use of
more than one flag as a means of evading the law of any given state.
23. Molvan v. Attorney-General for Palestine, 1948 A.C. 351
24. 679 F.2d at 1383. The court cites, inter alia, 9 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 21 (1968) and 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw 546 (7th ed. 1948).
25. 679 F.2d at 1382.
26. Id. at 1383.
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is also supported by the recent case of United States v. Martinez." In
that case, the vessel was stateless not because of proof that it was using
flags according to convenience, but because it was not validly registered
under Honduran law, as the defendants claimed.28 The emphasis on inva-
lid registration was justified under paragraph 2 of article 6 of the Conven-
tion on the High Seas.2 9 However, this provision addresses only vessels
that use flags of convenience, without mentioning registration. This ex-
tension of the "stateless" definition clearly aids prosecution, although its
justification remains unclear."0
United States v. Knight"' further supports the pro-prosecution
stance adopted by the Marino-Garcia court. In Knight, the vessel KRIS
was apprehended on the high seas in an exclusive Mexican fishing zone.
The home port, "Brownsville, Texas", was stenciled on the stern, al-
though the captain had claimed that the vessel and crew were Colom-
bian.3 2 When the defense introduced evidence that the ship was of Pana-
manian registry, the vessel was considered stateless because it had
adopted various nationalities according to convenience. The court clearly
required that the proof of a nexus, long a thorn in the side of the prosecu-
tion, was a burden to be borne by the defense. Thus, the defense had to
show a "sufficient nexus between the KRIS and another country in order
to preclude [United States] jurisdiction."3
Cases such as Martinez and Knight illustrate the judicial willingness
to aid prosecution. In addition, the Eleventh Circuit has also indicated
that stateless vessels may not be entitled to constitutional protection.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON SEARCHES AND SEIZURES OF
STATELESS VESSELS ON THE HIGH SEAS
The United States constitutional provision most often invoked to
dismiss high seas narcotics confiscation cases is the Fourth Amendment
proscription against unreasonable search and seizures.3 4 It requires that
every search and seizure on land be based on probable cause.35 The Ninth
and Second Circuits have drawn a parallel between the search and seizure
of vessels, concluding that in both instances an "articulate and reasonable
27. 700 F.2d 1358 (11th Cir. 1983).
28. Id. at 1362. The defendants had produced an Honduran certificate upon boarding,
which was later refuted by the Honduran government.
29. United Nations Convention on the High Seas, note 21 supra.
30. A recent law review article perceives this extension as implied under international
law. See Case Comment, United States v. Marino-Garcia, 52 CIN. L. Rzv. 292 (1983). See
also United States v. Marino-Garcia: Criminal Jurisdiction Over Stateless Vessels on the
High Seas, 9 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 141 (1983).
31. 705 F.2d 432 (1983).
32. Id. at 433.
33. Id.
34. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
35. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). This case held that a valid search of an
automobile required a "reasonable and articulable suspicion."
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suspicion""6 is required. The rationale is that the lesser expectation of
privacy on board a ship justifies a lesser standard than probable cause.
The Fifth Circuit rejected the applicability of landbased Fourth Amend-
ment requirements, holding that because seizures on the high seas were
fundamentally different from those on land due to limited enforcement
personnel,37 there was no need to show reasonable suspicion or probable
cause.
The Eleventh Circuit adopted the Fifth Circuit's standard that the
Coast Guard need not have a reasonable suspicion of an ongoing violation
in order to implement a valid seizure. 8 Stateless vessels, as well as Amer-
ican vessels, are subject to this rule. The Marino-Garcia decision indi-
cated in dicta that even if the Fourth Amendment applied, the seizure
would still be valid because, under international law, the Coast Guard has
the right to approach an unidentified vessel in order to ascertain the ves-
sel's nationality. 9 This rule was extended by providing that the Coast
Guard may subject the unidentified vessel to a seizure for the limited
purpose of a document inspection. There must be a reasonable suspicion
that the vessel is an American flagship or that the vessel is attempting to
conceal its identity. 0 However, the potential for abuse is great, as random
and subterfuge searches designed to seek evidence of a crime are covertly
authorized under the guise of administrative searches.4 In addition, the
36. In United States v. Piner, 608 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1979), a divided panel concluded
that a random inspection of an American vessel conducted at night without a reasonable
suspicion of illegal activity transgressed the Fourth Amendment. See also United States v.
Streifel, 665 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1981).
37. United States v. Shelnut, 625 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Williams,
617 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1980).
38. 679 F.2d at 1385.
39. The S.S. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A., No. 10 (Judgment of Sept. 7); The Mariana
Flora, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat) 1 (1826).
40. United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Rubies,
612 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 940 (1980). The Supreme Court has
recently ruled that the search and seizure of a ship located in U.S. waters providing ready
access to the open sea was valid even though there was no suspicion of wrongdoing at the
time of boarding. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez et al., -U.S.-, 103 S.Ct. 2573
(1983). In Villamonte-Marquez, a ship was boarded by customs officers pursuant to 19
U.S.C. § 1581a, which authorizes them to board any vessel at any place for a document
inspection. Marihuana was discovered in the hold, and the defendants were prosecuted
under 21 U.S.C. § 963. The gist of the Supreme Court's holding (by Justice Rehnquist) was
that, in boarding the vessel, customs officers need not suspect any wrongdoing by the crew
because "the nature of the governmental interest in assuring compliance with documenta-
tion requirements, particularly in waters where the need to deter or apprehend smugglers is
great, [and] the type of intrusion, while not minimal, is limited." 103 S.Ct. at 2582. The
dissent argued, however, that "[tioday's holding ... r[a]n roughshod over the previously
well-established principle that the police may not be issued a free commission to invade any
private premises without a requirement of probable cause, reason, suspicion or some other
limit on their discretion or abuse thereof." Id. at 2589.
41. See Nanda, Enforcement of United States Laws at Sea-Selected Jurisdictional
and Evidentiary Issues in INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CRIMINAL LAW: ENFORCING UNITED
STATES LAW IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY, FOURTH SOKOL COLLOQUIUM (1981).
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Marino-Garcia court's extension of the right to approach was allegedly
authorized by article 22 of the Convention on the High Seas. In invoking
this provision, however, the court misapplied it. Article 22 provides that:
[a] warship which has encountered a foreign merchant ship on the
high seas is not justified in boarding her unless there is reasonable
ground for suspecting. . . that, although flying a foreign flag or refus-
ing to show its flag, the ship is, in reality, of the same nationality as
the warship."'
The United States Coast Guard is boarding vessels on the high seas
because of a suspicion that they are stateless. The U.N. Convention re-
quires that the suspicion must be based on the fact that the ship is of the
same nationality as the state asserting jurisdiction; therefore, it does not
provide a basis in international law for denying constitutional rights.
Domestic constitutional law provides no more justification for a de-
nial of the constitutional rights of the crew of stateless vessels on the high
seas than does international law. It is an accepted principle of United
States law that the Fourth Amendment is not limited to domestic vessels
or United States citizens. "[O]nce a foreign vessel is subjected to criminal
prosecution, it is entitled to the equal protection of all laws; including the
Fourth Amendment."4 The Eleventh Circuit has interpreted this provi-
sion as encompassing foreign vessels but excluding stateless vessels, as
follows:
Without deciding the issue, we note that a number of considerations
militate against the extension of the Amendment to stateless vessels.
Stateless vessels have no right to travel freely on the high seas and are
considered a threat to the order and stability of the oceans. Since the
vessels have no rights under international law, we find it somewhat
dubious to suggest that the Founding Fathers intended to provide
these vessels with the prophylactic safeguards contained in the Fourth
Amendment."'
Indeed, the court went further and indicated that even if the Fourth
Amendment were applicable, a vessel's status as stateless might render
any search and seizure reasonable. 45 The defect in this argument is that a
vessel's status cannot be determined until boarding for a document in-
spection; yet, this prior boarding is sanctioned by a subsequent
discovery.4"
42. United Nations Convention on the High Seas, supra note 21, at art. 22, para. 1(c).
43. United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1262 (5th Cir. 1978).
44. 679 F.2d at 1384 n.21.
45. Id. at 1384.
46. A sounder approach was utilized in United States v. Barrio, 556 F. Supp. 395
(D.P.R. 1982). This case involved a stateless vessel boarded while on the high seas. The
defendant crew members' motion to suppress evidence was denied as Fourth Amendment
rights were "personal rights not to be vicariously asserted." This analysis was made in con-
formity with Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), which ruled that a person who
is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure as a result of a third person's premises or prop-
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This circular reasoning should not be the basis for denying constitu-
tional rights. The equal protection clause under the United States Consti-
tution demands that foreign persons prosecuted under United States laws
receive constitutional protection.4 7
V. CONCLUSION
In the wake of Marino-Garcia and its progeny, a clear trend can be
identified which dramatically alters the prosecution of suspected drug
smugglers on the high seas. The Eleventh Circuit has begun to treat drug
smuggling as a universal crime by expanding the jurisdictional base of
section 955a. It does so by including invalid registration within its defini-
tion of stateless vessel and also by placing the burden of showing a nexus
upon the defense. Instead of focusing on the statelessness of the vessel,
international dialogue would be encouraged by focusing on the vessel's
activities vis-h-vis drug smuggling. This would preserve the constitutional
rights afforded crews of stateless vessels under United States law, while
allowing for effective prosecution of illegal drug traffic on the high seas.
Lynda Hettich Knowles
Directed-Energy Weapons
On The "High Frontier"
I. INTRODUCTION
President Reagan recently announced the proposed development and
deployment by the U.S. of a space-based ABM system utilizing directed-
energy weapons (DEWs).1 Although the proposal provoked a variety of
intense reactions from the political and scientific communities in both the
U.S. and U.S.S.R., it failed to arouse and sustain the public concern
which might otherwise be forthcoming. The "Star Wars" quality of the
plan perhaps renders it superfluous in the minds of most.
Although doubts exist as to whether the technology necessary to im-
plement the President's proposal will ever be available, they do not war-
rant disregard of the impact which would be caused by the development
erty has not suffered any loss of Fourth Amendment rights.
47. See NOWAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 592 (1982).
The Fourth Amendment is applied through the Fourteenth Amendment, which requires
equal protection under the law for all persons. "Aliens are persons, so they receive the pro-
tection of ... the Equal Protection Clause." See also United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d
1252, 1262 (5th Cir. 1979).
1. Reagan Proposes New Weapons, Denver Post, Mar. 24, 1983, at 1-A, col. 2.
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This circular reasoning should not be the basis for denying constitu-
tional rights. The equal protection clause under the United States Consti-
tution demands that foreign persons prosecuted under United States laws
receive constitutional protection.4 7
V. CONCLUSION
In the wake of Marino-Garcia and its progeny, a clear trend can be
identified which dramatically alters the prosecution of suspected drug
smugglers on the high seas. The Eleventh Circuit has begun to treat drug
smuggling as a universal crime by expanding the jurisdictional base of
section 955a. It does so by including invalid registration within its defini-
tion of stateless vessel and also by placing the burden of showing a nexus
upon the defense. Instead of focusing on the statelessness of the vessel,
international dialogue would be encouraged by focusing on the vessel's
activities vis-h-vis drug smuggling. This would preserve the constitutional
rights afforded crews of stateless vessels under United States law, while
allowing for effective prosecution of illegal drug traffic on the high seas.
Lynda Hettich Knowles
Directed-Energy Weapons
On The "High Frontier"
I. INTRODUCTION
President Reagan recently announced the proposed development and
deployment by the U.S. of a space-based ABM system utilizing directed-
energy weapons (DEWs).1 Although the proposal provoked a variety of
intense reactions from the political and scientific communities in both the
U.S. and U.S.S.R., it failed to arouse and sustain the public concern
which might otherwise be forthcoming. The "Star Wars" quality of the
plan perhaps renders it superfluous in the minds of most.
Although doubts exist as to whether the technology necessary to im-
plement the President's proposal will ever be available, they do not war-
rant disregard of the impact which would be caused by the development
erty has not suffered any loss of Fourth Amendment rights.
47. See NOWAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 592 (1982).
The Fourth Amendment is applied through the Fourteenth Amendment, which requires
equal protection under the law for all persons. "Aliens are persons, so they receive the pro-
tection of ... the Equal Protection Clause." See also United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d
1252, 1262 (5th Cir. 1979).
1. Reagan Proposes New Weapons, Denver Post, Mar. 24, 1983, at 1-A, col. 2.
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of such a system. This is particularly true in light of the increasing milita-
rization of space and the desire of both the U.S. and Soviet Union to
achieve and maintain military stability.
The Outer Space Treaty2 and the ABM Treaty,' both designed to
address these concerns, may be inadequate when applied to the emerging
beam technology, in view of the probable U.S. and Soviet constructions of
the relevant provisions of these treaties. Consequently, this article will
focus on this problem of treaty interpretation, as well as on the nature of
DEWs and the strategic value of their incorporation into an ABM system.
Included also is a brief discussion of certain policy concerns associated
with the development and deployment of these newest among the so-
called "ultimate weapons."
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEWs
Throughout the 1970s, the Soviets experimented intensively with
anti-satellite weaponry (ASATs),4 and although the Pentagon claims to
be at least fifteen years behind the Soviets in ASAT technology, the U.S.
is scheduled to test its first ASAT later this year.' The development of
directed-energy weapons such as the high-energy laser (HEL) and the
particle beam weapon (PBW) have become more of a priority to both the
U.S. and Soviet Union in recent years.' By 1978, the Soviets were sus-
pected of having developed and successfully tested a PBW and of having
developed the world's largest HEL.' Yet, the Pentagon has only recently
2. Outer Space Treaty, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S.
205. This treaty reveals the early expectations of the signatories that space would eventually
be used for military purposes and that general guidelines are necessary to restrain that ac-
tivity to some degree.
3. ABM Treaty, May 26, 1972, United States-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No.
7503. As an integral part of the SALT I accords, this bilateral treaty prohibits anti-ballistic
missile systems in an attempt to restrict the strategic offensive arms race. It is also the
formal embodiment of the MAD (mutually assured destruction) doctrine, which proposes
that if each state is exposed to the offensive nuclear weapons of the other, neither state will
have the incentive to launch a first-strike attack.
4. See also STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, 97TH
CONG., 2ND SESS., SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS 1976-80, at 184-91 (Comm. Print 1982) [hereinaf-
ter cited as SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS].
5. U.S. Military Arsenal Extending Into Space, Rocky Mt. News, Aug. 22, 1983, at 32,
col. 1.
6. The most promising HEL derives its power from chemical reactions and is capable of
producing a 200-billion-watt beam of energy for 20 billionths of a second at the speed of
light. This creates a thermal reaction within the target causing it to melt, vaporize or possi-
bly shatter as a result of internal shock waves, depending on the wavelength used, and the
chemical composition and speed of the target. The PBW is a device "using directed beams
of charged or neutral particles at high energies as projectiles to inflict damage." Such beams
are essentially man-made lightning. For an excellent comprehensive analysis of the opera-
tional aspects of these particular DEWs and an in-depth study of the applicable interna-
tional law, see E. FESSLER, DIRECTED-ENERGY WEAPONS: A JURIDICAL ANALYSIS 8-29 (1979).
7. Cady, Beam Weapons in Space, AIR U. REV., May-June 1982, at 33, 38. See also
Vlasic, Disarmament Decade, Outer Space, and International Law, 26 McGu.L L.J. 135,
1983
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
confirmed that it has successfully test-fired its own two-million-volt PBW
as part of the top secret "White Horse" program.' Testing of HELs by
the Department of Defense, however, has been in progress since 1973.9
The Pentagon expects to begin testing the first generation of HELs with
ASAT and ABM capability by 1987." It has been recently disclosed that
U.S. high-energy microwave weaponry is in an even further stage of de-
velopment than both the HEL and PBW."
Considering the relatively early stages of development of these
DEWs, it is odd that the President made public the plan of their eventual
deployment as the principle components of future ABM systems. In fact,
the majority of the scientific community in the U.S. and Soviet Union,
while acknowledging the viability of these weapons in component form,
declares that the technology necessary to incorporate them into an effec-
tive ABM system is unachievable, as well as extremely destablizing.' 2
Others, however, including renowned physicist and current member of
the White House Science Council, Edward Teller, believe that the current
status of DEWs is comparable to the "same stage of development as was
the Manhattan Project in 1940.'1 Teller further implies that with public
support and massive research and development expenditures, ABM sys-
tems utilizing DEWs could be deployed before the turn of the century,
perhaps even within the next decade.14
III. PROJECT HIGH FRONTIER
Directed-energy weapons technology is currently being developed for
integration into an ABM system, most notably the High Frontier propo-
sal. High Frontier, a think tank funded by the conservative Heritage
Foundation, is headed by retired Lieutenant General Daniel Graham, a
former Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and more recently
Ronald Reagan's military advisor during the 1976 and 1980 presidential
campaigns. The administration's support of the High Frontier plan
clearly requires renunciation of the MAD (mutually assured destruction)
164-65 (1981).
8. Death Ray is Successfully Test Fired, Rocky Mt. News, Apr. 7, 1983, at 4, col. 2.
9. Laser Technology-Development and Application: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on .oe To hnnogyv nnd Sp re of the Senate Comm. on Commerce. Science, and
Transportation, 96th Cong., 1st and 2nd Sess. 85-86 (1979-80) .(statement of Dr. J. Richard
Airey, Director, Directed-Energy Technology, Dept. of Defense) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings].
10. Attack on Spy Satellites Could "Blind" U.S., Rocky Mt. News, Aug. 25, 1983, at
30, col. 1.
11. Microwave Beam May Some Day Join Nation's Weaponry, Rocky Mt. News, Aug.
13, 1983, at 57, col. 1.
12. Rocky Mt. News, note 8 supra. See also Soviet Scientists Slam U.S., Rocky Mt.
News, Apr. 10, 1983, at 50, col. 3.
13. Beane, High Energy Lasers: Strategic Policy Implications, 5 STRATEGIC REV. 100-03
(1977). See also Reagan For the Defense, TiME, Apr. 4, 1983, at 12.
14. See TME, note 13 supra.
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doctrine, and is hoped to "fast thaw the nuclear freeze movement."' 8
In a speech delivered in 1982,16 Graham outlined the High Frontier
concept in some detail, referring to it as a "layered strategic defense" in-
corporating space and land-based beam weapons capable of filtering out
most incoming Soviet missiles, as well as protecting other space assets.'7
Seven years and $35 billion from now, High Frontier's "purely defensive"
system could be fully operational.'9 Admittedly, the plan and its "purely
defensive" application has some appeal in light of the nuclear alternative.
There are some problems, however, which arise upon application of cer-
tain international treaties to the proposal.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE OUTER SPACE AND ABM TREATIES TO PROJECT
HIGH FRONTIER
Despite proponents' apparent disregard for international legal re-
straints, 9 both the Outer Space Treaty and the ABM Treaty are immedi-
ately relevant to any discussion of the implementation of the High Fron-
tier proposal. However, intentional ambiguities in the drafting of these
two treaties and an inclination to construe their relevant provisions very
narrowly makes them nearly inadequate to address the plan.
A. The Outer Space Treaty
The Outer Space Treaty is flawed by the inclusion of two ambiguous
phrases: "peaceful purposes" and "weapons of mass destruction." Be-
cause of the vagueness of these terms, the treaty's applicability in al-
lowing or prohibiting space-based DEWs is uncertain. The main problem
concerns the construction of article IV."° Applying the maxim inclusio
15. Fossedal, Exploring the High Frontier, CONSERVATIVE DIGEST, June 1982, at 3-4.
16. Defense and Development on the High Frontier, a speech by Lt. Gen. Daniel Gra-
ham as part of a seminar entitled Preventing World War III, delivered Feb. 3, 1982 at
Hillsdale College's Center for Constructive Alternatives, Hillsdale, Michigan, reprinted in
IMPRIMIS, June 1982, at 1 [hereinafter cited as Graham].
17. Id. at 2.
18. Id. at 4-5. The High Frontier program also involves the utilization of non-nuclear
space-based missiles, the development of a "high performance space plane," upgrading of
the current Space Shuttle Program, development of a manned low-earth orbit space station
and a space power station, and a stepped-up civil defense program. In addition, the plan
envisions a space industrial systems research and development program to be funded mostly
through private enterprise.
19. Consider the statement of Major Steven Cady, an enthusiastic supporter of beam-
weaponry deployment in space: "Throughout history, great nations wishing to remain great
have interpreted principles of law in a manner consistent with their own needs and inter-
ests. A preoccupation with the niceities [sic] of law. . . has always been the road to disas-
ter. Cady, supra note 7, at 36. (Emphasis added).
20. The Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, at art. IV, states:
States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the
earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of
mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such
weapons in outer space in any other manner.
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unius est exclusio alterius to this article, it appears that outer space itself
is not restricted to exclusively "peaceful purposes," whereas the "moon
and other celestial bodies" are restricted.2' The early Soviet position
maintained that "peaceful purposes" meant "non-military, '22 but both
the Soviets and the U.S. currently view the term as meaning "non-
aggressive. '
'1 s
In addition, the treaty's proscription against specific military activi-
ties can easily be interpreted as allowing all other military activities. 4
This means that unspecified military activity will be permitted on the
moon and other celestial bodies as long as it is non-aggressive. This inter-
pretation would also imply that aggressive activity is permissible in outer
space, since article IV's first paragraph does not contain the "peaceful
purposes/non-aggressive" limitations.
High Frontier seems to dismiss the "peaceful purposes" issue alto-
gether. If the U.S. currently equates this phrase with "non-aggressive",
then former Lieutenant General Graham's revealing comment that "[we]
should harbor no illusions that space can be limited to 'peaceful uses'
" . . 9925 may be an indication that those orchestrating the plan have little
intention of maintaining a "non-aggressive" posture, let alone a "non-mil-
itary" one.
Another controversial element of article IV is the phrase "weapons of
mass destruction," which is generally construed to prohibit the orbiting,
installation, or stationing in space of weapons capable of "inflicting dam-
age to extensive geographical areas or injury to substantial populations,
such as nuclear, chemical, or bacteriological weapons. 2' This interpreta-
tion is thought to permit extremely selective, albeit destructive weapons,
including conventional weaponry of less destructive power.2 7 Conse-
quently, since DEWs are comparatively clean, discriminating, and con-
trollable weapons capable of being operated so as to avoid the excess of
devastation sought to be prevented, they may well fall outside of the
treaty restrictions.
On the whole, the Outer Space Treaty seems to delegate to the su-
perpowers "a large degree of freedom to turn this common domain into
an area of bilateral arms competition to the detriment of all the others. 28
The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used ... exclusively for
peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases. . . , the testing of any
type of weapons and the conduct of military maneuvers on celestial bodies
shall be forbidden.
21. E. FESSLER, supra note 6, at 51.
22. Id. at 49.
23. Vlasic, supra note 7, at 171.
24. E. IFSSLER, supra note 6, at 51.
25. Graham, supra note 16, at 4.
26. E. FESSLER, supra note 6, at 53. See also Hearings on the Outer Space Treaty
Before the Senate Foreign Relations Comm., 90th Cong., 1st. Sess. 76 (1967).
27. For a more detailed discussion, see E. FESSLER, supra note 6, at 52-56.
28. Vlasic, supra note 7, at 174.
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B. The ABM Treaty
The Reagan administration claims that the planned research and de-
velopment of this proposed "high tech" ABM system will not violate pro-
visions of the ABM Treaty, and that only at the deployment stage would
there be any actual conflict with its provisions.2 9 This assertion is proba-
bly incorrect since the purpose of the treaty is to forego the development
of such systems, limiting each party's exposure to the existing offensive
weaponry of the other. By this process, "the pressures of technological
change and its destablizing effects on the strategic balance" will be
minimized. 0
Several problems arise in the application of this treaty to the High
Frontier proposal of using DEWs in an ABM mode. For example, article
II describes specific components of an ABM system.31 The problem is
whether this description is an exclusive or exemplary listing of the com-
ponents intended to be prohibited. If intended as examples, then DEWs
within an ABM system are likely to be proscribed. If article II is in-
tended to be an exclusive enumeration of prohibited components, then
DEWs, not having these components, would fall outside the provision's
prohibition.2
Agreement (D) of the treaty provides that "in the event ABM sys-
tems based on other physical priciples. . . are created in the future, spe-
cific limitations on such systems and their components would be subject
to discussion in accordance with Article XIII of the Treaty."3  This would
imply that future developments in ABM technology, including DEWs,
were not intended to be included in the components listed in article II.
Despite this interpretation, DEWs as components within an ABM
system would be prohibited from being developed, tested, and deployed
pursuant to article V, but only where they were "sea-based, air-based,
space-based, or mobile land-based. ' 34 These components could therefore
be developed and tested if fixed and land-based, assuming that DEWs are
not construed as being included under article II.
Ironically, DEWs could be developed, tested, and deployed in space
within an ASAT mode as long as they were not actually used to interfere
with verification satellites protected by article XII."
Both the Outer Space and the ABM treaties are, in reality, binding
only to the extent that the signatories wish to be bound; thus, circumven-
tion of their purpose and specific provisions can easily be accomplished
by self-serving interpretations. However, in light of the potentially grave
29. Denver Post, note 1 supra.
30. Vlasic, supra note 7, at 176.
31. ABM Treaty, supra note 3, at art. II, para. 1.
32. E. FESSLER, supra note 6, at 69.
33. ABM Treaty, supra note 3, at Agreed Interpretations, para. D.
34. Id. at art. V, para. 1.
35. Id. at art. XII, para 2. See also Hearings, supra note 10, at 88.
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consequences of proceeding with the High Frontier proposal without
clearly-defined restraints, it would be in the best interests of both super-
powers to come to some agreement on procedure before a destabilizing
imbalance occurs.
V. OTHER POLICY PROBLEMS PRESENTED BY THE HIGH FRONTIER
PROPOSAL
In addition to doubts about the viability and effectiveness of the
High Frontier plan, the issue of destabilization has caused prominent
members of the scientific community to condemn the President's propo-
sal.30 The essence of their opposition is that the extension of the arms
race into space merely increases the possibilities of war on earth.8 s Any
shift in the balance of power caused by either nation's sole possession of
these "ultimate weapons" would be likely to set in motion a dangerous
escalation of DEW development by both nations, as well as the escalation
of other weapons designed to penetrate the other's system. For example,
if the U.S. suspected the Soviets of having attained first-strike capability
without fear of a retaliatory strike, it might then be induced to launch a
first-strike against the Soviets before the Soviet ABM system is fully
developed.
While the President has proposed the use of DEWs in a purely de-
fensive manner, former Lieutenant General Graham has proposed other
possible uses, including the preservation of the West's access to raw
materials8" and the assurance of U.S. preeminence in space for military
and commercial exploitation."9 His philosophy is to "move the contest
into a new arena where we could exploit the technological advantages we
hold."4 O
Other strategists envision even first generation DEWs as "politically
useful instruments for achieving critical objectives of American foreign
policy... ,"41 and as permitting the "fighting [of] non-nuclear wars with
the Soviet Union involving vital U.S. national interests .... ,,4' This
kind of diplomatic blackmail is not new. Threats of using atomic and hy-
drogen bombs to coerce other nations to comply with U.S. demands has
apparently been practiced by every President (with the exception of Ger-
ald Ford) since Harry S. Truman.48
36. Soviet Scientists Slam U.S., note 12 supra.
37. Space Weapons Invite Earth War, Rocky Mt. News, May 13, 1983, at 29, col. 1.
Featured in this article are the comments of Astronomer Carl Sagan and Columbia Univer-
sity Professor of Physics Richard Garwin, who spoke in Washington, D.C. in favor of a reso-
lution to ban space weapons.
38. Graham, supra note 16, at 2.
39. Id. at 4.
40. Id. at 2.
41. Smernoff, Strategic Value of Space-Based Laser Weapons, Am U. REv., Mar.-Apr.
1982, at 12.
42. Id. at 11.
43. Ellsberg, Introduction to E. THOMPSON & D. SMITH, PROTEST AND SURVrVE at v-vi
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Because DEWs can be used offensively within an ABM system for
detonating nuclear warheads and other purposes, it is naive to assume
that they will only be restricted to defensive measures, especially since
they may not be singularly effective and may be extremely vulnerable as
well. The main criticism of the High Frontier plan is that in order for
such a system to provide more than just the illusion of security, it would
have to be 100% effective." Leakage of 5-10% is not a problem, however,
according to former Lieutenant General Graham, who asserts that
"[d]efenses throughout military history have been designed to make at-
tack more difficult and more costly-not impossible." '45
VI. CONCLUSION
The containment of space militarization and the alleviation of the
continuous threat of nuclear war are two worthy and compatible goals.
However, if judged to be in the interests of "national security," the devel-
opment and deployment of a space-based ABM system for the stated
purpose of defense will most likely be pursued by the U.S. and the Soviet
Union, despite possible treaty restrictions and the undesirable effect of
destabilization. Such a course will not be the panacea that President Rea-
gan and his advisors envision, however. Technology breeds technology,
and it is almost ludicrous to believe that either superpower will ever be
able to develop the ultimate, impenetrable defensive system. In fact, in-
herent in the development and testing of such a system is the simultane-
ous development and testing of technology designed to counteract or limit
its effectiveness. On the other hand, once a certain level of technology has
been achieved, it can then only be channeled, not suppressed or ignored.
The threat of the military application of such technology will exist as long
as the materials, knowledge, and technology exist. An attempt to stifle the
military exploitation of directed-energy technology by application of am-
biguously worded treaties destined to be ignored, or worse, abused, is a
futile effort. New treaties could be formulated, however, with unambigu-
ous provisions specifically addressing the issue of space-based DEWs and
providing effective sanctions in case of violations. This would allow re-
search in this area to proceed within well-defined guidelines to the mu-
tual advantage of all parties.46
With or without new or renegotiated treaties, the suggestion has been
made that research and development of DEWs should continue as a joint
effort so as to strengthen the validity of U.S. and Soviet claims of "purely
(1981). See generally id. at i-xxviii.
44. Rocky Mt. News, note 37 supra.
45. Graham, supra note 16, at 3.
46. The Soviets have apparently submitted a draft of a proposed treaty to the UN call-
ing for participant states "not to test or deploy . . . any space-based weapons intended to
hit targets on Earth, in the atmosphere, or in outer space" in addition to other provisions
addressing the militarization of space. Soviets Want UN to Ban Manned Military Space-
craft, Rocky Mt. News, Aug. 22, 1983, at 32, col. 3.
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defensive" intentions.47 Although a well-reasoned approach, this is a high-
ly unlikely alternative, in spite of the almost inevitable destabilization
resulting from a unilateral breakthrough. A better and more palatable so-
lution would be the simultaneous reduction of offensive weaponry by both
nations, which would serve to demonstrate further the sincerity of their
intentions. Recent developments demand that we begin now to re-evalu-
ate our dependence on largely ineffective legal restraints and consider the
propriety of these and other proposed methods designed to avoid the
over-militarization of space as well as the catastrophic destabilization
that would be likely to occur with the implementation of High Frontier.
Mark A. Clark
Powell v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons:
The Treatment of Mexican Work Credits by
U.S. Authorities Under the Prisoner
Transfer Treaty with Mexico
In its recent decision in Powell v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons,' the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined that the work credits earned
in a Mexican prison by a prisoner subsequently transferred to the United
States represented only a conditional reduction in the offender's sentence.
The court held that U.S. authorities could order such work credits for-
feited when the offender violated the conditions of his parole. Through
the court's interpretation of the terms of the United States-Mexico Pris-
oner Transfer Treaty, 2 the decision clarifies the Treaty's jurisdictional al-
location of sentencing issues to the Transferring State and parole issues
to the Receiving State.
The United States entered into the treaty negotiations with Mexico
in response to public concern over the frequently inhumane treatment
U.S. nationals received in Mexican prisons and out of a desire to lessen
the bilateral tensions which resulted.$ Under the terms of the Treaty,
U.S. nationals serving time in Mexico can be transferred to American cus-
tody for the remainder of their sentences.' Mexican nationals held in U.S.
47. Buckley, Share Defense Research, Rocky Mt. News, Apr. 7, 1983, at 70.
1. 695 F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1983).
2. Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, Nov. 25, 1976, United States-Mexico,
28 U.S.T. 7399, T.I.A.S. No. 8718.
3. Kowalski, Penal Transfer Treaties and the Application of 'Unconstitutional Condi-
tions' Analysis, 12 U. TOL. L. REv. 1, 5-6 (1980).
4. In addition to several conditions which must be met before a transfer can be ef-
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prisons can be returned to their home country as well. In either case, the
Receiving State assumes the role of jailer. The completion of the trans-
ferred offender's sentence will be carried out according to that State's
laws, including any provisions for parole,5 but the sentence itself can only
be challenged in the Transferring State.6 Powell focuses on this division
of jurisdiction.
Powell, an American national, was convicted of a drug offense in
Mexico and sentenced to six years and three months in prison. Initially,
the term was due to end August 13, 1982, but Powell earned 336 days of
work credits, and the Mexican authorities advanced his release date to
September 8, 1981. Powell was transferred to the United States in 1978,
pursuant to the terms of the Treaty. The U.S. authorities released Powell
on parole in September of that year. While still on parole, Powell was
convicted of another drug-related offense, this time in the United States.
The U.S. Parole Commission revoked his parole and ordered additional
time added to the two year sentence he received for his latest conviction.7
The order forfeited the work credits which Powell had earned in Mexico.
Powell initiated habeas corpus proceedings, arguing that the work
credits permanently reduced his original sentence and could not be for-
feited under Articles V(3) and VI of the Treaty.' The District Court for
the Northern District of Texas agreed.9 It granted the writ and ordered
that the sentence be recomputed to restore the work credits. The Fifth
Circuit reversed, finding that the work credits constituted only a condi-
fected, the consent of the prisoner, the Transferring State and the Receiving State to the
transfer is required. See Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, supra note 2, arts. II
& IV.
5. Id. at art. V(2).
6. Id. at art. VI. This provision has been the subject of several attacks on the Treaty's
constitutionality, in both cases and law review articles. See, e.g., Rosado v. Civiletti, 621
F.2d 1179 (2nd Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 856 (1980); and Pfeiffer v. United States
Bureau of Prisons, 615 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 908 (1980). For a
sampling of representative law review articles, see Abramovsky & Eagle, A Critical Evalua-
tion of the Mexican-American Transfer of Penal Sanctions Treaty, 64 IOWA L. REV. 275
(1979); Bassiouni, Perspectives on the Transfer of Prisoners Between the United States
and Mexico and the United States and Canada, 11 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 249 (1978); and
Robbins, A Constitutional Analysis of the Prohibition Against Collateral Attack in the
Mexican-American Prisoner Exchange Treaty, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1 (1978).
7. Powell was ordered to serve two years, four months and seventeen days. The pre-
sumptive parole date was set as March 1, 1982. Powell, 695 F.2d at 869.
8. Article V(3) provides: "No sentence of confinement shall be enforced by the Receiv-
ing State in such a way as to extend its duration beyond the date at which it would have
terminated according to the sentence of the Transferring State." The pertinent part of arti-
cle VI provides: "The Transferring State shall have exclusive jurisdiction over any proceed-
ings, regardless of their form, intended to challenge, modify or set aside sentences handed
down by its courts."
9. Powell, 695 F.2d at 869-70 n.2. Footnote 2 of the federal circuit court opinion dis-
cussed the opinion of the lower court, which stressed time contraints and rejected the rec-
ommendation of the magistrate that the issue be referred to the Mexican courts for determi-
nation. The federal district court also asserted that the Mexican courts would hold that
Powell's work credits operated to reduce his prison sentence permanently.
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tional reduction in Powell's sentence.
After disposing of Powell's mootness argument,"0 the court turned to
the issues surrounding the forfeiture of the work credits. It found that the
only clearly applicable Treaty provision stated that the laws of the Re-
ceiving State govern the completion of the transferred prisoner's sen-
tence, including the granting of parole, unless another term of the Treaty
provided otherwise."' The provisions relied upon by Powell dealt only
with the modification or improper enforcement of the sentence handed
down by the Mexican courts. Since Powell's work credits were adminis-
tratively awarded, they were not part of the sentence of the court. 2 The
court thus found the Treaty articles cited by Powell inapplicable.
Once the Fifth Circuit concluded that no other Treaty term removed
jurisdiction of the matter from the Receiving State, the court was faced
with the dilemma of deciding how American laws could be applied to a
foreign penal program. Using the legislation passed to implement the
Treaty in the U.S., 8 the court drew an analogy between work credits and
the good time credits awarded in the U.S. prison system. Because the two
credit systems are treated as equal under the implementing legislation
and good time credits may be revoked because of parole violations, the
court reasoned that work credits should also be forfeitable. In a footnote,
the court cited Mexico's Penal Code to show that Mexico would also con-
sider the award of work credits as conditioned upon the offender's contin-
ued good behavior."
The Powell decision is in harmony with Boyden v. Bell, 5 a Ninth
Circuit decision involving the United States-Canada Prisoner Transfer
Treaty. 6 The Boyden case concerned a prisoner transferred to the United
States after being sentenced to twenty years of imprisonment by a Cana-
10. Powell argued that the full term of the sentence imposed by the Mexican court had
ended on August 13, 1982, and that a reversal of the district court would have no effect. In
addition, article V(3) does not permit the U.S. to extend the sentence beyond that date. The
Fifth Circuit pointed out that Powell had been released pending this appeal and determined
that the sentence would terminate with the expiration of the six year and three month term,
not the specific date of August 13, 1982. The six year and three month period would expire
when Powell served the balance owed on that term at the time of his early release. Id. at
870.
1. Articlp V(9. prnvii.; in pirtinent part: "Except as otherwise provided in this
Treaty, the completion of a transferred offender's sentence shall be carried out according to
the laws and procedures of the Receiving State, including the application of any provisions
for reduction of the term of confinement by parole, conditional release or otherwise."
12. Powell, 695 F.2d at 871-72.
13. Act of Oct. 28, 1977, § 1, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3244, 4100-4115 (Supp. V 1981). The court
quoted specific sections of section 4105(c), which provides in subpara. (1) that "all credits
for good time, for labor or any other credit" awarded by the Transferring State will be
added to the good time credits given by the United States. Powell, 695 F.2d at 871.
14. Powell, 695 F.2d at 871 n.5.
15. Boyden v. Bell, 631 F.2d 120 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1051 (1981).
16. Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, Mar. 2, 1977, United States-Canada,
30 U.S.T. 6263, T.I.A.S. No. 9522.
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dian court. The Canadian authorities informed the U.S. authorities that
the prisoner was entitled to 1,827 days of remission credit over the life of
the sentence. The Ninth Circuit, faced with a Treaty very similar to the
Treaty with Mexico and the same implementing legislation,17 concluded
that U.S. authorities could prorate the prisoner's remission credits before
awarding him any good time credits."s In both the Boyden case and the
Powell case, American authorities were permitted to modify sentence re-
ductions awarded by foreign governmental authorities other than the sen-
tencing courts. The Ninth Circuit's reasoning was nearly identical to that
of the Powell court. 9
The Fifth Circuit court in Powell felt no need to consult the Mexican
government concerning the classification of work credits as conditional
sentence reductions. Once it found Treaty provisions allowing application
of U.S. law to the case, the court ignored any interest which Mexico
might have had in its outcome. In addition, the court saw no conceptual
difficulty in basing its decision to permit the revocation of the credits
earned before the prisoner's transfer on a Treaty provision that only
granted U.S. jurisdiction over the completion of the offender's sentence.
Given the basic similarities between all the prisoner transfer treaties to
which the United States is a party,20 the reasoning of the Powell decision
could well be applied in situations involving such treaties. Although deci-
sions such as Powell are not likely to harm foreign relations significantly,
future prisoner transfer treaties should be carefully drafted to avoid any
potential misunderstandings.
Michael R. de Lisle
17. Articles V(2) and (3) of the Treaty with Mexico appear almost verbatim in the
Treaty with Canada in articles IV(1) and (3) respectively. The same legislation is used to
implement all prisoner transfer treaties to which the United States is a party.
18. The prisoner was allowed 240 days of Canadian remission credits to be combined
with over 2,084 days of good time credits awarded under U.S. law. Boyden, 631 F.2d at 122.
19. The court stated specifically that it did not "accept Boyden's argument that the
proration of remission credits contravenes the 'exclusive jurisdiction' of Canadian courts
under art. V of the Treaty. Remission credits do not modify the term of a prisoner's sen-
tence, but determine his release on parole." Id. at 123 n.11.
20. In addition to the Treaty with Canada, note 16 supra, see Treaty on the Execution
of Penal Sentences, Feb. 10, 1978, United States-Bolivia, 30 U.S.T. 796, T.I.A.S. No. 9219;
Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, Jan. 11, 1979, United States-Panama, -
U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. 9787; Treaty on the Enforcement of Penal Judgments, June 7,
1979, United States-Turkey, - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. 9892; Treaty on the Execution
of Penal Sentences, July 6, 1979, United States-Peru, - U.S.T. - , T.I.A.S. No. 9784.
All of these treaties permit the Transferring State to retain sole jurisdiction over the sen-
tence to be governed by the laws of the Receiving State. See also Note, Prisoner Transfer
Treaties: Need for the Elimination or Modification of the Retention Provision, 13 CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. 321, 325 (1983).
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In The Matter of a Grand Jury
Subpoena to Marc Rich & Company, A. G.:
Preventing Evasion of U.S. Tax Laws
By Foreign Companies
A federal grand jury recently investigated an alleged tax evasion
scheme whereby a Swiss-based commodities concern, Marc Rich & Com-
pany, A.G. (hereinafter AG), allegedly attempted to evade U.S. tax law by
diverting income from its wholly-owned U.S. subsidiary, Marc Rich &
Company International, Ltd. (hereinafter International) to the parent
firm.1 A grand jury subpoena duces tecum was served on the U.S. subsidi-
ary, International, on March 9, 1982.2 International complied with the
subpoena and began to produce the business records requested. 3
On April 15, 1982, a subpoena duces tecum was served upon the
counsel of International for the production of documents held by AG.4
Counsel for International accepted the service on behalf of International
but did not purport to accept service for AG. 5 AG's board of directors
determined that compliance with the subpoena would violate Swiss law
and resolved not to comply and instead sought to establish the ineffec-
tiveness of the subpoena.'
I. THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION
On June 4, 1982, AG filed a motion to quash the subpoena, for lack
of in personam jurisdiction, in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York.7 On August 25, 1982, the motion to quash
was denied.' In denying AG's motion, United States District Judge Leo-
nard Sands determined that the court had jurisdiction to enforce the sub-
poena despite claims by AG to the contrary. AG contended that its busi-
ness was deliberately structured so as to avoid any contact with the
United States and that it was therefore not subject to the court's jurisdic-
tion.9 The government, however, asserted that AG's wholly owned subsid-
iary, International, provided a sufficient basis for an assertion of
jurisdiction."1
1. See Wall St. J., Aug. 22, 1983, at 17, col. 3.
2. Brief for the United States of America at 2, In the Matter of a Grand Jury Subpoena
Directed to Marc Rich & Co., A.G., No. 82-6226 (2d Cir. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Brief].
3. Id.
4. In the Matter of a Grand Jury Subpoena Directed to Marc Rich & Co., A.G., No. M-
11-188 at 2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 1982) [hereinafter cited as District Court Opinion].
5. Id.
6. Id. at 2-3.
7. Brief, supra note 2, at 3.
8. District Court Opinion, supra note 4, at 19.




In determining that there was in fact a proper assertion of jurisdic-
tion, the court first considered the problem via a "burden of proof" analy-
sis." Noting the difference between a grand jury proceeding and a civil
case, the court found that "the appropriate allocation of the burden of
proof is as follows: once the moving party raises the issue of jurisdiction,
the Government must show that it has a good faith basis for asserting
jurisdiction; thereafter, the burden of proof shifts to the party challenging
jurisdiction. 1 2 Then, applying New York law, the court determined that
"if the subject matter of the investigation is related to the contact with
the jurisdiction, the grand jury's exercise of its subpoena power should
not be invalidated by the court.""
In deciding that the subject matter of the investigation was related
to the contact with the jurisdiction, the court considered an ex-parte affi-
davit submitted by the government." In answer to AG's protest concern-
ing the unfairness of an ex-parte affidavit, the court noted the govern-
ment's allegation that disclosing the name of the informant would
jeopardize the investigation, and stated:
The Court is thus placed in the position of having to balance the
Government's need to maintain in secret the identity of the informant
and the movant's need to know the asserted grounds for jurisdiction
in order to refute them. AG's need for the information is heightened
since the Court has imposed the burden of proof on it. Under the cir-
cumstances presented in this case, we will consider the ex-parte affi-
davit, because the Government has generally revealed its contents and
demontrated the significance of the secret information, and because
the need for secrecy appears to be genuinely invoked. In order to miti-
gate the possible unfairness to the AG, we will only hold AG to a bur-
den of proof which addresses the general disclosure made to AG."5
Finding that AG had not met its burden of proof, 6 the court went on
to consider whether or not a Swiss statute barring disclosure of a "'busi-
11. Id. at 8.
12. Id. at 10. The circumstances which the court referred to included the fact that or-
dering discovery to permit the government to substantiate its assertion would necessarily
force production of the documents in question. The court also noted that it would be partic-
ularly important for the Government to reach the documents if it was to bear the burden of
proof.
13. Id. at 16. It is interesting to note that both the Brief for the United States and the
Opinion of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals criticized the application of New York law
by Judge Sands. See Brief at 9 and In Re the Matter of a Grand Jury Subpoena Directed to
Marc Rich & Co., A.G., No. 82-6226 at 7 (2d Cir. May 4, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Second
Circuit Opinion].
14. District Court Opinion, supra note 4, at 7. The ex-parte affidavit revealed that In-
ternational structured its resales to direct $20,000,000 in domestic income overseas to the
parent company, so as to avoid U.S. taxation.
15. Id. at 13.
16. Id. at 17. In so finding, the court noted that AG had failed to explain the massive
losses incurred by International.
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ness secret' to a foreign government"' 7 would require the subpoena to be
quashed." Noting that AG had shown by affidavit that the delivery of the
requested documents would violate Swiss law,19 the court balanced the
interests of the United States and Switzerland 20 and decided:
[T]he interest of the United States in investigating violations of its
tax laws outweighs the Swiss interest in avoiding possible disclosure of
business secrets in this case. The Government has made a substantial
showing indicating that AG used its United States subsidiary to con-
vey income to it overseas in circumvention of United States tax laws.
To permit AG to shield this conduct from the scrutiny of the grand
jury would be a "travesty of justice.""'
Subsequent to this decision, AG continued to refuse to produce the
business records and on September 13, 1982, a judgment of civil contempt
was entered against AG in the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of New York.2
2
II. THE SECOND CIRCUIT OPINION
Marc Rich & Company, A.G. appealed the contempt order in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The court noted:
It would be strange, indeed, if the United States could punish a for-
eign corporation for violating its criminal laws upon a theory that the
corporation was constructively present in the country at the time the
violation occurred [citation omitted], but a federal grand jury could
not investigate to ascertain the probability that the crime had taken
place.22
The court then stated that the issue involved was whether or not the Dis-
trict Court had such personal jurisdiction over AG that it could enforce
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 20 n.2. The Schweizerischer Strafgesetzbuch, Code p~nal suisse, Codice
penale svizzero, art. 273, provides in part:
a person who discloses a manufacturing or business secret to a foreign govern-
mental authority or to a foreign organization or to a foreign private enterprize
or their agents, shall be punished with prison, in severe cases with jail. The
imprisonment may be combined with a fine.
20. in balancing +he interets of each country the court cosidered:
(a) vital interests of each of the states,
(b) the extent and nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement
actions would impose upon the person,
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the terri-
tory of the other state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasona-
bly be expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state.
Id. at 18, citing United States v. First National City Bank, 366 F.2d 897, 902 (2d Cir. 1968).
21. District Court Opinion, supra note 4, at 18.
22. Brief, supra note 2, at 1.
23. Second Circuit Opinion, supra note 13, at 5.
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obedience to the grand jury subpoena."
Referring to McGee v. International Life Insurance Company,26 the
court stated that it subscribed to the notion that "where a person has
sufficiently caused adverse consequences within a state, he may be sub-
jected to its judicial jurisdiction so long as he is given adequate notice
and an opportunity to be heard."2 "
Commenting that if, in fact, there was a conspiracy between AG and
International to evade the tax laws, both a conspiracy and at least part of
the conspiratorial acts would have occurred within the United States. The
court went on to state that service upon AG's officers within the territo-
rial boundaries of the United States was sufficient to warrant judicial en-
forcement of the subpoena."
The Second Circuit concluded its opinion by affirming the decision of
the lower court and stating that "in a case such as this, if the Government
shows that there is a reasonable probability that ultimately it will succeed
in establishing the facts necessary for the exercise of jurisdiction, compli-
ance with the grand jury's subpoena may be directed. '2 8
III. CONCLUSION
In light of the above decisions on the Marc Rich case, it is clear that
case law is beginning to strengthen the idea that a federal grand jury
should have access to overseas documents.29 Just how far these decisions
will reach, however, and to what extent they will prove effective against
foreign companies seeking to evade U.S. tax laws remains to be seen. For
example, despite the decisions of the federal district and circuit courts,
the United States has yet to receive the requested documents from Marc
Rich & Company, A.G. As of June 29, 1983, fines of $50,000 per day were
being assessed against AG for its refusal to comply with the subpoena
served upon it by U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York. 0 After finally agreeing to comply with the subpoena, AG attempted
to ship documents to Switzerland, maintaining that they had to be shown
to a Swiss lawyer." Although the documents which the company at-
tempted to ship were seized by federal agents at Kennedy International
24. Id. at 7.
25. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
26. Second Circuit Opinion, supra note 13, at 7.
27. Id. at 9.
28. Id. at 14.
29. See the statement of U.S. attorney John Smietanka, quoted in Wall St. J., Aug. 22,
1983, at 17, col. 3.
30. Denver Post, Sept. 20, 1983, at Fl, col. 2. It is also interesting to note that a 51-
count indictment was handed down Sept. 19, 1983, by the grand jury charging that Marc
Rich evaded $48 million in taxes and "traded with the enemy" by purchasing $200 million
worth of oil from Iran during the Iranian hostage crisis. Id. at F1, col. 1-2.
31. Id. at F1, col. 3. U.S. Attorney R. Guillano has said that the Government is cur-
rently seeking to confiscate the stock in AG held by an affiliate and plans to attempt to
extradite defendants who have fled the country.
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Airport, some of the other subpoenaed documents were impounded in
Switzerland by Swiss police. International negotiations have been entered
into concerning the dispute.32
The Marc Rich decisions of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit should serve greatly to improve the ability of U.S. officials
to enforce United States tax laws against foreign corporations maintain-
ing subsidiaries in the U.S. As long as a foreign company operates a whol-
ly-owned subsidiary in the U.S., in personam jurisdiction can be exercised
by U.S. courts to obtain essential financial records of any foreign com-
pany suspected of evading U.S. tax laws. While this legal tool will pro-
mote the effective enforcement of U.S. tax laws overseas, it may also jeop-
ardize significantly the future of international business transactions. Only
time will tell whether foreign companies will be prompted to decrease or





The War-Making Powers of the President
Reviewed by William M. Beaney*
THOMAS, A.V.W. AND THOMAS, A.J. JR., THE WAR-MAKING POWERS OF THE
PRESIDENT, SMU Press, Dallas (1982); $15.00; ISBN 0-87074-185-3, xii, 177 pp.;
endnotes, index, forward by Charles 0. Gavin.
This carefully written, scholarly study brings the debate over the re-
spective war-making powers of the President and Congress to the posture
it had assumed by November 1982. Such has been the rapid flow of
events that recently, in November 1983, important new chapters have
been added to the tale ably recounted by Thomas and Thomas, co-au-
thors of nine books dealing with important international issues and devel-
opments. As Charles 0. Galvin concludes in the Foreward to this book:
[T]hey [the Thomases] have provided a historical, a critical, and an
analytical treatise which is a major contribution in the field. Although
they conclude that the power of the President to commit forces
abroad remains a dark continent of American jurisprudence, their
splendid work has illumined the subject to the benefit of all who
search the area.'
The heart of the difficulty arises from our separated and shared
power system which inevitably gives rise to many questions concerning
the respective powers of Congress and the President. One of the most
serious questions which arises is where the boundaries of their respective
roles in war-making lie. Article II of the Constitution spells out a poten-
tially powerful role in foreign affairs and national security in its terse list
of grants of presidential powers: "The executive power" encompasses du-
ties including commander-in-chief, making treaties, receiving ambassa-
dors and taking "care that the laws be faithfully executed." In the histori-
cal chapters (1-5) the authors reveal the accordian-like expansion and
continuation of war-making powers, dependent upon the philosophy of
the presidential office-holder and the particular issue involved. Franklin
D. Roosevelt, a strong President by any standard, abandoned use of force
* William M. Beaney is Acting Dean and Professor of Constitutional Law at the Uni-
versity of Denver College of Law and a member of the Board of Advisors of the Denver
Journal of International Law & Policy.
1. A.V.W. THOMAS AND A.J. THOMAS, JR., THE WAR-MAKING POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT
viii (1982).
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in Latin America, but did not hesitate to commit acts against Germany
long before the outbreak of World War II, belying United States neutral-
ity. His Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, told the Senate Committees on
Foreign Relations and the Armed Services that the Congress, in the exer-
cise of its power under the Constitution, lacked power to interfere with
the President's powers in the implementation of foreign policy and
treaties.'
The Constitution gives to Congress the power "to declare war." 3 The
same law allows Congress to "grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal," and
clause 14 authorizes "Rules for the Government and Regulation of the
land and naval forces."4 In addition, Congress can point to the power of
the purse and the "necessary and proper" clause as justification for a role
in war-making short of a declaration of war. 5
The basic dilemma facing the United States since the end of World
War II, when it assumed the role of leader of the free world, is that the
perceived enemy-the Soviet Union-has long-term goals which it seeks
to achieve by overturning unstable regimes through revolutionary means
and by confrontations with the United States in situations where it be-
lieves the United States will not respond. The Berlin airlift and the Cu-
ban Missile crisis and ensuing naval blockade represent Soviet miscalcu-
lations. Vietnam, on the other hand, was a Soviet triumph, because at
little cost (personnel and materiel) its surrogates inflicted a shattering
blow to the prestige and morale of the United States.
It is increasingly obvious that the "cold war" policies do not involve
declarations of war. Congress sat by during the Vietnam conflict, quite
content to follow presidential leadership (repeated appropriations; Ton-
kin Gulf Resolution) as the stakes and costs grew ever greater. As success
evaded South Vietnam and the United States, a "let's bring the boys
home" attitude developed in the American public. Nightly TV exposure
of the human and material costs of an undeclared war that refused to
yield victory turned public opinion, and eventually Congress, against
President Johnson's protestation that the United States effort would
eventually prevail. His successor, President Nixon, compounded his prob-
lem in Vietnam by covert actions which amounted to waging an un-
declared executive war.
Extending military assistance to a nation that seeks it violates no
principle of international law nor any provision of the United States Con-
stitution. This is true whether a treaty or simple executive agreement is
the chosen instrument for justifying the placement or employment of
armed forces.' More controversial are those agreements made in times of
2. Id. at 21.
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 11.
4. Id. cl. 14.
5. Id. c. 18.
6. THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 1, at 85.
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rebellion or turmoil when the United States intervenes to maintain peace
and stable government, such as in El Salvador. Of doubtful validity is
intervention, not at the request of the "assisted government" but of their
neighbors who claim to act under a treaty with the invaded nation, as in
Grenada this last fall. Of course, there are other acceptable principles of
international law available to justify such actions, as the supporters of the
Grenada "rescue" mission have made clear. The United States Constitu-
tion gives its citizens travelling abroad the right to protection and inter-
national law recognizes the legitimate exercise of sovereign power for that
purpose. Given the way the superpowers, and lesser powers, tend to tailor
the facts of any given situation to conform with international law norms,
there is nothing but the momentary displeasure of the world community
to deter or punish a major nation bent on protecting a self-proclaimed
national interest. Therefore, the heart of the controversy in the United
States arises from the endless struggle for supremacy between Congress
and the President with respect to war-making without a declaration.
Recognizing that the precedents and realities supported presidential
preeminence, Congress in 1973 adopted, over a presidential veto, the War
Powers Resolution 7 the most serious effort to this date by Congress to
limit presidential war-making powers. Claiming that the Act fulfilled "the
intention of the framers of the Constitution," the Act required consulta-
tion with Congress, reports to Congress and an opportunity for Congress
to ensure termination of hostilities and removal of United States forces
whenever the President proposes to introduce, or has introduced, United
States Armed Forces into hostile situations. Except for emergencies, the
import of the Act is that the President should consult with, and receive
congressional approval for, potential or actual war-making exercises. The
Act is filled with ambiguities and unanswered questions.
As the authors point out:
Section 2(c) of the resolution seems to restrict presidential power by
asserting that the constitutional powers of the President as Com-
mander-in-Chief to deploy forces abroad is limited to three types of
situations: (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authoriza-
tion, or (3) a national emergency created by 'attack upon the United
States, its territories, or possessions, or its armed forces.' "
None of these conditions was present in the Cuban missile crisis in which
President Kennedy acted to forestall the introduction of missiles with a
nuclear capacity in Cuba. Nor does this section take into account the
other foreign policy bases for presidential action: treaty power, executive
power, and, as Justice Sutherland proclaimed in U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright,
209 U.S. 304 (1936), the President's role as the nation's exclusive agent in
foreign affairs plus certain attributes derived from national sovereignty.
Understandably, President Nixon, who attempted to veto the 1973
7. 50 U.S.C §§ 1541-1548 (1973 & Supp. 1983).
8. THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 1, at 133.
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Joint Resolution, and subsequent Presidents have been unenthusiastic
with this effort of Congress to gain a more explicit share of the un-
declared war-making power. As early as 1975, President Ford showed lit-
tle concern for the Resolution's provisions in evacuating Americans and
Vietnamese from South Vietnam and in rescuing the merchant ship May-
aguez and her crew, though he did in the latter case notify Congress after
the action was completed.
The Carter Administration's softer international line presented fewer
occasions for controversy but the Reagan Administration's hawkish poli-
cies produced episodes in late 1983 that brought into sharp focus the at-
tempt by Congress to share in the war-making process. The suicide
bombing of the Marine quarters in Beirut, Lebanon in October led to an
agreement by the President to accept an eighteen-month limit on the
presence of the peacekeeping force, though the President skirted the di-
rect application of the War Powers Resolution. United States interven-
tion in Grenada later in October, assertedly to rescue American students
and to forestall the creation of a firmer Cuban presence, again raised
questions about the applicability of the War Powers Resolution. Presi-
dent Reagan, without formally complying with the Resolution, informed
Congress by a letter only after the military operation was well-advanced,
and subsequently announced through a spokesman that virtually all
forces would be withdrawn within 60 days. The popular success of the
American Grenada operation has blunted criticism based on international
law and the Constitution. After failures in Lebanon, Iran, and South Vi-
etnam, the frustrating program to prop up El Salvador, the lack of suc-
cess in supporting the overthrow of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua,
and even world-wide rejection by our friends and others of the invasion as
a violation of international law has proved no deterrent. The Congres-
sional critics have been silenced-the foreign critics ignored.
What the authors have demonstrated is that while legal norms in the
body of international law have a role to play, it is hardly a substantial
impediment when the superpowers pursue their national interests. In do-
mestic law, the situation remains unclear. The attempt by Congress to fill
in the constitutional lacunae has not yet had a fair trial, but it has not yet
cowed Presidents into abandoning their great role in national security
and foreign policy, of which the use of military forces is an obvious part.
A final issue, with which the authors deal inconclusively: Is judicial
resolution possible? The lesson drawn from attempts to challenge the Vi-
etnam undeclared war is that courts, or at least most judges, are reluctant
to find intelligible constitutional standards to guide the judiciary. The na-
ture of the issue(s) involved suggests the wisdom of abstaining, which
leaves to the elected Congress and President the obligation to hammer
out reasonable compromises through the give and take of political life.
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FRAGOMAN, JR., A. T., DEL REY, JR., A. J. AND BERNSEN, S., IMMIGRATION
LAW AND BUSINESS, Volume I; Clark Boardman Company, Ltd., 435 Hud-
son St., New York, NY 10014 (1983); $75.00 (looseleaf); ISBN 0-87632-
344-1 (set), LC 83-11315; xvi, 566 p. Volume I of a two volume set. This
book is part of the Clark Boardman Immigration Law Library.
This is the first volume of a set designed as a tool for both the exper-
ienced immigration lawyer and the attorney who only occasionally han-
dles an immigration case. The set provides reference to statutory law,
case law, administrative decisions, internal operational guidelines, proce-
dure and practical considerations. While giving careful analysis to most of
the issues which might require research in a complex immigration case,
this book also emphasizes the practical side: which forms to use, where to
file papers, and procedures at different Immigration and Naturalization
Service offices. The introduction indicates an intention to provide model
forms to illustrate the textual discussion, but these forms are neither in-
cluded in this volume nor mentioned in the table of contents for the an-
ticipated second volume to be issued in late 1983.
Volume I begins with an analysis of the major statutory develop-
ments in immigration law. After discussing the statutory history and his-
tory of immigration law, the authors move to a discussion of the non-
immigrant categories and procedures for transitory entry into the United
States. They examine the application procedures and qualifications neces-
sary to obtain temporary visitor, student and exchange visitor, business
and investor (including H-visas for temporary workers), and other non-
immigrant category visas.
Permanent resident status is the usual goal of aliens seeking to re-
main in the United States indefinitely. Again, the complete process for
application is described as are the various preference and non-preference
categories which go toward determining admissibility. Not only does the
text cover the several routes for obtaining permanent resident status, but
it also emphasizes the basic methodology of the Immigration Selection
System (quotas by country of original nationality). Special immigrant
preferences, non-preference investors, job offer preferences, and familial
preferences are among the classes given specific attention.
The authors devote an entire chapter to the difficult subject of the
labor certification, which is necessary for a job offer preference. The chap-
ter outlines the complex procedures which must be followed to obtain De-
partment of Labor approval for a job offer made to a foreign national and
analyzes some of the most difficult substantive questions, such as the
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meaning of "unduly restrictive" job requirements and the proper method
for determining a "prevailing wage".
This volume concludes with an investigation of the naturalization
and citizenship requirements. Topics included are the statutory qualifica-
tions, Constitutional aspects, ineligible classes and naturalization proce-
dures. Citizenship at birth, whether by birth taking place within or with-
out the United States, and dual citizenship are also encompassed. A
treatment of the loss of citizenship through denaturalization or expatria-
tion ends this first volume.
Volume II will include chapters on exclusion and deportation, refu-
gees and asylum, the rights of aliens and the tax aspects of immigration.
The authors are editors for the Clark Boardman Company.
MCKEAN, W., EQUALITY AND DISCRIMINATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW;
Oxford University Press, Oxford England (1983); available in the United
States from Oxford University Press, New York, NY; $69.00 (cloth);
ISBN 0-19-285311-7; 320 p.; List of Abbreviations, Index of Cases, Annex
I-III, Index.
This book studies equality and discrimination in the international
arena. The book contains an introduction and sixteen chapters. The in-
troduction discusses different philosophies which underly equality, ine-
quality and discrimination. It also describes the history of the interna-
tional treatment of equality prior to World War I.
Chapters I and II cover the post-World War I period and the League
of Nations. They discuss the policies toward religious and racial equality
and describe the protection of minorities during this period. Chapter III
deals with post-World War II peace treaties. Chapters IV and V examine
the development of equality under the United Nations Charter, the sub-
commission on prevention of discrimination and protection of minorities.
These chapters also discuss the definitions of minority protection and dis-
crimination prevention.
Chapters VI through X thoroughly cover the international study of
discrimination. The conventions and declarations are examined in depth,
with Chapter X focusing on equality of the sexes internationally.
Chapters XII through XIV discuss regional treatment of human
rights. Chapter XII looks at the European Convention on Human Rights,
the European Commission and Court of Human Rights and their respec-
tive proposals. Chapter XIII covers equal protection in the United States
and India, while Chapter XIV covers the legal principles of non-discrimi-
nation through its standards, norms, and the jus cogens principle of indi-
vidual equality. Finally, Chapter XVI describes the conclusions drawn by




BERENBEIM, R., MANAGING THE INTERNATIONAL COMPANY: BUILDING A
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE; The Conference Board, Inc.; 845 Third Ave., New
York, NY 10022 (1982); ISBN 0-8237-0251-0; vii; 32 p.; Tables: Exhibits,
Charts, Conference Board Report No. 814.
If there is one prospect for the 1980s on which top executives of
many large United States and European companies agree, it is the antici-
pation of major growth for their organizations outside their own coun-
tries. Trying to develop effective global business strategy in a world in-
creasingly conscious of national sovereignty underscores the question of
what is involved in operating an international company beyond merely
doing business in a foreign country.
This study seeks to define an "international" company in terms of
criteria recognized by companies with long and substantial experience in
foreign operations. Managerial resources and practices that companies
have evolved are described, and questions such as "What defines an inter-
national company?" and "How do you achieve an international perspec-
tive?" are asked of many companies substantially involved in interna-
tional business, and the composite answers are analyzed in terms of their
implications for successful international performance.
The sample was drawn from a list of 300 U.S.-based corporations
with significant operations overseas. This list includes representative
manufacturers, banks, and construction, commercial and service compa-
nies. In addition, similar information was sought from 300 European com-
panies with comparable international activity. Survey data are supple-
mented by interviews with top executives from all over the world, with
special emphasis on the U.S., Europe, and Latin America.
Ronald E. Berenbeim is a Senior Research Associate at the Confer-
ence Board, an independent, not-for-profit research institution which
studies management and economics.
PARK, C. (ed.) THE LAW OF THE SEA IN THE 1980's; The Law of the Sea
Institute, University of Hawaii (1983); ISBN: 0-911189-05-X, LC:
JX4408.L373; XX, 636 p. bibliographical references; proceedings of the
fourteenth annual Law of the Sea Institute Conference, October 20-23,
1980, Kiel, Germany, with list of participants.
In the 1970s, the law of the sea was subjected to a basic review un-
dertaken by the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.
Deliberations at the Conference were not only exhaustive but also ex-
hausting, and by the end of a decade of meetings, it had become certain
that a comprehensive ocean constitution would be adopted for the first
time in history.
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At its third annual meeting in Kiel, in October 1980, (after the Hague
in 1978 and Mexico City in 1979), the Fourteenth Annual Conference of
the Law of the Sea Institute tried to present a preview of what the new
direction of the law of the sea would be in the 1980s. The presentations
and discussions are embodied in these proceedings and are divided into
eight major parts: the stage-setting sessions-"Where trends the Law of
the Sea?"; "Old Law and New Law: How are They to be Squared?"; "The
International Seabed: Prospects for Mining in the 1980s"; "How Will the
New Law of the Sea Affect International Organizations?", "Cooperation
in the Baltic Sea"; and "The Baltic Straits."
Professor Choon-ho Park of the East-West Center, Honolulu, who
edited this volume, is a member of the executive board of the Law of the
Sea Institute.
QUINN, J. AND SLAYTON, P., NON-TARIFF BARRIERS AFTER THE TOKYO
ROUND; The Institute of Research and Public Policy, Montreal, Quebec
(1982); available in U.S. in paper from Rothman for $17.95; ISBN 0-
920380-61-1, XXXIV, 272 p., footnotes, notes on contributors, glossary,
and members of the Institute listed along with available publications.
The forward and introduction are written in English as well as French.
The text is written in English only. This volume is a product of the Inter-
national Economics Program of the Institute and will be followed by
other studies in the area over the next two or three years.
The Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations was initiated
formally on September 14, 1973, when ministers from nearly one hundred
nations met in Tokyo and approved a declaration calling for renewed ef-
forts to remove obstacles to international trade. The Tokyo Round, over
its eight-year staging, produced many agreements on tariff and non-tariff
measures. The central achievement is considered to be in the area of non-
tariff barriers.
These non-tariff agreements are intended to expand the international
trading community's control over the policies and programs of national
governments that affect international economic relations. The general aim
of the essays which make up this volume is to examine the structure of
the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT) system for regula-
tion of non-tariff measures, the political and economic goals that underlie
the provisions of the new codes, and their prospects for fostering a more
liberal economic order.
This volume is a result of a conference held at the University of
Western Ontario. It attempts to place a particular Canadian perspective
on this important international trade issue. It explores the general eco-
nomic and political rationale for protectionism in Canada and the United
States and each of the codes governing the use of specific non-tariff barri-
ers in turn. While no position is advocated, the essays illuminate the chal-
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lenge faced by Canada in this decade in managing its own non-tariff bar-
riers and in dealing with those of its major trading partners, particularly
the United States.
Both editors, John Quinn and Philip Slayton, teach at the University
of Western Ontario. The former teaches law and economics and the latter
teaches international trade law. Quinn has written several articles on in-
ternational and domestic trade regulation. Slayton is the author of several
articles and monographs on legal aspects of Canadian commercial policy.
t
GARCfA-AMADOR, F.V., THE ANDEAN LEGAL ORDER: A NEW COMMUNITY
LAW; Oceana Publications, Inc., Dobbs Ferry, New York, (1978); $32.50
cloth; ISBN 0-379-20285-9; translated from the original Spanish version,
published by The Inter-American Institute of International Legal Affairs;
viii, 423 p.; footnotes and appendices.
This book is an examination of The Andean Legal Order, as it
changed and developed under the Cartagena Agreement signed in Bogota,
Columbia on May 26, 1969. It also examines the relations to the commu-
nity legal order and institutions existing in related Latin American
countries.
Chapter 1 traces the acts and decisions leading up to the Andean
Subregional Integration Agreement, describing the objectives and mecha-
nisms of the Agreement. The chapter also explains the results of the
Agreement on the Andean community. Policies and planning for eco-
nomic development, industrial planning, tariffs, agriculture and livestock
policies, competitive commercial practices, savings clauses, and financial
decisions contained in the Agreement are described. Special attention is
paid to the subregional integration process resulting from the Agreement
and other developments within the institutions and laws on the Andean
subregion.
Chapter 2 studies the relationship of the Agreement with the pre-
existing legal order of LAFTA (Latin American Free Trade Association).
The chapter examines the compatibility of the two orders through the
problems with imcompatible clauses, analogy to similar agreements, con-
ditions for amending the Agreement and the requirements relative to ac-
cession. The Chapter describes the transitory nature of the Agreement,
execution of new, related agreements, the hierarchical relationship be-
tween the legal orders, and other characteristics of the Cartagena Agree-
ment in relation to LAFTA.
Chapter 3 examines the institutional framework created by the
Agreement. This framework is composed of a Board and Commission.
This chapter also described the Auxiliary, Financial, and Judicial organs'
structures and functions, as created by the Agreement. Institutional rela-
tions outside the community resulting from the Agreement are examined.
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Chapter 4 analyzes the system adopted by the Agreement for attrib-
uting normative, executive and implied competences to subregional or-
gans of the order.
Chapters 5 and 6 explore the validity of the subregional acts.
Through an examination of the form and effects of the acts, their recep-
tion in domestic law, the initiative of the Board to overcome problems
associated with the reception and the hierarchy of legal order, the concept
of "community law" as developed through the act is developed.
The appendices contain a copy of the Cartagena Agreement as signed
in Bogota, Columbia, May 26, 1969, plus the texts of negotiations, addi-
tions, supplementary regulations, standards and directives arising from
the Agreement. The Author is a professor of law at the University of
Miami College of Law.
GREENE, A. (ed.), TRADEMARKS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD (3d ed.); Clark
Boardman Co., Ltd., New York, NY. ISBN 0-87-632-126-0, LCK
15554.T7; xx, 1181 p.; Expokerebort & Nachs Digest, and appendices,
kept current annually.
TRADEMARKS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD is a quick reference, answer-
ing most questions on other countries' trademark laws. It is also an excel-
lent place to begin serious, comprehensive research. TRADEMARKS is a
loose-leaf digest edited and updated three times annually by Trade Activ-
ities, a division of Clark Boardman Company, Ltd. in New York. The
book compiles and categorizes the trademark laws of over 265 countries.
The applicable law(s) and citation(s) are listed under the name of the
country. Then, for each country, the laws and regulations are broken
down into subheadings listing and explaining, for example, conventions,
who may apply, procedures, time limits, licenses, opposition and assign-
ment. The appendices tabulate more information for easy reference. Ap-
pendix A provides both the International Classification of Goods and Ser-
vices and the Classification of Goods and Services of particular countries.
Appendix B reorders the material in the form of answers to 15 specific
questions. Finally, Appendix C explains the settings, purposes and topics
dealt "u-th by the major International Trademark conventions. The text
from these conventions is also provided.
Anne Marie Greene is an editor in the Trade Activities Division of
Clark Boardman.
t
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PAOPERTY ORGANIZATION, PCT APPLICANT'S GUIDE;
World Intellectual Property Organization, [No 432(E) International Bu-
reau WIPA CH-1211 Geneva 20, Switzerland (1978); ISBN 608 W893
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p(1978), Volume 1, 119 p., Volume 2 140 p.; indexes; looseleaf with
updates.
The looseleaf publication contains general information on the Patent
Cooperation Treaty (PCT) and is intended for those interested in filing
international patent applications. The information published is a con-
densed and interpreted form of the considerably longer official text of the
PCT and the regulations under the PCT. Consultation of those texts is
indispensible for receiving complete information. The publication is up-
dated periodically, with updates available from the World Intellectual
Property Organization.
The publication is divided into two looseleaf binders. The first binder
contains a guide, indexes, annexes, and administrative instructions. The
guide contains a basic explanation of the PCT. Included are an explana-
tion of the terms of the treaty, the basic operation of the treaty, and the
procedure for filing a PCT application. The paragraphs explaining the
terms are cross-referenced to the articles of the treaty. The guide is fol-
lowed by an index to the treaty. The index includes a catchword index for
commonly used technical terms. The annexes contain tables of informa-
tion concerning filing in each of the designated states and forms used by
the International Bureau. Finally, the first binder is concluded by the ad-
ministration instructions under the Patent Cooperation Treaty.
The second volume contains information on the procedures used by
the designated and elected offices. This volume is divided into 20 sec-
tions, one section for each of the designated offices. Each section contains
a guide as well as an annex. The guide contains a discussion of terms,
procedures and interpretations of the PCT used by the office. The guide
is cross-referenced to both the PCT and national patent laws. The annex
contains samples of various forms used by the designated office and a
discussion of such procedures as amendments, translation and fees.
The text stresses the technical nature of patent laws and administra-
tion and that the text is a basic guide and not meant to replace either the
PCT or the rules of the regional offices required for patent practice.
t
CARLSSON, J; SOUTH-SOUTH RELATIONS IN A CHANGING WORLD ORDER;
Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, P.O. Box 2126, S-750 02 UPP-
SALA, Sweden (1982); ISBN # 31-7106-20G-8; LC# K3823.Ap, S62,
1982; 166 pages; 19 tables; end notes after every article, bibliography after
most articles; 14th of the Seminar Proceedings from the Scandinavian In-
stitute of African Studies.
The five articles comprising this book were presented as papers at a
seminar in 1981 in Kungalv, Sweden. The articles examine relations be-
tween developing nations with a heavy emphasis on Brazil-Nigeria rela-
tions. The analysis is more macro-economic than political. It is based on
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page after page of empirical data. This book has independent value as a
source book. Unfortunately, some of this value is lost through numerous
errors in spelling and grammar.
This book's primary worth is found in its analysis. It offers another
useful, supportable view of the world from a trilateral perspective. The
view is unprejudiced by any ideological slant. The only drawback to the
analysis is the lack of any significant discussion of the world debt crisis.
For anyone who wants a lucid explanation of the world economy, this
is good reading. For anyone who wants to understand the world economy
in the next ten years, this is required reading.
Jerker Carlsson is a researcher at the Department of Economic His-
tory, University of Goteborg, Sweden.
t
GOLDBLAT, J., ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, A HANDBOOK; Praeger Pub-
lishers 521 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10175 (1983); ISBN 0-03-
063709-0; LC 83-2167; xiv, 328 pp.; maps, tables, glossary, index to the
Salt II Agreements, Bibliography. This is a revised and abridged version
of the book which was originally prepared at the Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) on the occasion of the 1982 U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly Special Session devoted to disarmament.
This edition is intended as a handbook for students, politicians, and
other concerned citizens interested in arms control and disarmament. The
book deals primarily with bilateral and multilateral arms control agree-
ments reached since World War II.
Chapter 1 is a brief historical survey of the pre-World War II efforts
towards disarmament. Chapter 2 covers the activities of the United Na-
tions in the field of arms regulations during the first years following
World War II. Special attention is devoted to problems relating to nu-
clear weapons, proposals for the reduction of armaments, and plans for
general and complete disarmament.
Chapter 3 reviews the scope of the obligations undertaken by the
parties to the post-war arms control agreements and attempts to assess
whether, and to what extent, each agreement has affected the arms race,
reduced the likelihood of war or otherwise contributed to the overall goal
of disarmament. The agreements have been divided into seven categories,
according to the nature and type of the undertakings.
Chapter 4 deals with the verification of compliance and discusses, in
particular, the shortcomings of the existing arrangements. Chapter 5 con-
tains the official texts of the relevant documents and Chapter 6 contains a
tabular presentation of the status of the implementation of the most im-
portant multilateral agreements.
Chapter 7 describes the existing arms control negotiating machinery,
while Chapter 8 summarizes the arms control experience gained up until
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the spring of 1982.
Josef Goldblat is a senior member of the Research Collegium of the
Stockholm International Peach Research Institute (SIPRI). He has been
studying the problems of arms control since the 1950s and has been in-
volved in disarmament negotiations in Geneva and New York in different
capacities, including service for the United Nations.
ZARTMAN, I. W. AND BERMAN, M. R., THE PRACTICAL NEGOTIATOR; Yale
University Press, New Haven, Conn. (1982) ISBN 0-300-02523-8; L.C.
jxrr7e.737 xiii, 250 p.; appendices; published with the assistance of the A.
Whitney Griswold Publication Fund; Special Forward by Alvin C. Eurich.
This is a book about the art of international negotiation. It is a text
for aspiring diplomats and others on how to negotiate most effectively. By
bringing together recent research by scholars and the practical experience
of practitioners, the authors have developed a three-stage process for pre-
paring and conducting negotiations.
Their approach rejects the notion that skillful negotiators must have
an innate "feel" for negotiations and instead assumes that much of the
process can be taught and learned. Their primary teaching tool is a model
which identifies the three stages in the process and associates different
types of problems and behaviors with each stage: (1) diagnosing the
situtation and deciding to try negotiations; (2) negotiating a formula or
common definition of the conflict in terms amenable to a solution; and (3)
negotiating the details to implement the formula on precise points of dis-
pute. Most of the book is spent developing the details of these stages,
exploring their implications, and providing insights into the appropriate
behaviors for each stage. The authors rely heavily on examples from post-
war negotiations to illustrate their points.
At the outset, the book recognizes that no model can fully and accu-
rately describe a process as complex and variable as negotia-
tion-especially in the international context where cultural and language
differences create additional complexities. The authors readily acknowl-
edge that their approach has important limitations; it cannot, for exam-
ple, tell anyone how to win. They have in fact concluded that, in theory,
it is impossible to tell anyone how to do best; one can only learn how to
do better.
Given this objective, the book tries to give the reader a basic theoret-
ical understanding of the process while at the same time sprinkling the
theory with enough practical tips from experienced negotiators to make
the book a worthwhile "how to" book as well. Although the authors began
their research by focusing on negotiating theory, their end point is a reali-
zation that fundamental character traits such as patience, self assurance,
and stamina are just as important as a well-thought-out negotiating
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strategy.
I. William Zartman is a professor of international politics at the
School for Advanced International Studies, the Johns Hopkins
University.
Maureen R. Berman is executive director of the International League
for Human Rights.
t
BUXBAUM, D. C., JOSEPH, C. & REYNOLDS, P. (eds.), CHINA TRADE: PROS-
PECTS AND PERSPECTIVES; Praeger Publishers, 521 Fifth Ave., New York,
NY, 10175 (1982); ISBN: 0-03-056687-8, LC: HF 3836.5.C46; XX, 424 p.;
footnotes, tables, index.
China's 1978 announcement of its ambitious modernization program,
the "Four Modernizations", met with immediate foreign euphoria as
Western businessmen envisioned development of "The Great Mall" along
the Great Wall. Such premature euphoria has acceded to reality: China's
economic plans call for a slower, balanced development with emphasis on
agriculture and light industry as well as the development of its energy
resources and resolving its massive infrastructure problems.
China Trade: Prospects and Perspectives offers resourceful reading
for the academic and practical information for the student of Chinese
trade and the entrepreneur attempting to enter China's market.
The book is divided into four parts, each containing several chapters
and each chapter containing numerous sub-chapters. In Part I, "Back-
ground for Trade: China's Economy, Politics and People", Chapters 1, 2,
and 3 are presented. These chapters cover the history and future of
China's trade, political trends in China and their implications for foreign
trade and an overview of diplomatic dealing with the Chinese.
Chapters 4 through 8 are presented in Part II of the book. The sec-
tion covers selected market sectors. Chapter 4 discusses the current status
and future prospects of agricultural and related imports. The geology,
reserves, technology and policies of China's petroleum industry are intro-
duced in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 presents the mineral and metal mining
industries of China. Chapter 7 covers China's machine tool industry. Fi-
nally, this section closes with a discussion of the role of China's transport
in industrial modernization in Chapter 8.
Case studies of China's international competition are the portions
presented in Part III with Chapters 9 through 14. Chapter 9 is a summary
of economic and legal data of Sino-German trade. Chapter 10 asks
whether there are lessons for American traders in a discussion of Sino-
Japanese trade. Chapter 11 presents a case study of Kaiser Engineering
Co. Chapters 12, 13 and 14 present case studies of Pullman Kellogg, Sum-
mit Indistures Limited and American International Companies.
Part IV presents the practical considerations of trading in China.
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These are discussed in Chapters 15 through 18. Chapter 15 covers enter-
ing the Chinese market. Chapter 16 addresses contracts with Chinese
merchants and Chapter 17 presents the China differential and the legal
framework of trade between the United States and the People's Republic
of China. Chapter 18 covers the available financing for trade with China.
David C. Buxbaum, a member of the New York and California bars,
practices law in those states and in his offices in Guangzhou, PRC. A for-
mer professor of law, he has contributed to many books and periodicals
on Chinese law. He also compiled the Chinese law digest in the Martin-
dale-Hubbel Law Directory.
Paul Reynolds is an Associate Professor of Law at Texas Tech Uni-
versity. In addition to articles on U.S. trade law, international banking
and doing business in Mexico and China, Reynolds has authored two
books, including his latest, China's International Banking and Financial
System.
DRZEMCZEWSKI, A., EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTION IN DOMESTIC
LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY; Clarendon Press, Walton Street, Oxford
OX26DP England (1983); available in the United States from Oxford
University Press, New York, NY; ISBN 0-19-825396-6, xiv, 372 pp.; foot-
notes, bibliography, appendix, index.
This volume not only presents an up-to-date survey of the implemen-
tation of the European Human Rights Convention in each of the twenty-
one member-states of the Council of Europe. It also synthesizes the
thirty-year history of the Convention in order to draw conclusions as to
its vitality.
Part I gives a thorough descriptive explanation of what Drzemczew-
ski calls "the most effective and advanced international system for the
protection of human rights in existence today"-the European Human
Rights Commission and its supervisory organs. The author underlines the
sui generis nature of the Convention as a "unique precedent in interna-
tional law".
Part II is a detailed, comparative study of the domestic status of the
Convention in each of the twenty-one member states. Clearly the perme-
ation of the Convention into domestic law varies a great deal among the
contracting states. Only seventeen of them have recognized the European
Human Rights Commission's competence to receive petitions from indi-
viduals complaining of violations of a right guaranteed by the Convention
of their governments. Moreover, the European Human Rights Court's de-
cisions do not necessarily have the force of law in the legal systems of
contracting states.
Part III focuses on three specific topics which may illustrate, at least
in some of the countries, the Convention's expanding penetration into the
1983
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
domestic courts of member states: 1) the use by domestic courts of the
Convention as a kind of European standard not only for govern-mental
action but also for relations between individuals; 2) the possible adoption
by domestic courts of the ten member states of the European Community
of at least some of the Convention's provisions as forming part of the
"corpus" of European Community law; and 3) the Convention's influence
in court decisions in those states in which the Convention has the status
of domestic law, as compared with its impact in states where it is not
domestic law. One interesting conclusion is that "[t]he role played by the
European Court of Human Rights cannot, unfortunately, be equated with
that of the Luxembourg Court[,] whose directly enforceable decisions on
certain questions of European Community law prevail over all conflicting
domestic law."
Though clearly an advocate of extending the power of the European
Human Rights Court and the impact of the Convention, Drzemczewski
has no illusions as to their real influence, as he concludes:
In short, although it is most certainly valid to claim that the [Conven-
tion] mechanism departs from reliance upon the traditional concepts
in international law of "nationality" and "reciprocity" in order to pro-
tect individual rights, the facultative status of the right of individual
petition, as well as of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction, unduly re-
stricts and weakens the role played by the supervisory organs estab-
lished under the Convention, and relegates this mechanicism prima
facie to that of a subsidiary or supplementary means of redress availa-
ble to a limited number of individuals.
This book is an updated version of the thesis which Drzemczewski
submitted in 1980 for his Ph.D. degree at the University of London.
Andrew Z. Drzemczewski is currently Senior Lecturer in Law at the
Polytechnic of North London.
STACK, J. L. (ed.), ETHNIC IDENTITIES IN A TRANSNATIONAL WORLD; Green-
wood Press, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 (1981), ISBN # 0-
313-21088-8, LC # 80-1199; xv, 226 p.; Footnotes, bibliography tables,
figures, maps, index, List of contributors. Part of a specica series, "Contr1-
butions in Political Science, Number 52", Greenwood Press.
This book is a collection of six essays which expound on a central
theme: ethnicity is a significant force in world politics because it fre-
quently operates independently of the activities of formal nation-states.
The impact of this force of ethnicity thus is described as being
"transnational."
The first essay establishes a framework for the subsequent essays and
analyses ethnicity on three levels: intersocietal, state and global. This es-
say also briefly explores various themes which arise in the later pieces: the
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structural inequities between advanced industrial states and developing
countries, worldwide communication and transportation networks, and
the interplay of ethnic groups at various levels.
The second essay discusses the impact of the Greek lobby on Ameri-
can foreign policy showing how foreign policy decision-making has been a
primary object of ethnic-group politics. The essay also shows how states
can give ethnic groups more transnational power than they can achieve
themselves.
North African workers in France is the subject of the third essay,
which documents the political and economic tensions inherent in rela-
tions between France and its former colonies. The article specifically
highlights the economic dependence of Western Europeans on the immi-
grant poor from their former colonies. It shows the negative impact of
such importation during periods of economic stagnation or recession.
The fourth essay explores two themes: "transnational tactics" proved
useful to the Sardis in building political legitimacy and nationalistic aspi-
rations and transnational appeals by the Sardis have proven effective in
galvanizing political power Middle East politics.
Brazilian economic and technological dependence on the U.S. accel-
erating the black protest movement in Brazil is the subject of the fifth
essay. The essay demonstrates the transnational character of the black
ethnic experience. The thesis is asserted on the basis that the importation
of America's mass-produced culture through movies and music has raised
the racial and political awareness of Brazilian blacks, despite the fact that
the Brazilian culture inhibits black politicization.
The final essay illustrates how ethnicity intrudes into world politics
through world sporting events. The essay suggests that world sports
figures symbolically or explicitly may project local concerns into a domes-
tic, regional and/or global arena, thereby operating in transnational
communication.
The editor (and author of the first essay) is assistant professor of
political science and director of ethnic studies at Florida International
University. He is author of INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT IN AN AMERICAN
CITY; BOSTON'S IRISH, ITALIANS AND JEWS, 1935-1944 (Westport, Ct:
Greenwood Press, 1979). He is working on a study of transnationalism
within the framework of contemporary North-South relations.
t
KAVASS, I.I., SPRUDZS, ADOLPH, A GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES TREATIES
IN FORCE; William S. Hein Company, Buffalo, NY; $38.68 (paper); ISBN
0-89941-189-4; ISSN 0736-5713; x, 376 pp; explanatory introduction, key
to abbreviations, numerical list of bilateral and multilateral treaties and
agreements of the United States in force on January 1, 1982 divided into
the following subcategories: Treaty Series (1776-1945), Executive Agree-
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ment Series (1929-1945), Addenda-Unnumbered Treaties and Agree-
ments of the United States (Pre-1950 and 1950-1981); Subject Reference
Index; Part I of two parts.
The GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES TREATIES IN FORCE provides access
to currently operative bilateral and multilateral agreements of the United
States from a variety of perspectives. The GUIDE is arranged in two parts.
Part I consists of two sections: a Numerical List and a Subject Reference
Index. Part II will deal exclusively with multilateral treaties and agree-
ments currently in force. Its major features will be a chronological index
of the individual agreements and an index to treaties and agreements by
country, giving all treaties and agreements to which specific countries and
the United States are contracting parties. The GUIDE is expected to be
updated annually as new editions of TREATIES IN FORCE appear from the
Department of State.
The Numerical List of treaties and agreements in Part I is given in
straight numerical order, regardless of whether they are bilateral or mul-
tilateral. It is further divided into the different publication series (Treaty
Series, Executive Agreement Series, and Treaties and Other International
Acts Series) with addenda for the unnumbered treaties and agreements
appearing in TREATIES IN FORCE.
The Numerical List is not intended to replace TREATIES IN FORCE.
Rather it is a reference tool to be used in conjunction with the State De-
partment's publication, augmenting the information provided in TREATIES
IN FORCE in some cases and giving easier access to individual agreements.
The Subject Reference Index provides a simple listing of the subject
categories utilized by TREATIES IN FORCE with the individual multilateral
and bilateral agreements given under each heading.
Igor I. Kavass is a professor of law at Vanderbilt University Law
School and Adolf Sprudz is a professor of law at the University of Chi-
cago Law School.
RAIFFA, HOWARD, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATIONS (How TO RE-
SOLVE CONFLICTS AND GET THE BEST OUT OF BARGAINING); Harvard Univer-
sity Press, Cambridge, Mass. and London, England (1982); Hardcover
$18.50; ISBN 0-674-04812-01, LC BF 637.N4R34; x, 360 pp.; footnotes,
bibliography, and index.
This book is aimed at improving the negotiating skills of the seller of
a house, closer of a business deal, divorce lawyer, labor lawyer or treaty
negotiator. This is a sophisticated self-help book emphasizing problems
and situations where all parties involved can achieve beneficial results
through the skills the author aims to develop.
"This book is concerned with situations in which two or more parties
recognize that differences of interest and values exist among them and in
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which they want (or in which they are compelled to seek a compromise
agreement through negotiation." The author's aim is to explain some of
the scientiffic theories of others, as well as his own, in a context of art to
show how science and art can interact in a complementary fashion. Sci-
ence involves a systematic analysis of a problem, while art involves inter-
personal skills, including the abilities to convince and be convinced, and
the ability to use a number of bargaining tools and the wisdom to know
when and how to use them.
This is not a book addressed primarily to analysts and academics; it
neither introduces a new nor enhances an old theory of the negotiation
process. Rather, it is addressed to practitioners of negotiation-and they
are legion. It publicizes a need and an opportunity for them to think more
systematically and consciously, and in a more conceptually integrated
fashion, about the dynamics of negotiation. The principal theme of the
book is that analysis is an invaluable tool in the negotiation process.
Howard Raiffa, who is a professor at the Harvard Business School
and Kennedy School of Government, also plays a prominent role in the
Harvard Negotiation Workshop. He helped create the International Insti-
tute for Applied Systems Analysis, located outside Vienna, and was its
first director, which involved him in negotiations with scientists from six-
teen countries from East and West. Although his disciplinary roots lie in
mathematical analysis and game theory, he has a reputation for making
conceptual and logical intricacies simple and accessible, gained through
years of teaching business and public policy to students, managers, mili-
tary officers and executives.
FIRESTONE, C. H., INTERNATIONAL SATELLITE TELEVISION: RESOURCE MAN-
UAL FOR THE THIRD BIENNIAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW SYMPOSIUM; U.C.L.A.,
Department C, P.O. Box 24607, Los Angeles, CA 90024 (1983); $50.00 pa-
perback only; LC # KF 2840.A75 U2 1983; 377 pp; footnotes, bibliogra-
phy, glossary, tables, maps; part of a special series.
This collection of materials is designed to address some of the key
technological, political and legal issues surrounding the concept of inter-
national television, and is a useful analysis of those issues. It includes
articles, charts and documents placing the concept of global television in
historical and technological perspective, facts relating to world market
prospect, descriptions of the world's telecommunications regulatory
framework, and legal resources for resolving international disputes. There
is emphasis on domestic decisions of the United States and a few other
countries where it is particularly illustrative of a point in issue.
Introductory materials by Joseph Pelton place satellite television in a
broader global and historical perspective.
One section examines existing and future markets and some of the
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legal concepts and decisions affecting those markets, including a closer
look at the United States, United Kingdom and Canadian and Australian
systems. This includes excerpts from the recent American decisions on
orbital slot deployment and transponder sales.
Also included are transponder sales and service contracts and a dis-
cussion of satellite insurance.
The materials provide a framework for analyzing suggestions for rec-
onciling the interest of a nation to control its own airspace with the free
flow of information. They also focus on the great amount of international
attention placed on the issue of satellite broadcasting across international
borders.
The editors look at the prospects for direct international broadcast-
ing by examining the interim policy of the United States for regulation of
the Direct Broadcast Services service. A variety of items are brought to-
gether relating to the unauthorized use of satellite video signals. Materi-
als applicable to both copyright infringement and other forms of unau-
thorized uses are included.
Charles M. Firestone is the Director of the UCLA Communications
Law Program and Adjunct Professor of Law at UCLA. He was assisted in
this project by Penelope Glass and Michael Morris, the 1979 Law Student
Coordinators.
PERKINS, JOHN A., THE PRUDENT PEACE; The University of Chicago Press,
Chicago, IL 60637 (1981); ISBN 0-226-65873-2; L.C. dx3160.P43P78 xvi
pp., p. 246; preface and introduction, footnotes, bibliography, appendices.
John Perkins argues that international law rests no less on practical
and political logic than on moral grounds and that therefore law must be
recognized as the only successful strategy ever devised for the resolution
of conflict. He sees the balance of power not as an alternative to interna-
tional law, but as a part of the structure of law; supportive of it and sup-
ported by it. Specific illustrations from history demonstrate the political
logic of international law. Applying this perspective to sensitive areas of
emerging law, the right of self-determination, the rule of non-interven-
tion, international rights in strategic areas and international rights of ac-
cess to resources, the prudence of a foreign policy vis-a-vis the rules of
law is tested. The basic issue is not whether international law is enforcea-
ble but whether a foreign policy not based on a commitment to law can
be effective in serving the national interest.
Part One examines how the conflict-solving strategy of law is already
interwoven in U.S. foreign policy and argues that an effective foreign pol-
icy for this country must be grounded in law. Part Two tests the idea that
emerging law may provide rules suitable for a realistic foreign policy and
evaluates the viability of the key principles of emerging law. Part Three
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considers what prudent initiative toward law might be taken by the
United States unilaterally if need be, and sets forth a proposal to provide
direction and momentum for the forces that can move the world toward
law. Part Four attempts to define the kind of choice the United States
must now face.
The Author is a partner in the Boston law firm of Palmer and Dodge.
Mr. Perkins was a graduate researcher at University College, Oxford in
1978.
t
MCWHINNEY, E., CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
WORLD ORDER IN A REVOLUTIONARY AGE; Holmes & Meier Publishers,
Inc., 30 Irving P1., New York, NY 10003 (1981); ISBN 0-8410-0694-7, 0-
8419-0696-3 (pbk), LC 341 M257 co; 16 pp.; includes Table of Cases and
Selected Bibliography. Updated expansion of an earlier book, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND WORLD REVOLUTION.
This book raises questions about the development of international
law in light of the rapid changes taking place throughout the world. After
identifying four major revolutions of our time, McWhinney explores the
ramifications of each revolution.
The first great revolution was the October Revolution of 1917, which
overthrew the Czarist regime in Russia. The second great revolution of
our time was an ideological one-the cold war conflict of the late 1940s
and 1950s culminating in the developing Russian-Chinese schism in 1959.
The third revolution is in economic science and its impact on developing
third world development. The most current revolution is in science and
technology, with special impact on the world community resulting from
large-scale nuclear weapons capability, the space age, and international
telecommunications.
The author looks at these revolutions in light of their relationship
with international problem-solving. The first method of problem-solving
is that of the United Nations. This is broken down into these themes: the
inclination of the superpowers to bypass the UN, the effect of the UN
and developing countries, the challenge of changing a big-power domi-
nated and regulated world community to a more genuinely pluralistic one
with a variety of groups involved in decision-making is addressed.
Other questions are asked: What will a more equitable, more inclu-
sive world economic and public order system look like? How will groups
resolve their differences, particularly the conflict resolution required be-
tween the Soviets and the United States? How will international law be
utilized to create a new international economic order, to internationalize
the oceans economic resources and support the principles of self-determi-
nation of peoples and non-intervention in the internal, domestic affairs of
a state? This book provides an historical framework for addressing these
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difficult questions in a difficult, rapidly changing time.
The author, Dr. Edward McWhinney, Q.C., is a Professor of Interna-
tional Law and Relations at Simon Fraser University in British Columbia.
He has been a consultant to the UN, the U.S. Naval War College and the
Japanese Cabinet Commission on the Constitution. His books, articles
and editorials have been widely published.
t
PETTMAN, R., BIOPOLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL VALUES; Pegman Press,
Inc., Maxwell House, Fairview Park, Elmsford, NY 10523 (1981), also
published in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, France, and The
Federal Republic of Germany; ISBN # 0-08-026329-1 (hard cover), ISBN
0-08-026328-3 (pbk); 187 p., including index, Author's Biography, and Ro-
man Numeralized Preface; footnoted at the end of each chapter.
Ralph Pettman describes his book as an objective approach to the
understanding of human behavior. This approach presumes that human
social behavior is, to some degree, genetically determined. In short, for
every society or culture there exists a gene pool which includes genes
marked with traits relating to human values, morals and behavior. Thus,
the objective approach would understand values to be genetic as opposed
to learned. The text of the book is primarily an application of that pre-
mise applied to specific socio-political issues. These issues include racial
and sexual discrimination, individual (American) versus collective (So-
viet) ethics, and the concept of liberty, exploring (and perhaps predict-
ing) the complexity of international values and policies. Pettman's analy-
sis includes comparisons of theories of human nature and their impact on
particular cultures' attitudes and behavior. He reviews current biological
research in genetic engineering and the consequences that might result
for society and politics. He also addresses questions of whether we are
innately selfish in social affairs, exploring the genetics of altruism and
whether the truth as we know it has a future. He reviews evidence of the
importance of adequate nutrition in the context of freedom from biologi-
cal deprivation and the effect of deprivation of capacity to make choices,
such as our freedom to construct cultures and change them at will.
Ralph Pettman is currently a visit.ing associate prnfeQQor in the De-
partment of Politics at Princeton University. He has in the past been a
Senior Research Fellow for the Institute of Advanced Studies at the Aus-
trailia National University, Canberra. His work includes: STATE AND
CLASS: A SOCIOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS; MORAL CLAIMS IN WORLD
AFFAIRS (an edited collection); and HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND WORLD POLIT-
ICS: A TRANSDISCIPLINARY INTRODUCTION.
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